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I.

PAUL'S DOCTRINE OF ELECTION IN ROMANS IX.—XI.

BY REV. W. RUPP, D. D.

These chapters contain a philosophy of history, rather than an account of the eternal destiny of individual souls. The question which confronted the apostle, and which his Jewish and Judaizing opponents continually forced upon him, was how he could explain the fact that the Jews, the people of the covenant, as a body rejected the Gospel, while the Gentiles were accepting it and coming into the fellowship of the Christian Church.* Did not this prove either that God had broken His covenant promises

* According to some commentators this is the central question and the leading theme of the Epistle to the Romans. There were three main points involved in the controversy between Paul and his opponents. The first was the significance of the Mosaic law in relation to the Gospel, the second the legitimacy of Paul's apostleship, the third the admission of the Gentiles into the Messianic kingdom. The first of these subjects is discussed in the Epistle to the Galatians, the second in those to the Corinthians, leaving the third to be discussed in that to the Romans. This subject, accordingly, was first in the mind of the apostle when he began the composition of this epistle, and the epistle was written mainly with a view to the discussion of it. But in the execution of his plan the apostle devoted the greater part of the epistle to the consideration of other themes, especially those connected with the great subject of justification by faith. Logically this is not an impossible view. Many a sermon is written, as every preacher knows, for the purpose of enforcing a thought to which not the largest amount of space is devoted.

to Israel or that Jesus was not the Messiah? Israel was the people of Jehovah. He was their Father; they were His children; although these expressions do not in the Old Testament denote the same tender relation as in the New. But to Israel pertained the promises of the Messiah and of the Messianic kingdom. This thought occurs everywhere in the Old Testament, and is acknowledged in 9: 4, 5 of our epistle. Now, in breaking down all distinctions between Jews and Gentiles, and admitting the latter on equal terms with the former to the blessings of the Messianic salvation, was there not a disregard of the ancient covenant? Has not Jehovah, on the supposition that Jesus is the Messiah, and that He receives Gentiles into the Messianic kingdom, while the Jews as a body remain without, proven unfaithful to His covenant promises? Has not God's word, in this case, been made void? This is the question to which the apostle furnishes an answer in these three chapters.

The answer in general runs as follows: God's purpose in the election of Israel has not changed, and He has not broken His covenant. There is, however, a discrimination in the election itself, according to which some are preferred to others; which discrimination applies to the Jewish people in their individual as well as in their collective relations. As the body of the Jewish people has been preferred to other peoples, so within the Jewish people some individuals have been preferred to others. And this law of election now is asserting itself in the manner in which individuals and nations come into the Messianic kingdom. According to this law a *remnant* are chosen as heirs of this kingdom, while the rest are passed over. This election, however, is only a temporary historical and economic arrangement, which looks to the largest beneficial results and to the salvation of the largest number in the end. This is in accordance with God's universal method of dealing with men, as is often illustrated in the history of Israel itself. The election is an election of some unto historical privileges and functions, which are to be enjoyed and exercised for the benefit of all. Hence the preterition of Israel at present and the preferment of the Gentiles does not in itself mean dam-

nation for any, but rather salvation for all men. In the infinite wisdom of God the partial hardening of Israel now is intended first to subserve the conversion of the Gentiles and ultimately the salvation of all Israel. The ultimate outlook of the Christian economy is not the eternal perpetuation of a hard and dreary dualism of election and reprobation, but the universal salvation of all mankind in diverse degrees and forms of glory.

The apostle begins his treatment of the subject by saying, 9 : 6, that the word of God concerning Israel's election has not failed, *ἐκέπτωκεν, fallen to the ground*. Though the majority of the Jewish people have not come into the enjoyment of the blessings of the Messianic kingdom, the election of Israel still stands. But all are not real Israelites who are natural descendants of Israel. God promised Abraham that his seed should be like the stars of heaven for multitude, and that it should be for a blessing to all nations. But among the seed of Abraham are counted only the descendants of Isaac, the child of promise; not those of Ishmael. And again of the posterity of Isaac only the descendants of Jacob are included in the promise, while those of Esau are excluded. These are well known historical facts which the Jews could read in their own sacred scriptures. God there shows Himself to be sovereign in preferring and rejecting, according to His own good pleasure and purpose, individuals and nations as the historical bearers of the idea and power of His kingdom. So that the prophet may be able to say in Jehovah's name, "Isaac I loved, but Esau I hated;" a sentence, however, which, according to Paul's apprehension, means no more than is affirmed in the statement made to the mother of Jacob and Esau that "the elder shall serve the younger" (Gen. 25 : 23), and consequently has nothing to do with the eternal destiny of these persons as individuals. It is doubtless true that in this election to historic privileges regard is had to the peculiar individuality of the persons chosen. But, then, this peculiarity itself depends not merely upon human action and will, but upon a divine agency exercised in the generation and development of individuals—upon the general arrangement and government of the world in which individ-

nals are born and educated; so that before the children were born, or had as yet done anything, either good or bad, it could be said of Esau and Jacob that "the elder should serve the younger."

If, then, this method of discrimination has been the manner of God's dealing with men in the historical development of His kingdom in the past, it is nothing new or strange that it should be so also now, and that within Israel itself a difference should be made between elect and non-elect, the former—the elect remnant—pressing into the Messianic kingdom, while the latter, the non-elect, are sullenly standing without. While in one view, as we shall see hereafter, it is their own fault that they are standing without, yet in another view it is the consequence of an elective agency of God in history. But if so, is not then God unjust? If in history and providence He shows His favor to men in different degrees, exercising kindness towards one by making him a means for the immediate manifestation of His grace, and selecting another as an instrument for the manifestation of His severity and power, is He not, then, unfair and unjust, and has He a right still to find fault with men for being what they are? In answer to this question the apostle uses his famous comparison of the potter and the clay, 9: 20, 21: "Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why didst thou make me thus? Has not the potter a right over the clay, from the same lump to make one part a vessel unto honor, and to make another unto dishonor?" For the purpose for which it is intended the comparison is appropriate. If the intention had been to show that God can, without cause, and yet rightfully, doom a moral being to endless misery, the Christian reason would properly demur; but if the intention is simply to show that God has a right to use men and nations as they are best fitted, by their constitution and character, to be used in the on-going development of His world-plan, then there certainly can be no objection. The Hottentot has no right to complain that God made him a Hottentot and not a white man, and that he enjoys only the endowment and privileges of a Hottentot, and not those of a white man. The dog has no right to

complain that he is a dog, and not a man; nor has man a right to complain that he is not an angel. But a creature would have a right to complain if it were to be treated in a manner not in accordance with its nature and capacity. If a creature were made with a nature fitting it to live in the fire, like the fabled salamander, then for that creature it would be no hardship to live in the fire. But if a man were to be compelled to exist in the fire, that would be an atrocity which no good being could approve. The Hottentot has no right to complain that he is not a Caucasian; but if the Hottentot whose soul is made for happiness were, without any fault of his, to be consigned to endless torment, that would be an injustice which no power of a God could cause to appear right. Paul never thought God capable of doing so unreasonable, so atrocious a thing. The suggestion that there is unrighteousness with God he repels with his energetic *μή γένοιτο*, *perish the thought*, 9: 14. And how, then, could he have supposed that God made any souls for damnation in order to the enhancement of his own glory? A God who could do that would not be a good God, and could not be supposed to be capable of any glory. And that men in considerable numbers, and good men too, have ever been willing to believe the contrary only shows how prone they are to yield their reason to dead tradition and blind authority. But that Paul should ever have been made responsible for such a doctrine was an act of injustice that was scarcely equalled by any act committed against him by his Judaizing persecutors. Had he known that his doctrine of election would ever be interpreted in this way, it would doubtless have been a source of affliction to him that would have been worse than that legalistic preaching of the Gospel of which he complains in Phil. 1: 17.

Paul was not thinking at all of men's eternal destiny when he made use of that comparison of the potter and the clay, but only of their position and influence in the temporal development of the kingdom of God. And he is thinking of no more than that in the sentence which follows, 9: 22-24: "What if God, willing to show His wrath and to make His power known, endured

with much long suffering vessels of wrath fitted unto destruction, in order that He might make known the riches of His glory upon vessels of mercy, which He before prepared unto glory, even us, whom also He called, not only from among the Jews, but also from among the Gentiles?" The sentence is not complete. To the protasis there is no answering apodosis. What would the apodosis have been if it had been expressed? We can only conjecture; but we believe that it would have been something like this, that it is perfectly right and consistent for God so to act. He is violating no principle of right, but is in fact promoting the salvation of all. The restrained exercise of wrath directed against the vessels of wrath has not its end in itself, but in the salvation of the vessels of mercy, and must cease when that end has been accomplished. The proposition contained in verse 23 is a subordinate clause connected with the preceding clause by the conjunction *iva*, and denotes the purpose of what is affirmed in that clause.* But what is affirmed in that clause is that God, because He wished to manifest His wrath and make known His power in the case of Israel, as once He did in the case of Pharaoh, held back in much long-suffering His punishment, or the display of His wrath, from the vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, so that the manifestation in the end might be the more striking. And now this long-delayed and self-restrained manifestation of God's wrath, which has at last been accomplished in the rejection of Israel, has for its purpose or end that He may make known the riches of His glory in the salvation of the vessels of mercy—that is, the persons chosen unto the blessing of the Messianic kingdom from among Jews and Gentiles.

* The Textus Receptus and the English versions, both Common and Revised, insert a *kai* before *iva* in verse 23, making the two clauses of which the sentence consists coördinate. Westcott and Hort, on the contrary, following the authority of the Codex Vat. and of the Vulgate, omit the *kai*, making the sentence beginning with *γινωσκοντες* dependent upon the preceding and expressive of its purpose. Manuscript authority would seem to favor the retention of *kai*; and so also would the familiar law relating to the preference of the more difficult text. When, however, the more difficult text makes no sense at all, as to our mind seems to be the case here, then we believe that the law may properly be disregarded; and we, therefore, have no hesitation in accepting Westcott and Hort's text.

The vessels of wrath here spoken of are, of course, the unbelieving and hardened portion of the Jewish people, who have rejected the Gospel. They have become vessels of wrath, or instruments for the manifestation of wrath, partly through their own fault, as we learn from 11: 20, where we are told that the natural branches, the native Israelites, were cut off because of their own unbelief. But they have become vessels of wrath in part also by the elective purpose of God to manifest His wrath and make known His power, which has long been working in history. In some sense, then, it was God that has made them vessels of wrath. But what does *wrath* here mean? Evidently it can mean no more than what is meant by *dishonor* in the comparison of the potter and the clay. But this is something relative only—honor in a lower degree—not the absolute opposite of honor. Or we may say that by *wrath* can be meant no more than what is meant when it is said that God *hated* Esau; which, as we have already seen, signified only that he, as the elder brother, should serve the younger; that is to say, that historically Edom should be less highly favored than his brother Israel. So the Jews now as unbelieving vessels of wrath are in a world-historical and world-soteriological view less highly favored than the believing Gentiles. But this decides nothing in regard to their eternal destiny; or, at least, it does not decide the question of their eternal salvation. But it is said that they are prepared or fitted for *destruction*—κατηρτισμένα εἰς ἀπώλειαν. What, then, does this phrase mean? Prof. J. H. Thayer, in his *Lexicon*, says that the vessels fitted unto destruction are “men whose souls God has so constituted that they cannot escape destruction.” But what is destruction, ἀπώλεια? The word is used nowhere else in the Epistle to the Romans, and in but three passages of Paul's later epistles, none of which throws any light upon its meaning. We are, then, directed to other parts of the New Testament for its signification. Now it happens that the word in its kindred verbal form, ἀπόλλυμι, is often used in all parts of the New Testament. In the active voice it means to *ruin*, to *destroy*; in the middle and passive, to *be ruined*, to

perish, to be lost. In Matt. 10 : 6, Jesus directs His apostles to go and preach to the *lost* sheep of the house of Israel, τὰ ἀπολωλότα. In Luke 19 : 10, He says that the Son of Man came to seek and to save that which was *lost*, τὸ ἀπολωλός. And of the prodigal son in the parable it is said, Luke 15 : 24, 32, that he was dead and is alive again, and that he was *lost*, ἀπολωλός, and has been found. We see, then, that to be in the condition of an ἀπολωλός, or to be in the state of ἀπώλεια, is not to be in an entirely hopeless condition, for it is a condition in which salvation is still possible. When *we* speak of persons being *lost* or of having *perished*, we usually understand eternal or endless and hopeless damnation ; but that is not the sense in which the word is used in the New Testament, when it refers to the state of the soul at all. The ἀπολωλός is for the present, of course, in an unfavorable or unhappy condition ; but the whole economy of redemption is still directed towards getting him out of this condition into a state of salvation.

We see, then, that the vessels of wrath prepared for destruction are by no means necessarily doomed to eternal damnation. Their condition, relatively to the vessels of mercy, is for the present, of course, an unfavorable one. They are left standing without, while the more favored ones from among Jews and Gentiles are called into the kingdom of God. But their condition is not an irreversible condition ; and it will be reversed when its purpose shall have been accomplished. That purpose is the conversion of the Gentiles ; and until that is accomplished, the Jews are set aside, while the main stream of Christian history flows in the channel of Gentile nations. This, however, is not a circumstance implying a change in the divine counsels at the time when the Messianic kingdom is set up. On the contrary it was already foretold in the Old Testament Scriptures ; so that the Jew could not pretend that the idea was subversive of the revelation of Jehovah. A number of predictions in which this idea is involved, is quoted by the apostle in 9 : 25-33. The substitution of Gentiles for Israel is intimated, for instance, in Hos. 2 : 23 ; where the prophet says, in the name of Jehovah : "I will have mercy

upon her that had not obtained mercy; and I will say to them which were not my people, Thou art my people; and they shall say, Thou art my God." So the rejection of the major part of Israel and the salvation of a remnant only the apostle finds predicted in Isa. 10:22, where the prophet, speaking of a return from captivity, says, "For though thy people be as the sand of the sea, only a remnant of them shall return."* So, then, the substitution of the Gentiles for Israel in the privileges of the kingdom of the Messiah is in accordance with a divine plan which was already announced in the Old Testament, and ought, therefore, to occasion no surprise.

In the execution of this plan, however, God is not acting arbitrarily and without reason. Why is it that the Gentiles have been preferred to Israel? The apostle answers that it is because, while they were not following after righteousness in their own way, they obtained the righteousness which is of faith; while Israel, which was pursuing after a law of righteousness, did not arrive at the law, nor attain to the righteousness of faith. But this again happened according to a prophetic utterance. They stumbled at the stone of stumbling of which Isaiah speaks (28:16): "Behold I lay in Zion a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence, and he that believeth on Him shall not be put to shame." But the Jews were not able to believe. The mind of Israel had become so fixed in legalism, the spirit of legalism had become so much a second nature of the Israelite, that when the Gospel of free grace was preached to him, he *could* not accept it. A righteousness which has its root in faith and not in law, that is, a righteousness whose essence is remission of sin without any legal ceremony, and whose distinguishing quality is love, was a thing which the Jew could not understand. The Jewish mind was fixed in the idea that the law was something superior even to

*In quoting these and other predictions from the Old Testament the apostle does not follow closely either the Hebrew text or the Septuagint translation. He doubtless often quotes from memory, and sometimes gives a turn to the words quoted which could not have been in the minds of the sacred writers. That anxiety about literal accuracy of quotation which results from the doctrine of verbal inspiration the apostle did not feel.

the Almighty Himself. That strange collection of legal ordinances, which made the life of the Jew so artificial and stilted, and which made the Jew himself an object of amazement and derision to other nations, was believed to be something so wonderful that the Almighty Jehovah Himself was obliged to spend a portion of each day in the study of it. This absurd superstition was believed in by the Jew with all the intensity of his fervent oriental nature. It was an hereditary superstition, which had come down through many centuries, and which was fed and increased from time to time by the events of Jewish history. It was the reformer Ezra who first gave to the Jewish mind this legalistic direction, and transformed the freer and more flexible Jehovahism of the prophets into the dark, stern, hard, legalistic Judaism which we learn to know from the pages of the New Testament. This hard, legalistic Judaism was a growth of more than four centuries of time, and had its roots in the very reformation of Ezra and Nehemiah, which once probably saved Israel from absorption by the heathen. Need we wonder, then, that the Jew as a rule was not able to receive the Gospel? We, who know something about the tenacity of hereditary traditional ideas and beliefs in the domain of religion, need not be surprised to see how desperately the Jews clung to their law, as if it had been the very foundation of the universe itself. Nor need we be surprised to see St. Paul accounting for the unbelief of the Jew, not merely by reference to his individual will and choice, but by reference to a divine ordination in history. The Jews' rejection of the Gospel had its ground in centuries of perverted teaching. There was in this rejection, of course, also an element of personal determination and personal responsibility in the case of each individual; for no power of heredity and no influence of environment alone can ever account for all that is in a man, and for all that a man may do. There is in every man something original, a personal self, which is more than the product of heredity and environment, and to which the Gospel addresses itself. But in the case of the ordinary Jew the self was so crushed by the all-subduing, all-leveling legalism which everywhere prevailed that

it had positively no power to respond to the Gospel when it came.

This is that *hardening* which forms so prominent a conception in the discussion of these chapters. It is referred to in 9: 18: "So then he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will be hardeneth." The hardening is not merely the result of personal volition, but of divine ordination. As an example of such hardening the apostle mentions Pharaoh. Of Pharaoh it is repeatedly said, in Exodus, not only that he hardened his own heart, but also that the Lord hardened it for him, so that he would not and could not let Israel depart from Egypt. And it should be remembered that, according to the story in Exodus, the hardening influence came from the historical situation and circumstances. For instance, the science of the magicians contributed to the hardening of Pharaoh's heart. And the same hardening influence has now been exercised upon the body of the Jewish people. While the remnant are saved, *the rest have been hardened*, 11: 8. And this has happened according to the pre-intimations of Scripture. In the quotations which follow, in 11: 8, the apostle combines expressions contained in Deut. 29: 4, and in Isa. 29: 10, and says: "God gave them a spirit of stupor, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear, unto this day." When we bear in mind this, and similar quotations in the Gospels, for example, Matt. 13: 14, and John 12: 40, it is impossible not to recognize some divine agency in this fatality which has befallen Israel. The apostle Paul certainly recognized such an agency. It is true, of course, that along with this divine agency, the apostle recognized in the hardening of Israel also an element of personal willfulness which made the Jewish people, in some measure, responsible for their unbelief. There was, for instance, the inward testimony of the natural soul to Christianity, which the Jews, in their willfulness, must have suppressed; for we believe that this is what the apostle means when, in 10: 8, he quotes the following sentence from Deut. 30: 14: "The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart;" and then adds: "That is the word of faith which we preach." In the original

the statement referred to the law, and meant, no doubt, that the law was not merely a foreign system imposed upon men from without, but that it was in inward harmony with the moral nature of the soul itself, from which circumstance it receives its strongest sanction. And this, the apostle means to say, is true not only of the word of the law, but also of the word of the Gospel. The Gospel has an ally witnessing to its truthfulness in the nature of the soul itself; and this witnessing, as well as that of the Holy Spirit, which goes along with it, must be willfully suppressed before the Gospel can be rejected. This violence done to the testimony of their own souls was an element in the sinfulness of Jewish unbelief. Then there was the fact also that the Gospel had been preached externally and rejected. Had the Gospel not been preached to the Jewish people, they would have had no sin. Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ, and the word must have its heralds to proclaim it. But to Israel the word has been proclaimed; and this external testimony, too, as well as the internal testimony of the spirit in the heart, has been willfully suppressed. For this the Jewish people of the then-existing generation were, doubtless, to some extent responsible; and this responsibility the apostle plainly recognizes. But then there was, on the other hand, that tremendous power of heredity and of environment, and that irresistible traditional influence, which had been at work for ages, and which weakened the force of individual personality among the Jews more than among any other people above the condition of savages, and reduced to a minimum the element of moral freedom. That legalistic spirit which crucified Christ and rejected the offers of pardon afterwards was present in the infant's blood when he was born; it was in the air which he breathed; it was in all the institutions around him; it was in all that he saw and heard. Thus, then, the forces which made the Jew of the first Christian century an unbeliever, the forces which hardened his heart against the Gospel and caused him to reject it, were forces which had been working for ages in the providence and history by which the Jewish people had been educated and made to be

what they were. And now, if it be true that God works in providence and history, then it must be true that the agency by which the Jew was hardened against the Gospel was in some real sense a divine agency. Paul would have said that it was God who hardened the Jew, giving him eyes with which he could not see, ears with which he could not hear, and a heart with which he could not believe. And our Lord Himself, more than once, used language implying the same conception.

But now this divine hardening, according to St. Paul, was not equivalent to an eternal judgment of damnation. It was a temporary and economic arrangement for a purpose; and that purpose was the ultimate salvation of Jews and Gentiles alike. The apostle contends, 11: 1, that God has not *rejected*, ἀπώσας, His people. If his Judiazing antagonists maintained that, according to his teaching, God must have cast off His covenant people whom of old He had chosen for His own possession, and gotten Himself a new people from among the Gentiles, Paul answered, away with that thought, μὴ γένοιτο. That would imply that God was mistaken in His choice and disappointed in the result. This can not be admitted. Therefore, God has not cast off His people whom He foreknew. This truth becomes apparent from two circumstances. In the first place, all Israel has not been unbelieving. I too, says the apostle, am an Israelite; and there has been a remnant left us, according to the election of grace, which embraces, in fact, the core of the whole Israelitish people. It is now as it was in the time of Elijah. When Elijah said that all Israel had fallen away to the worship of Baal, and that he was the only orthodox man left, the Lord told him that there were seven thousand men in Israel who had not bowed the knee to Baal. So now, when it is said that all Israel has refused to accept the Gospel, that is not true, for very many Israelites are Christians. But a second and more weighty consideration in support of the proposition that God has not rejected His people, is stated in 11: 11, to the effect that the apparent fall of Israel is not a real fall, but a stumbling only from which they will ultimately recover themselves. "I say then, did they stumble that

they might fall? Away with the thought." Their stumbling, so far as it is controlled by the divine will, is not to the intent that they may fall so as never to rise again, or that they may be everlastingly damned, but to the intent that by means of their trespass salvation may come unto the Gentiles, so as to provoke them to zeal. But the apostle continues, if their trespass, or fall, has been the means of enriching the world, and their loss the means of enriching the Gentiles with salvation, how much more will be the repairment of their loss when the whole fulness of their number shall be converted? Here it is assumed that Israel's fall, or loss, will not be permanent. They will recover themselves, and their loss will be repaired. But meanwhile, and this is the principal point here, their fall, or their unbelief is promoting the salvation of the Gentiles; and this in turn will have the effect of accomplishing their own salvation by stirring them up to emulation. For if their temporary rejection has been the reconciliation of the world, their reception into favor again will be new life for it, equal to a resurrection from the dead, 11: 15.

The question may here be asked, Why was the temporary rejection of Israel necessary in order to the election of the Gentiles, or how does their fall bring salvation to the Gentiles? This question the apostle Paul does answer for us. Nor would it be an easy question to answer. We may compare it, for example, to the question, Why was the death of Christ necessary to our salvation? Why could not the salvation of the world have been accomplished by the teaching of Jesus, in connection with His moral influence and the coöperation of His Spirit? What necessity was there for the tragedy of the cross? We know the answers which men have given to this question. These answers form theories of the atonement. And these theories have been taken by many for divine revelation itself. But if they were revelation, why are there so many of them, and why are they so contradictory? There are some things that are not revealed; about which we may, at times, not unprofitably speculate, provided only we do not forget that we are speculating, and do not undertake to force our

conclusions upon others as if they were God's own whole and immutable truth.* Now this mystery of the partial hardening of Israel in order to promote the salvation of the Gentiles, we believe, belongs to these unrevealed things. Paul says, "I would not have you to be ignorant of this mystery, that a hardening in part hath befallen Israel, until the fullness of the Gentiles become in," 11 : 25 ; but then he refers only to the fact, not to the explanation of it. At least he proposes no explanation. He throws out a hint, indeed, in 11 : 11, where he intimates that the salvation of the Gentiles will in turn provoke the Jews to emulation. It has, however, now after a history of eighteen centuries, not yet accomplished that result. The Jews have thus far not been favorably influenced by the progress of Christianity among the Gentile nations; although it must be remembered that the triumph of Christianity is as yet very far from being universal. Perhaps when the Gentile nations shall have been converted in larger numbers, especially the orientals, and when Christianity shall have come to be regarded less as a dogmatical and more as an ethical interest, the effect may be different. But the question may here be asked, why might not the general conversion of the Jews, if that had been possible at the beginning, have stirred the *Gentiles* to emulation, and made their conversion more easy and rapid? As it is, the influence of Jewish unbelief does not seem to have been in favor of the spreading of the Christian faith, at least not in later times.

We may, however, be sure that the temporary rejection of Israel has not been without great cause in the religious development of mankind. Strange as it may seem that the history of Israel should end in such an extraordinary fatality, it was doubt-

* We are reminded here of what the Deuteronomist says with evident reference to certain judgments which had befallen Israel : "The secret things belong unto the Lord our God : but the things that are revealed belong to us and to our children forever, that we may do all the words of this law," 29 : 29. Speculation concerning the secret things of God, however, is not unlawful, so long as it is reverent and humble, and in harmony with the truth which is plainly revealed. We may, for instance, not ascribe to God motives and actions which the best ethics would condemn in men, and then appeal to ignorance when pressed by the question how such motives and actions can be consistent with the goodness of God's character.

less a necessary fatality. Had the Jews as a nation accepted the Gospel, then the Gentiles would not have accepted it. Let us consider for a moment what would have been the effect upon Christianity, if it had been accepted by the Jewish people in a body. For a while such a result seemed not impossible or improbable. When the first storm of persecution was over, there seems to have been a reaction in favor of Christianity among the Jewish people; and when, in the spring of A. D. 58, St. Paul arrived at Jerusalem, there were, according to the report of the heads of the church there, many myriads of believing Jews. But what was the character of their faith? They were all zealous for the law. Their Christianity was but a slightly modified Judaism. It was Rabbinism, Pharisaism, legalism baptised by a Christian name. They continued to insist upon the necessity of circumcision. They continued to adhere to the sacrificial ritualism of the temple; and it was the mistake of Paul's life that once, although it was only for a moment, he allowed himself to be induced to participate in this ritualism, long after he had discovered its utter futility as a religious force among men. These myriads of Christian Jews, moreover, continued sedulously to practice those ordinances concerning food, and drink, and life, which separated them so thoroughly from their Gentile neighbors, and caused them to look upon the Gentiles as no better than unclean dogs. What would have been the result now, if this form of Christianity had prevailed? Could the Gentiles ever have become Christians? Not unless Christianity had from the very moment of its birth been divided into two hostile camps. The Greeks and Romans could never have joined the Christian Church, if the Church had been controlled by the spirit of Judaism. The training which the Jews had received for ages unfitted them as a body for becoming the foundation of the absolute religious society of the world. Hence, while that foundation was composed of an elect remnant, who were Israelites indeed, and not *Jews** of the modern spirit, it was necessary that the body

* The fact has often been noted that in the Gospel of John the term *Jews* is generally used with the connotation of something anti-Christian and evil. The *Jews* are the opponents of Christ and the enemies of the truth.

of the Jewish people should be cut off and cast aside in order that room might be made for the Gentiles. By reflections of this kind we may be convinced that the rejection of the Jews was a necessary condition of the progress of Christianity. Judaism, with its perverse legalism and its inordinate national pride and fanaticism, must be buried under the ruins of its own city and temple, in order that Christianity might succeed.

Nevertheless Christianity had its root in Jewish soil. Its foundation was composed of that *remnant* who were the true spiritual seed of Abraham, and not merely Israelites by carnal descent. But this remnant was related to the whole body of Israel, as the first portion of dough from which sacred loaves are prepared, is related to the whole lump of dough; it makes the whole lump holy. If the first-fruit, ἡ ἀπαρχή, is holy, then the whole lump is holy, 11: 15. Or the chosen remnant may be supposed to be related to the whole mass of the people as the root is related to the branches of the tree. If, then, the root is holy, the branches also will be holy. The implication, then, is that the salvation of the chosen remnant, or of the sacred root, will draw after it in time the salvation of the whole body and of all the masses of the Jewish people. This thought is illustrated, in 11: 17-25, by the similitude of the good olive tree, some of whose branches are cut off and replaced by grafting in their stead branches of an oleaster, or wild olive tree. Judaism in its true spiritual essence and in its genuine religious souls is the good olive tree. Some of its branches are cut off, and in their place are grafted branches from the oleaster, which are thus made partakers of the root and fatness of the olive tree. These engrafted branches represent the believing Gentiles, who are substituted in the place of the unbelieving Jews in the kingdom of Christ. On the principle of pressing every point of a similitude one could easily raise a difficulty here by observing that the quality of a grafted tree is not determined by the nature of the root, but by the nature of the graft. The grafting of oleaster branches upon an olive tree would not produce an olive tree, but an oleaster. The apostle's point of comparison, however, is simply

this, that the life of the root is the source of the life of the engrafted branches. The root bears the branches, not the branches the root. Consequently the Gentiles, who have been substituted in the place of the rejected masses of the Jewish people, have no reason to be proud, or to exult over the Jews, for after all they get their religion not from a Gentile, but from a Jewish root. It is true in a sense that the Jews were cut off in order that the Gentiles might be grafted in their place. But there are two things to be observed in regard to this: the first is that the rejection of the Jew and the election of the Gentile has its motive in the unbelief of the former and the faith of the latter; and the second is that this arrangement is intended to be only temporary and not permanent. The Jews were rejected, cut off, by reason of their unbelief, 11: 20. This unbelief, while on the one hand the consequence of heredity and environment, and so in some sense the consequence of a divine hardening through the process of history, was on the other hand also the consequence of a personal determination and choice.* The decree of rejection, or of reprobation, was then not an abstract eternal decree, without motive or cause, but an historical judgment based upon the actual moral and religious condition of the Jewish people. It was capable of being reversed; and, in fact, designed to be reversed when it should have accomplished its world-historical soterological purpose. The rejection of the Jewish people is to last only so long as they continue in unbelief. God is able to graft them again in their own place in the stock of the good olive tree, so soon as they turn from their unbelief and call upon the Lord with a true heart.

And to accomplish this result is God's eternal purpose; which

* In this conception we have a solution of the apparent contradiction between the statement contained in 9: 18, to the effect that a man's lot depends not upon his own will but upon God's favor, and the statement contained in 11: 20, that the Israelites were rejected because of their own unbelief. The apostle Paul was not a man to be afraid of contradictions. He was too earnest and intense a thinker for that. When he looked at a subject in one point of view, he looked so intensely that sometimes he failed to remember that there were other points of view. This gives to his writings at times an appearance of contradiction; which, however, is an evidence not of a small, but of a great mind.

in the exercise of His infinite wisdom and power He is sure also to accomplish. "I would not have you to be ignorant of this mystery, lest ye be wise in your own conceits, that a hardening in part hath befallen Israel, until the fullness of the Gentiles be come in; and so all Israel shall be saved," 11: 25. "For the gift and the calling of God are without repentance," 11: 29. He has chosen Israel to salvation, and some time Israel will be saved. So He purposes the salvation of the fulness of the Gentiles, and some time that purpose will be accomplished. Through all obstacles God is threading His way to the salvation of all men. He can, indeed, not save men in a manner inconsistent with His own righteousness or with men's moral freedom. He can not override the unbelief of the Jew and make him a believer against his will. Neither can He force the Gentile to forsake his superstitions, to renounce his anti-Jewish prejudices, and to be willing to enter into one religious society with the Jew on Jewish terms. But God can use the disobedience of the Jew in order to promote the salvation of the Gentile, and then again the mercy shown unto the Gentile as a means of mercy to the Jew. In a world in which evil has come to be an ubiquitous presence and power, the course of moral development can not be along a straight line, but must be infinitely devious and complicated. If God could walk to the accomplishment of His purposes along a straight line, He would not need to be very wise in order to reach this end. But in a world not only of *free* will, but of *perverted* will, to reach His end with infallible certainty, and yet without any violence or constraint, making the forces of opposition subservient to the attainment of His purposes, that is wisdom worthy of an omniscient being. And that is what God is doing. He is making the very unbelief of one class to be the condition of the conversion of another; and then, again, the mercy bestowed upon this one a stimulation and a spur to faith in that one. "For God," says the apostle, "hath shut up all unto disobedience, *ἐς τὴν ἀπειθειαν*, that He might have mercy upon all," 11: 32.

"That He might have mercy upon all." These notes of uni-

versality in an argument which has been supposed to establish the partiality of divine grace are remarkable, and should not be lightly passed over. When it is said that God has shut up all, Jews and Gentiles, unto disobedience, or unbelief, in order that He might have mercy upon all, that means, that He might by the very unbelief of *some* overcome the unbelief of *all*, and so bring all men into the enjoyment of salvation. Above, ver. 25, it is said: "And so *all* Israel shall be saved." What are we to understand by *all Israel* in this statement? Does it mean merely the individual Israelites who shall be living after the time when the fulness of the Gentiles shall have come in, or does it mean all individual Israelites of all times and places? In the former case we would have to assume that all the innumerable generations which have died in the interim between the first coming of Christ and the conversion of the last Gentile nation have perished everlastingly. And remembering now that their unbelief was in some sense the result of a divine ordination, and that this had for its end the conversion of the Gentiles, then it would follow that, on this supposition, their eternal salvation was sacrificed to the salvation of others. Could we now, in the face of such a supposition, say that there is no unrighteousness with God? * That this was not St. Paul's meaning, we think, is clear from the whole tenor of his argument in these chapters. These innumerable generations of Israelites who have died in unbelief in order that the Gentiles might obtain mercy are, in Paul's view, not damned. They are still in a salvable condition, and may all be saved when the fulness of the Gentiles shall have come in.

And this "fulness of the Gentiles:" What is the meaning of that? Some would say that we have here to do with generic

* Schleiermacher holds that such a supposition would be fatal also to the blessedness of the elect. "As in the divine government of the world all things are mutually connected and conditioned, it must be evident that the favorable circumstances which we enjoy are dependent upon the same world-arrangement which has denied similar circumstances to others. Consequently our sympathy with the damned would ever be pervaded by the pain which must accompany the reflection that our advantages are purchased by others' disadvantages." *Der Christliche Glaube*, Vol. 2, p. 550.

conceptions only, and not with conceptions of individuals. "The fulness of the Gentiles," and so also "all Israel," are merely expressions denoting the genus or kind without regard to the individuals of whom the genus is composed. In this sense it might be said, for instance, that the whole *human race* was saved in the Flood, although all men were drowned except Noah and his family. And so, in the same sense, "all Israel," might be said to be saved, while in fact the great majority of the people of Israel might be damned. It is the genus or kind that is saved; and that is the only thing that the divine love has any care for. According to the philosophy underlying this view, individual men are only specimens of the race; for themselves they have no significance or value. But if this were so, then it is difficult to see why individuals should be immortal at all. If it is the "type" only of which nature is careful, then there is no need for the individual beyond this life. But men have a feeling that they are persons destined to an endless existence; and this feeling belongs not merely to the élite, but is common to all men. Hence the pantheistic philosophy, which cares only for the genus, and which destroys the conception of the personality of God as well as of men, can never become the philosophy of mankind. We are sure that this was not the philosophy of St. Paul. When he speaks of the fulness of the Gentiles entering into the Messianic kingdom he means the total number of Gentile personalities, and when he speaks of the salvation of all Israel he means the salvation of all Israelitish persons, past, present and future. This is the prospect of the Gospel which his faith holds out to him. Paul believed that it is the divine intention to save all men; and he believed that the power of the Gospel is adequate to the realization of this intention.

These notes of universality in respect of the intention and reach of the Gospel occur frequently in his later epistles. God our Saviour "willeth that all men should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth," 1. Tim. 2: 4. This idea of the universality of grace is one of the underlying ideas of the Adam-

Christ section of the Epistle to the Romans, 5: 12-21. We quote but one sentence: "So then as through one trespass the judgment came unto all men to condemnation, even so through one act of righteousness the free gift came unto all men to justification of life." The idea runs through this whole section that the saving power of Christ is commensurate with the corrupting power of Adam. Grace reaches as far as sin reaches; only while sin propagates itself through the spontaneity of nature grace must be realized in the way of moral freedom or faith. This equality between sin and grace is affirmed also in the proposition that "as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive," 1 Cor. 15: 22. In what sense shall all be made alive? In a merely physical sense, some have said; that is, in the sense that in the last day the bodies of the wicked will be brought out of the graves through the power of Christ, in order afterwards to be cast into hell. But it would seem that the being made alive in Christ should be as comprehensive a process as the dying in Adam; and if the latter was moral and spiritual, so ought the former to be also. That Paul looked for the universal triumph of the moral and spiritual power of Christ seems to be plain also from what he says in Phil. 2:10, where he makes the effect of the exaltation of Christ to be that, "in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth." But to bow the knee in the name of Jesus is to worship God in the spirit of Jesus; and that, of course, implies reconciliation or salvation through the mediation of Christ. Thus, then, the apostle looks for the universal triumph of the grace and power of Christ, by which all things are to be made subject unto God, so that God may in truth be all in all, *πάντα ἐν πάντων* 1. Cor. 15: 28.

It is but fair to remark, however, that some years earlier, when he wrote the Epistles to the Thessalonians, the apostle did apparently not take so hopeful a view of the final success of the Gospel. He then seems to have expected the history of Christianity in its later stages to take on something of a tragic character. Before the end comes, according to the representation of

these epistles, there will be a falling away, an apostasy from Christianity; and there will be a revelation of a man of sin, who will exalt himself against all that is divine, and enthrone himself in the temple of God, setting himself forth as if he were God, 2 Thess. 2:34. The meaning of this is doubtless that, in the last age, there will appear some human individual who will be in the kingdom of evil the exact counterpart of what Christ is in the kingdom of goodness—the anti-Christ, who will be an incarnation of the powers of evil in the world, and will head a vast revolt against God and His kingdom. In this conflict between Christ and anti-Christ the history of the world will reach its culmination; but in the end the victory will be with Christ—a mere triumph of power, however, and not of grace; and then the dead will be raised up, and the saints will be caught up to Christ in the air, to be with Him forever; while the disobedient and unbelieving will be punished with eternal destruction from the face of the Lord and from the glory of his might. The eternal destruction here, *ὀλεθρος αἰώνιος*, is something different from the *ἀπώλεια* of the Epistle to the Romans. The latter is destruction too, or ruin; but it is ruin from which there may be recovery. But the former is eternal, endless, and hopeless destruction—something like what is expressed in Dante's famous inscription over the gate of hell.

This seems to us to be a fair representation of the eschatology of the Thessalonian Epistles; and this view is in evident affinity with the teaching of the Apocalypse, and has ideas in common also with Jewish Apocalyptic literature. But this is no longer the eschatology of the later Pauline epistles. No such scheme could by any means be fitted into the Epistle to the Romans. According to the teaching of this epistle the history of the world is not destined to wind up in the smoke of battle and in the formation of two hostile kingdoms that will be made eternal by the execution of the last judgment. On the contrary, the disobedience of all will be overcome, and God will have mercy upon all. The apostle expects, of course, that history will still have its conflicts. There will at times be moral defeats. There will

be distress. There will be opposition and persecution. There will be temptation and trial. But above all these reigns the Lord God in infinite wisdom and power, who will make every manifestation of evil as well as of good to contribute to the final victory of the Gospel over all souls. There is here no anti-Christ; as also in the later epistles of John the idea of a personal anti-Christ is resolved into the notion of a multiplicity of immoral and heretical tendencies which were at work already in the writer's own age. (Cf. 1, John 2: 18-22.) And there is here no apostasy, but a constant and steady development of the forces contained in the kingdom of God, until all things shall become voluntarily subject to God, and God shall be all in all. It is this glorious consummation of the eternal purpose of divine love, in which God brings under His feet all things, without any injustice, or any violation of creaturely freedom, that inspires in the apostle that sublime ode in praise of the wisdom and knowledge of God, with which he concludes this part of the Epistle to the Romans. "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and the knowledge of God! How unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past tracing out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been His counsellor? or who hath first given to Him, and it shall be recompensed unto Him again? For of Him, and through Him, and unto Him are all things. To Him be glory forever. Amen." (11: 33-36.)

Could Paul, when he wrote that, have thought of an eternal decree of election and reprobation, laying the foundation of an irresolvable moral dualism in God's universe? Could he have supposed that Christianity was going to be a failure with the great majority of mankind? Could he have so praised God's wisdom and knowledge, if he had thought Him to be forever incapable of realizing His eternal purpose of love in the world which He has created, and which He governs? No, that wherein is shown the wisdom of God is not that He has formed an abstract decree of election and reprobation, which He is now accomplishing by mere sovereign might; nor that He has formed an eternal purpose of grace which He is not able to accomplish at

all; but in this rather, that without violating any creaturely freedom, or without exercising any "irresistible grace," and in perfect consistency with the strictest principles of justice, He is able to subdue the disobedience of all men, and to have mercy upon all. This is the wisdom which forms the theme of Paul's admiring eulogy. No method of salvation violating these principles could be the subject of such praise. Indeed, no Christian mind can accept any doctrine of salvation that would violate the eternal principles of justice or set aside the fact of human freedom and moral responsibility. For this reason we cannot accept the doctrine of an eternal predestination of any souls to damnation; and those who do accept this doctrine find it necessary to hedge it around by conditions which largely nullify its meaning; as, for instance, when it is said that the doctrine must not be held in such way as to make God the author of sin, or do away with human freedom. For the same reason also we can no longer accept any doctrine which makes salvation to be conditioned by accidents of time or chance of circumstances. It used to be regarded as good orthodox doctrine that, if of two unconverted persons, one should kill the other, the soul of the murdered man, who had no chance to repent, would at once go into an endless hell; while the murderer might be converted through the help of priests or preachers, and go up into glory when he is hanged. Now if that were true doctrine, we certainly should not know how to hold fast St. Paul's proposition that there is no unrighteousness with God. But that proposition we are bound to hold fast by all means. God is not going to violate His righteousness in the salvation of any human soul. No man is ever going to be made happy in sin. Indeed, the very idea of such a thing involves a contradiction in terms. No man can ever be made happy, or blessed, at all merely by external gift or circumstance. Blessedness is a condition that comes from within, from the moral state or character of the soul; and salvation, as a divine work, is the process, including all the discipline of nature and grace, of providence and history, by which a pure or Christian character is formed. The mercy of which St. Paul

speaks as something that is designed for all men, is not a disposition to make men blessed without regard to character—a thing which would in the nature of the case be impossible—but a discipline conducted by infinite wisdom and goodness, which has for its end the conquest of unbelief and the formation of Christian character as the source of eternal blessedness.

But will this divine discipline be successful with every human soul? Perhaps this is a question of which Paul was not thinking when he wrote the Epistle to the Romans. He was thinking so intensely of the universality of the divine purpose of salvation, and of the infinitude of the divine resources for the accomplishment of this purpose, that for the moment perhaps the thought of a possible failure did not occur to him at all. But success here depends not merely upon the operation of divine grace, but also upon the activity of human freedom. Salvation is a work of divine grace which can be accomplished in men only by the co-operation of their own will. Will all men, then, at last, somehow and somewhere, be induced freely to repent and accept the offer of divine grace? If the human will be free, and if it must forever remain free, is it not possible that it may forever resist the offer of divine grace and so remain forever in a state of perdition? May not the Jew, in spite of all that infinite wisdom and love can do for him, in the exercise of his power of self-determination, forever refuse to acknowledge the Messiahship of Jesus, and so forever remain in the outer realm of darkness, where there is weeping and gnashing of teeth? It seems to us that the possibility of this must be granted, though it may be only as an *abstract* possibility. For the fact must not be overlooked that the very thing which gives rise to the possibility of eternal resistance to grace, namely, the continued freedom of the will, must also constitute an eternal possibility of repentance, and consequently an eternal possibility of salvation. To this, however, it may be objected that *character ever tends to become fixed*; and that consequently a point may be reached in moral development where freedom ceases, and where no change will be any longer possible. The good will at last reach a stage where sin will be

impossible, and the wicked where repentance will be impossible. The former part of this proposition must, of course, be admitted. But does that also compel the admission of the second part? For the saints in glory it will be impossible to sin, because they *will* not sin. The ground of this impossibility to sin is in the will itself, which has been filled with its true and proper contents, and not in anything outside of the will. But can the will ever become thus fixed in evil? Can evil ever become the content of the will in such way that the latter can become entirely satisfied with this and rest in it as its good? If so, then where would be the misery of such a state? To maintain this view would seem to be to admit the evil to an equal rank of being with the good. If it be true that, as Augustine said, the soul must ever be restless until it rests in God, then it is, to say the least, difficult to understand how it can ever become absolutely fixed in evil. Besides, the proposition that character tends to become fixed is true, so far as experience goes, only relatively. It is true that within certain definite conditions character becomes virtually fixed; so that within these conditions it may be possible to predict, with a tolerable degree of certainty, how a person of given character will act. But when these conditions are transcended, all such predictions may prove to be entirely faulty, showing that character, especially if it be not yet wholly good, is by no means so fixed that there is no possibility of change. Hence it does not follow that, because repentance is not possible for a soul in this life, it may not be possible in another life and in new conditions. And if possible at all, then how long may this possibility be supposed to endure, and what will be the final result? That is a question to which, it seems to us, no one can give any dogmatic answer.

The opposite conclusion, however, that there is a point of time fixed when repentance and salvation will become absolutely and finally impossible, and when the divine mercy will be withdrawn, has led some Christian thinkers in modern times to adopt the theory of annihilation. The theory of an eternal moral dualism is, in the view of these thinkers, so repugnant to reason that they

prefer to suppose that the incorrigibly wicked will at last be annihilated. This theory does not commend itself to us. We cannot think that God will ever annihilate any of His offspring. To do so would be a confession that He had been mistaken in the creation of them. "The annihilation of the creature either now or at any moment even inconceivably distant," says Fairbairn, "were a confession by the Creator of utter helplessness, an acknowledgment that the universe, or a part of the universe, had so broken down in His hands that He knew no way of mending it but by ending it."* Rather than adopt this theory we would prefer to assume that God keeps on mending forever, even though there were no prospect of ever accomplishing the task. God as unchanging love can never abandon, whether it be to annihilation or to endless misery, the souls which His love has called into being; that is to say, He can never totally cast off and forget them. For, in the language of Fairbairn, "to abandon souls He loved, even though they had abandoned Him, would be to punish man's faithlessness by ceasing to be faithful to Himself." That cannot be. God must ever be true to Himself and to His own love. He can, therefore, never let an erring, sinning soul alone, but must always exercise His infinite wisdom in order to lead it to repentance, and educate it for eternal blessedness in a degree commensurate with its nature. In doing this He needs to offer no violence to its freedom. There is no violation of freedom in the processes of education. The teacher or parent does not violate the freedom of a child when, by precept, example, chastisement or silent influence, the child's will is trained in the right direction. And so the Father in Heaven does not violate the freedom of His human offspring, if, by all the means which infinite wisdom and knowledge can suggest, He overcomes their opposition, and trains them to what He would have them to be, so that He at last may be all in all. He has ages of ages for the accomplishment of this result; and all that we can say, with our philosophy, is that the result is conditioned by the exercise of freedom on the part of the creature, and that this implies the *possibility* of failure.

* The Place of Christ in Modern Theology, p. 466.

But it may be said that we have more than philosophy in this case. We have revelation, and that positively predicts a failure of the divine purpose of salvation, if indeed this purpose be universal, in regard to a large number, perhaps even the majority, of human beings. For instance, to quote one of the strongest passages at once, our Lord says that, in the Messianic judgment, *the wicked will go into eternal punishment*, εἰς κόλασιν αἰώνιον, Matt. 25: 46. This has been usually understood to mean endless perdition. But κόλασις is not perdition or destruction. It is not equivalent to ὀλεθρος, which Paul uses once, in 2 Thess. 1: 9. Κόλασις is punishment, chastisement, correction. Punishment is never merely retributive or retaliatory. It is not destruction of the subject, but the infliction of just and deserved pain with a view to saving the subject from destruction. But, it may be said, the punishment into which the wicked go is *eternal*, αἰώνιον. Yes, but this adjective does not by itself denote endlessness of duration. That idea is expressed either by αἰδιος, or by the repetition of αἰών in the plural: αἰῶνες τῶν αἰώνων, *ages of ages, world without end*. The word αἰών means an age, a period or cycle of time within which a certain process of development runs its course and comes to a relative conclusion. The Messianic judgment comes to pass at the conclusion of the Messianic αἰών, but beyond this there will be other αἰῶνες. And *aionian* or *eternal* punishment is, therefore, not equivalent to *endless* punishment, which would, indeed, be no longer punishment, but mere retribution. In the way of objection to this, however, it may be said that the same adjective is applied to the *life* into which the righteous go; and that if *eternal punishment* is not endless, so neither is *eternal life*. This, however, does not follow. That for punishment, which is a means and not an end, some αἰών may be the last, does not prove that for life also, which has its end in itself, there should ever come a last αἰών. Punishment is not to be placed in the same rank with life. So, then, it would appear that our Lord's sentence in this passage is not in conflict with St. Paul's hope of the final realization of God's universal decree of salvation. Eternal punishment there

may be ; and indeed that very clinging of God with His holiness and love to the impenitent soul, of which we have already spoken, would be to it a source of punishment ; but in the wisdom and mercy of God this punishment itself may become a means of ultimate salvation. Other passages of Scripture bearing upon the subject might be resolved with equal facility.

But it is not our purpose to continue this study any farther. A complete discussion and formulation of the doctrine under consideration would be possible only after a thorough study of every passage in every book of the New Testament bearing upon the subject. The work of the philosophic theologian can only properly begin when that of the exegete is completed. But if we have not been entirely mistaken in our views of the passage which we have made the subject of this paper, we have seen enough to be assured that the hard doctrine which has so often been read here, and which consigns the majority of mankind to absolute and hopeless perdition, has no foundation in what St. Paul has here written. Paul entertained a loftier view of God and a larger hope of man than is possible to any one who holds to the old Augustinian and Calvinistic doctrine of election. And the homiletic and practical bearings of this loftier view and larger hope must be patent to every reader.

II.

GLADSTONE'S STUDIES IN BUTLER.*

BY PROF. JACOB COOPER, S. T. D., D. C. L., RUTGERS COLLEGE.

Mr. Gladstone has by the third volume, "Studies Subsidiary to the works of Bishop Butler," put a colophon to his grand service in editing one of the greatest—perhaps the very greatest—book written in the English language. Several of these "Studies" have been published before in the periodicals of the day. Such have been modified more or less to fit the author's present purpose. Others have been added, and the various threads of the whole so deftly interwoven as to make a perfectly compacted web of argument. In this respect Mr. Gladstone consciously or unconsciously imitates his great prototype. For Butler's greatness is manifested most clearly in the masterly marshalling of his materials so as to produce an effect irresistible by their close concatenation. In this he employs the method of the Universe in its combination of an infinite number of parts, each taken by itself, small, and all, if looked upon without regard to their interrelation, presenting only a chaos, yet the elements are so harmoniously united that they form a system, beautiful in its order and overpowering in its effect. So Butler shows the genius that is in harmony with the creative power which formed all things, and the wisdom which directs in the two coördinate spheres of Time and Being.

The religious world will follow with its benediction the labor of love which has incited Mr. Gladstone to this supreme effort of his genius wrought in the maturity of his experience, and the undiminished lustre of his perennial powers.

Complaints have been freely made by opponents of Butler's analogical reasonings of what they term the insufficiency of that

* The Works of Joseph Butler, D. C. L., edited by the Right Honorable William E. Gladstone, 3 vols., Macmillan & Co., New York and London.

proof for a future life which is given in the sacred Scriptures. It is maintained by those who question the testimony of Revelation, that in a matter of such transcendent importance there should be proof of a character to make doubt or unbelief impossible. It may be pertinently asked: What sort of evidence would secure this result? Could any kind or degree of proof which is used in our daily life affect such a state of mind in those who do not wish to be convinced? Faith, like every other principle of mental action, is partly subjective and partly objective. Hence, if the proof furnished were of a sort which allowed of no alternative, then only one course of action would be possible. The personal element would be obliterated, and the character, no matter how good, formed by inevitable constraint, would not belong to man. Therefore there could be neither virtue nor vice in taking a course forced upon the will by demonstration, were that kind of proof in morals possible. But it is held by the foremost logicians, such as Mill and Jevons, that no proof even for science, which is based on induction, can rise to the cogency of demonstration; that the so-called uniformity of nature is only partial; and, therefore, the conclusions deduced never can rise to absolute certainty. So Hume held that the relation between cause and effect could never rise to higher certainty than observed sequence, and in this view he is followed by Kant. If, then, those who complain that the evidence for a future life furnished by Revelation is not strong enough to convince and will not be satisfied with less than demonstration, they ask for more than can be found in inductive science, more than is possible in any department of knowledge except pure mathematics.

But, grant that such proof could be furnished for the postulates of a future life. It would destroy its object which is to convince the reason by the same kind of evidence which we are compelled to use in all matters of moral or even physical action. Besides, there must be a temper of fairness in order to render any kind of proof availing to influence human character. Grant that we had demonstrative proof for the claims of a future life. This would have precisely the same effect on the intellect of the

unprejudiced that material force has on the will to compel its obedience; for it would leave no room for such choice as is involved in moral freedom. The prison walls which restrain the offender and thereby compel his will to obedience do not, by this process, make him virtuous, or change his purpose to ply his villainous calling as soon as he can escape, or is set at liberty. So demonstrative proof, such as the doubter demands, were that kind of evidence given by Revelation, would be useless. For it would force assent from the fair minded and unprejudiced, yet by a process of constraint which entirely excludes such free action as can generate moral character and make it the subject of rewards or punishments. .

But the effect of demonstrative or intuitive evidence which is the same in degree of cogency, is different according to the temper of him who apprehends it. If he be unprejudiced it will force his assent because there is no rational power to resist it. If he be prejudiced he closes both heart and eyes against its reception. He makes his own volition the measure of the truth he will admit and accept. This is a fact in psychology as well established as any in science. The world is full of examples of those who through prejudice, or ignorance resulting from it by refusing to examine the proofs which would convince, reject the clearest rational evidences, and rush on recklessly to moral and financial ruin. While demonstrative proof, therefore, would force assent from the fairminded, and by compelling their action deprive it of moral significance, it would be rejected by those whose wills are determined in advance; and so in either case be fruitless in its effect on character.

Hence we are forced to admit that if such proof as the doubter demands were furnished it would obliterate responsibility in those open to conviction, and make their actions simply necessary. This would exclude the possibility of improving in virtue, and make man a machine as completely as those driven by natural forces. Under this conception there could be neither good nor evil in the world; neither happiness nor misery as their effects, because these involve voluntary ends as the alternatives through

chosen means. Even if there could be Immanent or Mechanical Finality working at each step by a process which compelled assent, its action, like physical causality upon matter would exclude personal responsibility. Under such influences there could be, strictly speaking, neither a system of Optimism nor Pessimism, but only Indifferentism. If this last be the scheme of the universe, and this must be the case if the proof influencing action be such as to compel the will and thus exclude the element of personal choice, it makes not the slightest difference what men do or become. For thought and action can have no influence upon the moral character of the agent, or him who is the recipient; since there is no other than a necessary, a fatalistic connection between them. So neither happiness nor misery is dependent on any course of conduct, and there is neither incentive to virtue nor restraint on vice. This conclusion would, of course lead to blank despair, if there could be any such feeling under a system of indifference. Yet this would be a necessary result from conduct which was rendered compulsory through demonstrative proof; it could be neither good nor bad, and man would be helpless. This view is so absurd that it is not likely that any sane man will embrace it in theory—and none dare to in practice in matters relating to this life. Hence consistency should, and for practical purposes does, exclude such a monstrosity.

Again, if Pessimism be assumed as the controlling principle of the universe there is no need of proof to influence our belief. For whether it be demonstrative and compel our assent, or probable, like that one must act on in dealing with men or the inductions of science, the result is the same. That which seems true is false; for while it appears to lead to good its results are bad only, since, whether true or false, the outcome is sorrow and misery. Hence it is of no avail to try by virtuous and rational action to stem the torrent which is carrying all things inevitably to destruction. This view may be the outgrowth of despair and, therefore, wholly subjective, arising from a disordered mind or a thoroughly perverted nature which measures all things by its own standards. For those only can see all things hastening to de-

struction who find this tendency in themselves; who desire this to be true and bend all their energies to its realization. Momentary discouragement from misfortune, or anger at wrong-doing which has been suffered from our neighbor without justifying cause, has the power of recuperation by the use of reason, and sees the absurdity of denying the existence of the sun because a cloud obscures our horizon. But if Pessimism were indeed true it would be the duty of each to labor with all his might to hasten the catastrophe when all this nightmare of life might be swallowed up in the unbroken sleep of annihilation. Then we would have realized the paradox the worse a man acts the more completely he does his duty. But should the pessimist attempt in earnest to carry out his theory he would unconsciously give his case away unless awakened by the correcting arm of the law. For if he has the power to contribute to the consummation which he wishes so devoutly in theory, then he has the control of his volition in adding to its haste and certainty. But volition involves the idea of an alternative, and this alternative of acting in a very different way from that of hastening the catastrophe of misery. If he can do greater harm and bring more misery and evil on himself and the world he surely can do less, or even the reverse. He can act virtuously; he can increase the happiness by relieving the misery. So by the exercise of that volition which is assumed in his effort to hasten the catastrophe of misery he makes it clear that he does not believe practically in his theory. Thus we see that Indifferentism and Pessimism are both excluded from the possibilities of a moral government, either of this world or one to follow. For there could be no moral character, no good or evil, no happiness or misery, as the result of actions if they were controlled by fatalism which compels to evil, or were coerced by demonstrative evidence which allows no alternative. For, in either case, man would have no responsibility, his actions no moral quality, and therefore no influence on his destiny.

But it may be said that under an optimistic system we find difficulties. The evidence on which we are required to act is not such as to satisfy our curiosity or quiet our fears. When such

momentous interests as our eternal destiny are at stake, there ought to be no ground for doubt and no possibility of going astray. We have difficulties, it is true, and often desire greater light. But the difficulties do not involve absurdities at every step, as those in the other systems. We are not asked to believe statements concerning a future life on less evidence than we must be satisfied with, in matters of daily duty, involving contingencies which we cannot foresee. The uniformity of physical nature is no more certain than that which obtains in the moral world between right doing and the happiness of the agent. Neither do the difficulties render life meaningless nor virtue impossible. Men can at least act rationally according to the revealed system of truth. For they can be virtuous and thereby add to their own happiness and that of the world. They are commanded to relieve pain; to add to public purity; and by industry and sober living to increase the public welfare to the full measure of their ability. Their creed is that the fulfillment of the moral law is the fulfillment of the Revealed System. They are commanded to do their duty with the expressed as well as implied assurance that they have the ability of compliance. But under the other systems they are necessary agents, material machines, compelled to act according to an adamant destiny, and therefore not endued with reason or responsibility. Though the believers in the Revealed System may not be able to prove the freedom of action in the case of others, yet they know assuredly that they themselves possess the power of choice to act according to rational evidence. They can demonstrate the truth of this doctrine by their conduct, which of all evidence is the most satisfactory. And the evidence on which they act with reference to a future is the same in kind and degree with that which they are compelled to use if they act in the affairs of the present. For it should ever be borne in mind that a pure and earnest life, such as is required in the Holy Scriptures as a preparation for eternal blessedness is precisely what the highest type of Utilitarianism demands; so that Bentham and Butler are in this matter in full agreement.

The best Christian is the best citizen; the most useful life is

that which is most completely illustrated by the Founder of Christianity, who embodied his doctrine in his conduct—"Jesus of Nazareth, who went around doing good." And, what is most to the purpose, this proof is self-evidencing and grows in exact proportion as obedience is rendered. This is the warrant for scientific accuracy where the hypothesis satisfies all the conditions of the present and continues to explain all the facts as further progress is made. Were the proofs demonstrative there would be no analogy between the warrant for our action in the present and that relating to the future, and no assurance that this is a preliminary stage. And there could be no preliminary stage if it were not disciplinary. But it could not be disciplinary if the proof for this future life were demonstrative and permitted no freely chosen alternative. Hence there must necessarily be difficulties to be met with in considering any system of moral government which makes men accountable to a governing Ruler. But we live under some system. We have obtained a foothold in time and occupy a place in the universe of material and spiritual things. From this position we can neither expatriate ourselves nor be driven out. Our duty then is to grope about and discover our bearings. For no doubts, or even demonstrations, to show that we have no hereafter can obliterate the fact that we have a present. Nor will any speculation, however refined, convince us that as we are not endowed with responsibility, or free us from its consequences if we offend against the laws which are found necessary to govern men in civil society and which rest upon this assumption. We greatly desire to know our present bearings and how our conduct will affect our condition now and for time to come. We know beyond the power of sophistry to obscure our conviction or prove the contrary, that we are responsible to our consciences and therefore must give an account before a competent bar of justice for all our conduct. We know by experience that our conduct is the measure both of our inward peace or misery, and in some degree of our reputation and influence with the world. We know that voluntary conduct involves the choice between two alternatives; and that this choice

does not depend on demonstration, since in that case there could be no alternative. For here, just as in algebra or geometry, there is only one view possible. And this excludes the power of choice unless we are too ignorant to comprehend the proof, or wilfully do violence to intellectual convictions, and so arbitrarily reject what we know to be facts. If our conduct depended upon such proof it could have no quality. For it would be compulsory to a reasonable nature and therefore exclude the personal determination which makes it virtuous or vicious. The moral quality of conduct must therefore have its basis on such proof as presents reasons which we can apprehend, and yet permit us to act with entire freedom. For if we are to be judged by our actions they must be *our's*, dependent upon reasons approving themselves to *our* consciences, which must be the tribunals of last resort. Otherwise we could never know for what we are condemned or approved. There could be no transgressions where there was no law, and there could be no law for those who could neither understand nor obey its sanctions. Constraint, either material or logical, would be equally destructive to the idea of responsibility.

This brings us naturally to the question: Are there proofs enough for the sanction of moral law, and therefore for a Lawgiver who will in the end reward or punish, make happy or miserable, those who are subject to his authority? This is the question which is fundamental to all others in life, a question demanding an answer continually as a warrant for our action or endurance. We cannot stand still. Life involves constant activity and requires this to be guided by such evidence as is within our reach. The alternative is not whether we have this or that kind of evidence which we may imagine would be more satisfactory, for we have not the disposal of this matter, since we find our condition with reference thereto settled in advance and entirely irrespective of what unbelief demands as suitable to convince.

The effort has been made to show that evidence to influence responsible conduct must not be such as to force assent, for then we would act through compulsion, and actions which we might

perform under such conditions would not be our's. If then we are to be held accountable we must not be constrained by proof which is overwhelming like demonstration, which forces the intellect *volens volens*, and leaves no place for deliberative choice. Hence the proof must be such as will convince reason that is fair and open to conviction, not such as is demanded by a temper which absurdly makes its own criterion of proof, contrary to the conditions under which it is placed. The very heart of the matter is clearly this. Is the proof which Revelation affords reasonable? Is it of the same sort on which we are required to act in the relations of this life? For if it be different, either in kind or degree, from that by which we are guided in the affairs of this world, this would destroy the possibility of an analogy which is the natural guide in our inquiries concerning a future life. The demand of those who say that the sole province of Revelation, especially as it is declared to be supplementary to the teachings of the natural conscience, is that it must clear up all difficulties and leave no ground for doubt or anxiety. This demand, however, shows that the doubter requires the very thing which would destroy all possibility of proof from analogy. It would in fact require a proof which, as has been shown, is self-destructive. For if the virtue which fits a soul for a future existence depends on proof different from that it is compelled to use in the preliminary stage, then there could be no preparation; and all this life's work as a discipline would be lost, even if we admit the continued existence of the soul. Thus, the demand of the doubter is absurd in its very terms, and shows his unwillingness to accept any proof which is consistent with the disciplinary state in which man is placed. Hence it may be fairly inferred that no proof which could be given would suffice. For if it were demonstrative it would render the discipline for virtue impossible and destroy its own *raison d'être*. The great Teacher, who knew what is in man—his needs, his capacities, and the possibilities of his present condition—uttered this decisive sentence in answer to those who demanded more proof as a voucher for his doctrines: "If they believe not Moses

and the prophets, neither would they be persuaded though one rose from the dead." That is to say, the proof already given is all that could have any salutary effect on human nature by the discipline of character. For this must be built up by the exercise of reason in directing a choice when alternatives are offered for its acceptance. Hence, though a proof might be furnished which could compel intellectual assent, it could not that which is moral; and, therefore, would not effect any change in the character of those who were determined in advance not to believe. The Divine Master, therefore, pertinently declared that those who are not affected by reasonable evidence, such as is afforded by the Law and the Prophets, would not be persuaded if the veil which covers the unseen world were raised and all the tremendous realities of the life to come were disclosed. If one rose from the dead and unfolded his experiences this would be attributed to sorcery; or if accepted as genuine could have no more effect on character than the constant evidence afforded by virtue and vice as they testify by their tangible effects to the truth of Divine Revelation. The Lord says distinctly that no proof could be sufficient to persuade those who are obstinately prejudiced. This statement is a philosophic as well as a moral truth, and is embodied in the wisdom of the proverb which says that if you convince a man against his will you do not change his purpose or action. The demand made by the Pharisees on our Lord, though not complied with at the time, was in His own time and place literally met in the raising of Lazarus. While this miracle, the very one they had asked for, could not be denied by those who had seen the man dead and buried, and witnessed his resurrection by the command of Christ and now saw him alive and moving about among them, yet this did not change in the least their hostility to the truth. For so far were they from accepting a proof which they could not gainsay, they determined to get rid of the irrefragable evidence by destroying the man who had been raised by our Lord. Prejudice and hostility can close our nature against any proof that may be offered. They can give our nature over to strong delusion, so that we may believe a lie to our own condemnation.

Hence it is undoubtedly true that the proof which is best adapted for the discipline of character through personal responsibility has been furnished. For if we live under a system which encourages virtuous action, and where happiness is the reward of right doing, the means of reaching our destiny must be apportioned to us in such a way as best to secure that result, and is always proportioned to our desire for it. For surely a Master who requires virtuous conduct would not place us under conditions where its attainment is impossible. Had other proof been better adapted it surely would have been furnished unless our Master wished to mock us. Had it been better for us to live without making individual exertions the Power which gave us so much could assuredly, from His infinite resources, give us all that is lacking. If He had given us more happiness for the wish, to be fulfilled before our exertion was employed to produce it; if pleasure consisted not, as the prince of metaphysicians thought* in activity, but in eternal inaction without the necessity of making any exertion, then we would have been placed in quite another sort of a world than this. We would have been required, not to work out a character under discipline, but furnished with it ready made; with a mind so perfect that it is incapable of improvement, but no sphere for its exercise, since this would be equally needless whether for ourselves or others. The character being already perfect could not be improved; and all being alike, there would be no misery and consequently no need for its discipline for its own sake or others. This might be a desirable state in which to exist; but it is wholly different from the one in which we find ourselves as soon as consciousness awakes to a realization of our position. The conditions under which we are placed show us by the light of nature, the law written in our consciences, that we need to form our character, and have the means within us of doing this. This law has been reinforced by a revelation which is not different in kind, involving substantially the same terms, but enforcing its sanctions by testimony which, even though it were proved untrue

* Arist. *Eth. bich.* 1175, A. *ἀνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας ὅν γινεται καὶ ἡσυχίας.*

as an historical fact, is nevertheless true in its correspondence with the constitution of our nature and the experiences of our life. But this very correspondence of the two is a voucher for the claim that they both come from the same source. The correlation of their sanctions is proof that they are meant for the discipline of the same character; and that the two spheres of life to which they relate are coördinates of one system. No stronger moral proof than this could be afforded. Either by itself has as much credibility as that upon which we are required to act in our individual capacity or our relations to our neighbor. Both together, by their testimony, which continues unabated as far as they are permitted to work, prove that there is no limit to their action.

Thus Butler has shown that the proof afforded by nature and supplemented by revelation is the most convincing to a fair-minded inquirer who seeks to know the truth rather than display his ability to interpose doubts. The rôle of the objector is the easiest,* as well as the meanest, of all ways of displaying one's powers; but on a par with the incendiary, who can destroy the architectural monuments of genius, though he cannot erect even a hovel as a substitute. But every one who is willing to be guided with reference to a future life by such evidence as he unhesitatingly uses in this, finds all he can utilize in the combined testimony of nature and revelation. This proof is unique in the way it is handled in the *Analogy* of Bishop Butler. It does not consist in the several parts of proof taken as isolated, but in their combined effect. In this method he follows the course dictated by reason, but decried by those who would apply the atomic theory to the elucidation of moral questions, and insist that the chain is not stronger than its weakest link. All nature is a chain, a unit of elements which fit into each other, as is evident to him who can grasp the whole in its aggregation. The analogy which we see in the phenomena of nature which constitute them one universe, and the experiences of one person which constitute his individuality, show that they both belong to a system which embraces all things for its life, and the entire extent of time and

* Plato *Theaetetus*, 178 D. τὸ γ' ἀμφισβητῆσαι οὐ χάλεπον.

space for its field of action. Had our life been different from what it is, and not revealed to us as correlated to any other; had the evidences necessary to enable us to act rationally been diverse from those which related to another life, then the demand of unbelief for proof of another kind or degree might be valid. But reasoning from the basis of facts as they are, we can well answer those who hold the proof of a future life insufficient, in the words of Pascal*: Il a voulu se rendre parfaitement connaissable à ceux-la; et ainsi voulant paraître à déconvert à ceux qui le cherchent de tout leur cœur, et caché à ceux qui le fuient de tout leus coeus il tempère sa connaissance en sorte qu' il a donné des marques de soi visibles a ceux qui le cherchent, et obscures à ceux qui ne le cherchent pas. Here lies the root of the difficulty with unbelief of every sort and degree touching the evidences for the existence of God and the future life of man. Men love darkness rather than light, and therefore will not come to the light nor recognize it when it shines with the clearness of noonday. Hence there is no possibility of convincing such as come to the investigation determined in advance not to believe, and therefore insist on conditions which cannot be fulfilled without changing the principles which regulate the moral universe.

* Ed. Faugere, II., 151. Ed. Havet, II., pp. 47-48.

III.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY.*

BY THE REV. A. S. WEBER, A. M.

No idea has received more emphasis, during the last half century, than that of development. None has more profoundly stirred and stimulated the human mind. Gathering and combining, as it does, into one comprehensive movement, facts and theories which pertain to the physical, mental and moral realms, it has led the march of expanding thought along many, if not all, the avenues of modern scientific progress. It has done this in the face often of bitter opposition, and deep seated prejudice. Crudeness in holding the idea, coarseness in applying it to the study of various problems, seem not infrequently to have wrought mischief sufficient almost to justify the tardy recognition accorded to the idea itself.

As time has gone on the crude and the coarse have, however, been largely eliminated. Growing familiarity with the rational and religious aspects of development has revealed those aspects to be not antagonistic, but harmonious, in their relations. So-called "materialistic tendencies," supposed by some to inhere in the idea, have not undermined the Christian faith, as many were apprehensive that they would. On the contrary, its grounds have been strengthened. One achievement after another, accomplished it may be, in the direct interests of science, has turned out to be of indirect service to the cause of religion. Under the guidance of the idea, results differing very widely in character have been rapidly multiplying, and in this way acknowledgment won for it not only as to the value, but the validity also, of its claims. In every department of human knowledge, from physics to theology,

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evidences of its unmeasured significance, its revolutionizing power, are easily discoverable.

Of these general truths there is a signal illustration in modern psychology. The history of the science, since it has come under the developing power of the idea now under reference, must disclose even to casual examination remarkable progress. There is far greater precision and accuracy in the analysis of the various processes and phenomena of the human mind. There is less ill-siveness, more reliability, about the systematized principles and the developed facts of the science. There is a far clearer apprehension of the nature of mind itself, of the laws of its growth and of the methods of its activity. There is immeasurable gain in the application of results obtained to the conduct of matters educational, in nursery and school, college and university. And there is more successful use made of the science in its new form in the way of studying the numerous social and scientific, historical and philosophical problems now clamoring on every side for solution.

No clearer or stronger evidence of the progress thus indicated could be demanded than that afforded by the changed attitude in which large numbers now stand towards the branch of knowledge which has to do with mental phenomena and the laws by which they are governed. Not so long since there were many who looked upon psychological science as possibly an interesting intellectual pursuit for the few who are given to metaphysical speculations, but for the many the study of it seemed as empty of practical value as it was difficult of personal mastery. Now the science of mind is all but universally regarded as a most important branch of liberal training, a most serviceable factor in qualifying for practical usefulness in life. Of late there has not only been unaccustomed activity in circles long devoted to the study of mind, those circles have been enlarged, their number indefinitely increased. Every man is better qualified, it is now seen, for seizing opportunities and privileges, for discharging duties and responsibilities, by having even though it be but a partial knowledge of what psychology has to teach. The father is richer in

resources, in methods, in efficiency for the bringing up of his children; the teacher for the instruction of those who are to be taught; the employer for dealing with those whom he employs, the statesman for the enactment and execution of the public laws; the lawyer, the juror, the judge, for measuring out justice; the minister of the gospel for preaching the word and administering the affairs of his charge. In a word everyone having a knowledge of the nature of man as a thinking, feeling, willing being; a knowledge of the complexion received by that nature through heredity and environment; a knowledge of the motives under which that nature exercises its powers and develops its strength; and a knowledge of the conditions and limitations of that nature's life—that one has made acquisitions what are now generally recognized as indispensable to the greatest usefulness and the broadest culture of the individual character. Hence the earnest, the widespread public interest is one of the most difficult and complicated of all the subjects towards which the scientific research of our day is directing its investigations, an interest so great that some one has ventured the prophecy that this age, notwithstanding the fact that original minds in all fields are giving increased attention to its questions, will perhaps "be known in the future as the psychological period of intellectual interest and achievement."

During the period in which this changed attitude toward psychology has been brought about, it is true, the horizon of human knowledge has in every direction been greatly widened. Physicists, under the impulse of strong and laudable ambition to know the secrets of nature, have vied with each other in pressing their explorations farther and farther into her territory. Science after science has arisen and brought its contributions as new practical and beneficent means for enriching the physical, the intellectual, the social resources of our race—as a new impulsion indeed to almost every phase of modern life and civilization. These new conditions and this wider outlook have no doubt contributed somewhat to the deeper appreciation of the value and import of psychology. But the great power in this direction has been exerted by psychology itself, in the higher developed form to which

it has attained. It has stood, with other particular sciences, in the current of modern progress, and under the stress of its pressure has yielded to a transforming power. Out of a science that was old, there has been evolved, or, if it is preferred, developed a science that is new, wider in scope, richer in results, in closer alliance with other science, no longer under the long-borne reproach of vagueness and uncertainty, of doubtful value as a discipline, and of uselessness for practical service. And just in proportion to the development of the new science in these directions has been the increased confidence it has commanded, the deepened attention it has been receiving from ever enlarging numbers of thoughtful people.

This new psychology owes its existence, and the general favor, we have just seen, is now bestowed upon it, to the employment of the modern scientific spirit and method, in prosecuting the study of mental life and attempting the solution of its problems. Like other sciences energetically cultivated at the present time, psychology proceeds under guidance of the idea of development to make minutest analyses, in the inductive and experimental way wherever possible, of all mental phenomena. In its constructive efforts it follows the same guidance along the lines of genesis and growth, believing that the various forms under which the life of the mind comes to expression can all be better understood if traced from their origin, through the process of their "becoming," to what they now are. In other phrase, perception is looked upon as a growth, will as a growth, conscience as a growth, both in the individual and in the race. It follows the same guidance, moreover, in its anthropological and sociological comparisons, striving, as Prof. Ladd has somewhere so aptly put it, "to throw into the recesses of every individual soul the rays of light that shine from many individuals of the same and of other species in the great kingdom of souls."

In distinction from these methods, the earlier psychology had adhered very closely to the method simply of subjective introspection. It was correct in supposing that directly we know just so much of mental life as by self-introspection we can learn from

the phenomena of personal consciousness. But in limiting itself to such subjective observation, it was constantly hindered from reaching results that were adequate and satisfying. The one-sidedness due to individual peculiarities; the difficulty of seizing the particular mental state that was to be observed, and of holding it for a sufficient length of time, separate and distinct from other previous or succeeding states; the uncertainty as to whether two persons saw the same mental fact when speaking in identical terms—these and other similar perplexities made it at once desirable and necessary to supplement the strictly psychological method of observation by that of experiment, and of objective investigation of psychological data. To afford opportunity for experimentation the science of physiology was pressed into service; for the objective investigation referred to, extensive historical and sociological inquiries were placed under contribution.

It is interesting and instructive to follow the application of these new scientific methods in the two directions indicated, and to note some of the results which by them have been won to psychological knowledge. In turning for this purpose, in the first place, to physiology, it is proper to make the preliminary observation, that the experimental examination of the structure and functions of the nervous system, no matter how minute and painstaking it may be, can yield conclusions about the nature of mental activities only by means of inference or analogy. Höffding, the Danish philosopher, to whom modern psychology is so largely indebted, is particularly urgent in his insistence upon this point. "Every explanation," he says, "that physiology is able to give of the functions of organic life may be of service to psychological knowledge. * * * But it must be borne in mind that in the last resort objective psychology always rests on an inference by analogy—subjective psychology alone sees the phenomena themselves face to face. What, we as objective psychologists think we discover of mental life outside our own consciousness, we reproduce within ourselves by means of a sympathy closely connected with analogy. But these analogies may afford indispensable correctives for our subjective observations."

Were the wisdom and bearings of these cautionary words more generally understood and carefully remembered, much of the suspicion with which physiological investigations in the interests of psychological knowledge are now often regarded would be avoided. Only by the exceptional few have such experiments been intended to prove the identity of brain and mind, of the material and the spiritual. Not only the eminent authority just quoted, but Wundt and Lotze, Herbart and Lindner, among the Germans, Dewey and Hall, Bowne and James, among the Americans, teach in substance, that whilst physically conditioned upon certain nerve or brain structure, the phenomena of mental life are to be explained, not by physiological, but by psychical data. The mind and the body are the distinct elements which constitute the complex nature of man. The knowledge gained by the method of experimentation with the latter has of itself no value in the way of explaining the activities of the former. "Physiology can no more of itself give us the what or why or how of psychical life than the physical geography of a country can enable us to construct or explain the history of the nation that has dwelt within that country."

The fullest acceptance of these statements does not, however, contravene the idea of value, indefinitely great, attaching to the method of investigation furnished by physiology towards the advancement, the development of psychology. The vast body of literature, known as physiological psychology, would in itself appear to be proof sufficient of this. In the post-graduate course in psychology as laid down by our Alma Mater for students to follow, there are for instance not scores, or hundreds, but actually thousands, of closely-printed and deeply-interesting pages devoted to the consideration of different phases of this single topic. There would not be time in the hour to which we are limited, and in this presence there is no necessity, to detail the specific contributions made according to the records of this literature by the experimental method, to the knowledge of the mental life. We may pause long enough, however, to instance, by way of illustration, a few of the more conspicuous results that have been accomplished.

One of these is the successful analysis of certain states of consciousness that had long been regarded as ultimate, because they were beyond the analytic reach of simple introspection. This is true of the sensations of both color and sound, each of which, we now know, is made up of several elements that could never have been ascertained without the aid of physiological investigations. Another result obtained by inference from the accurate measurement of the rapidity with which neural processes traverse the nerves is the measurement of time occupied in psychic processes. Both of these measurements were once regarded as beyond the reach of human possibility. But the time required for the prick of an electric shock on the tip of the finger of one hand, to be carried to the seat of consciousness, and instruction thence to be issued to the end of the finger of the other hand for the pressure of a key, is now determined to the chronoscopic fineness of less than the thousandth part of a second. In this way the psychologic processes of association, attention, memory and volition are now explored and understood to an extent which the old method would never have undertaken and could never have reached. A third result appears in the aid the new method has given to explanation and observation by showing the processes which condition visual perception. The landscape which stretches out before the artist's eye is not the simple ultimate fact which the uninformed take it to be; it is not an impression stamped upon his mind from external nature alone. It is rather as described by a lecturer on Psychology in Art, "that which is built up from color and muscular sensations, with perhaps unlocalized feelings of extension, by means of psychical laws of interest, attention and interpretation. It is, in short, a complex judgment, involving within itself emotional, volitional and intellectual elements. The knowledge of the nature of these elements, and of the laws which govern their combination into the complex visual scene, we owe to physiological psychology through the new means of research with which it has endowed us. This doctrine that our perceptions are not immediate facts, but mediated psychological processes, has been called by Helmholtz the most important psychological result yet reached."

With this latter judgment there may not be general agreement among those who believe the new psychology to owe its deepened conviction as to the unity of the mind to the same experimental method. The older psychology represents the constitution of the human mind from an aggregative rather than from a unitary point of view. According to its theory the mind is an aggregation of faculties—the sum total of what we call sensation, perception, reason, memory, imagination, desire, will and their like. It forgot that these so-called faculties of the mind are mere abstractions of thought, and that they do not severally stand for anything really distinct in mental life. Now whilst retaining, in a measure at least, the vocabulary of the old, the new psychology guards against the misconception referred to and its mischievous consequences, by insistence upon the unity of the mind.

Unlike the body, unlike the brain, the mind has no organs, no parts. There are differences in the modes of our conscious life and activity, which need to be distinguished by names and classified, but always with the remembrance that the mind which knows is the same that feels and wills. "Consciousness does not appear to itself," Prof. James declares, "chopped up into bits. Such words as 'chain' or 'train' do not describe it fitly. It is nothing jointed; it flows. Let us call it the stream of consciousness or of subjective life." The mind is a unit. In exercise or movement its organic unitary life reaches out over the various activities which we distinguish and designate by different terms, though the life of thinking and feeling, desiring and willing, is discernible in every one of them. This single achievement of knowing the mind in its unity, in whose possession the new psychology rejoices, and which was suggested and developed in connection with physiological and biological discoveries, is of itself an ample return for all the toil expended in making the experimental investigations out of which it has grown.

When psychologic science had come to the full recognition of this organic unity of the human mind, the transition to the comparative method in its development was at once easy and natural. This transition marks a long stride forward in the growth of the

new psychology. It is a conception brought out into clear light by biological investigations that the life of an organism can be lived only under conditions of environment. Self-conscious life, the high-water mark reached in the evolution of life, is no exception to the conditions needed by life in lower stages of development. The human mind unfolds its powers and gathers strength by living in and struggling with its surroundings, just as other forms of life do in the presence and under the pressure of elements in whose midst they stand. Everything which stirs in the human soul, it thus comes to be seen, is conditioned by the place it occupies in the great historic or social system of human life. "No man liveth unto himself." No mind lives in separate independency. Hence the application of the comparative, anthropological and sociological methods by the new psychology. By their use the observations of individual life are amplified and corrected. The human mind is studied in the history, customs, faiths, institutions, languages and literatures of various peoples, under a variety of conditions, in different ages. Psychological data in their spontaneous and unsophisticated forms are met with in this way. No one can doubt the modifying and broadening effect upon the knowledge of mind produced by such comparative study. The same method takes up also the study of heredity, the mental life of savages, of children, of criminals, and of those in whom it manifests itself under abnormal or disturbed conditions, in order thus to enlarge the base upon which the generalizations of the science are to stand.

Here again the limitations of time, which must be regarded, forbid the selection of more than a few of the numerous facts which offer themselves for illustration. Take first the matter of language. It is difficult to estimate the wealth of material and of problems furnished by it to psychology. How it has originated; whether it was contemporaneous with or subsequent to thought; how thought and language have acted and reacted upon each other; what mental laws have caused the differentiation and development of languages; how their structure and syntax have been brought about; how the meaning of words has come to be

established, and how the rhetorical devices have been invented—these, it will be seen at once by any one at all acquainted with modern discussions of language, are but a partial list of the many interesting questions propounded by such discussions in the interests of psychological science.

As an auxiliary to their solution, the growing minds of children, as disclosed by the formation of their vocabulary, the grouping of words in sentences, the use of pronouns and so forth, has for years been receiving careful and enthusiastic attention among large and widely separated groups of interested observers of child-life. Such study of language in its origin and growth, its structure and refinement, it must be readily seen, could not but prove a potent influence, almost strong enough by itself to bring about the revolution from the old to the new in treating the science of mind.

But the new method, moreover, has cultivated also the large, fertile and productive field of literature, which adjoins that of language. History and biography, poetry and philosophy, have all been compelled to bring to modern science that which is enshrined in them of the inmost being and character of the mind of man. A striking example of this has recently come under my personal observation. George Adam Smith, the distinguished author and professor of Glasgow, delivered during the spring at Johns Hopkins University a remarkable series of lectures on Hebrew Poetry. The profound and sustained grasp with which the entire course had been wrought out abundantly warranted the enthusiastic interest with which the successive lectures were awaited by the great audiences that were privileged to hear them. But by far the most interesting of the lectures, the one which showed to the best advantage the keen and penetrating analytic power of the lecturer's intellect, and yielded no doubt the most satisfactory results to his hearers, was the one which drew forth from the poetry under consideration those psychologic facts and principles adapted to illustrate the mental life and character peculiar to the Semitic races. Such contributions from the study of literature cannot but supplement and enlarge the knowledge of

the workings of man's mind and of the laws which govern them. Extended historical study, wider experience gained by examining the varied forms of mental life as found in biography, in philosophic systems, perhaps most of all in real poetry—these have severally and collectively placed some of its most valuable possessions into the hands of the new psychology.

At least a passing reference should here be made to other lines of inquiry which are now being assiduously cultivated, and are returning valuable psychological suggestions. I refer to the study of mental life under abnormal or disturbed conditions. The insane and the lunatic, the delirious and the epileptic, the blind and the dumb, the defective and the criminal, are now undergoing investigation of the most searching character. Their biographies and their family histories are most carefully studied. Aside from their high practical value for dealing in a merciful and helpful way with those unfortunates in the institutions where in such distressingly large numbers they are gathered, the results attained are very important also for the interest and advancement of psychical science. Hypnotism and hallucination, dreams and visions, ecstacy and telepathy, mind-reading and faith-cure, which many have often been disposed to laugh out of court, are likewise brought under the analytic scrutiny of the scientific test, and for both pedagogic and purely philosophic purposes the results reached are to be neither despised nor disregarded.

Under the transforming impulse issuing from such comprehensive, comparative study as now partially and imperfectly outlined in connection with that obtained as the result of physiological experiments, it is no wonder that the science of mental phenomena, as once known in the light of self-inspection simply, should have undergone changes so great and fundamental as to entitle it in its new and developed form in a most eminent degree to the name of the new psychology.

Guided in the process of this transformation by the principles and laws, regnant in other particular progressive sciences of modern times, this new psychology has recognized, it is almost gratuitous to say, no logic save the logic of life and of fact. In

search only of the truth, it has allowed no preconceived notions to embarrass its efforts. Its investigations, analyses and comparisons have proceeded step by step only as fact, established by adequate experiment as being true to life, warranted advance to be made. It has inquired what it is to think, what to know, and has recognized that in these, questions of the highest import and of the greatest difficulty are met with, and that upon the answers given to them depend not only our accepted doctrines of theology, but our trust also in religion. Accordingly it accentuates knowledge and studies carefully its origin and development in the mental life. But it places greater emphasis, if possible, upon the feelings. It believes their importance to have been too long and too generally underrated. Their relation to the cognitive and volitional sides of mental life is vital and far more significant than has been often supposed. The new psychology therefore has good reasons for regarding the feelings as the deepest, the most inexplicable, thing in man. They furnish the great impulse to action and direct the course pursued by those actions. In them, rather than in the cognitive or volitional powers, lies also the great distinction between the mind of man, and that of brute creatures below him. Human feelings determine interest in truth, in righteousness, in beauty, and guide life and conduct along the paths of correct morals and pure religion. Hence the sensibilities are to be regarded as fundamental, whilst the intellect is simply instrumental, and the will merely executive.

The new psychology lays large stress also upon the will. It regards it not as an abstract power of unmotivated choice, nor as an executive power intended to obey the behests of the understanding. It is rather the living bond which connects and conditions all mental activity. Upon strictly psychologic grounds it regards the question as to the determinism or indeterminism of volition to be insoluble; but in its ethical tendencies, and after weighing well the voluminous and refined discussions to which all schools have contributed, it decides in favor of the freedom of man's will. The entire history of the new psychology, in its progressive development upon all these questions, is marked, it

must be seen, by repeated evidences of real contact with life. And in this probably there is one of the secrets whence has sprung the peculiar popular favor it has been accorded on the one hand, and on the other that ever widening influence upon, or power over, other departments of thought and inquiry which it has been so successfully wielding.

How, indeed, when we come to think of it, could it well be otherwise? Psychology being the systematic exhibition of our knowledge of the being, activity and growth of the human mind, the more accurate that exhibition is, and the more intelligent our apprehension of it, the more correct and thorough must be the result of every other science developed by us. Given the instrument, the results to be accomplished by it in any direction depend upon our knowledge of it in structure and function, and the skill with which we can employ it. This obvious truth as regards the mind, though not always given the recognition due to it, might be abundantly verified by examining systems of physical and metaphysical philosophy, or those of ethics and theology, with a view of ascertaining the number and character of the happy changes wrought in them by the direct and indirect influence of the new psychology.

At this time we must forego, however, the pleasure of entering the delightful fields of inquiry which here so invitingly open before us. In passing them it must suffice to say in a general way that their testimony is strong and unequivocal. In the realm of physics it has dissolved ancient illusions and established important facts and principles. In that of æsthetics it has given a deeper insight into the nature and laws of beauty, and thus reduced the difficulty of their application in the production of works of art. In the sphere of ethics there has been heartfelt response to the broader and truer principles of the later psychology, and the advantages thus gained have lifted the entire science of human duty to a loftier plane. In the sphere of philosophy, especially as regards that most insidious heresy of the day known as agnosticism, significant results in the way of arresting its influence and showing the untenability of its position, have been accom-

plished. In the sphere of theology more than one important doctrine has been affected and modified. The question as to the nature and reality of "a Christian consciousness" has been studied in the light of scientific psychology, and our knowledge of the content of man's mind as redeemed, placed upon firmer grounds. The question of personal immortality—question old, yet ever new—has been investigated once more—and in the light of the new science—with the result of grounding all the more securely, if possible, our faith in the great truth brought to light by the Gospel. The question of inspiration, as applied to the mind of man and as the product of a mind inspired, has received new attention, and the most satisfactory views of the question are those which acknowledge their debt to the new psychology and take account of the deeper insight into the nature and life of the mind, which it has disclosed. The conception of God himself, as an outside agent or will ruling over creation by the application of external force, has been compelled, under the potent influences of better psychological notions, to make way for the more correct Christian conception of Deity as a universal personal presence absolutely pervasive throughout the universe or immanent in it.

These few facts may serve to indicate the numerous and varied directions into which the influence of the new psychology has been reaching out in the course of its comparatively brief history. No cautious person would think of affirming that its scientific researches have already accomplished their greatest work. More and larger things may reasonably be expected from the further development now in progress. And those who can stand in the presence of its past and prospective achievements without becoming interested, or without acknowledging the importance and significance of the new psychology both in itself and in the influence it must exert upon knowledge and faith, upon morals and religion, can not be placing a just and accurate estimate upon established facts. Those who do not in the conduct of their intellectual life take proper account of this psychological movement cannot be reasonably expected to keep abreast with that which is truest, best and most inspiring in any department of current inquiry, opinion and thought.

IV.

THE DRINKING HABIT AND PROHIBITION.

BY REV. D. B. LADY, D. D.

One of the great evils under the sun is the excessive use of strong drink. It is not the only evil under the sun. There are those who claim that it is not the greatest. It is not necessary to the design of this paper to assert that this claim is correct or that it is not correct. If it is one of the great hindrances to human welfare, which probably all are ready to admit, enough is conceded for the present purpose.

The bad effects of drunkenness come first of all to the man who drinks.

Drinking intoxicating liquors, such as wine and whiskey, impairs the strength and vigor of the physical powers. It inflames the stomach and interferes with the digestion. It destroys a pure, natural and healthy taste and appetite for wholesome food. It produces nervousness. It exhausts physical vigor and energy. It shortens life. The drunkard in many instances does not live out half his days. His sun sets at noon. And instead of its being a bright sunset, the herald of another and better day, his life goes out in clouds and darkness, with no promise of good for the life to come.

Of twenty-five men who went to the Arctic regions on the Greely expedition only six came back alive. The first to perish was a man who had, years before, been a hard drinker. Of those who lived through the hardships to which they were exposed all were men of the most strictly temperate habits. This is the testimony of General Greely himself.

Drunkenness also interferes with the mental faculties. It diminishes acuteness and accuracy of thought. It weakens the memory. It impairs the correctness of the reasoning. It vitiates

the judgment. It stands in the way of sustained application. It destroys the mind. Where drunkenness increases, insanity increases.

Unwise physicians have been known to administer whiskey to tide an infant over a dangerous disease. In such cases the life is sometimes preserved, and the patient lives an idiot to the end of his days. "In 1874 there were 300,000 distillers of brandy in France, who were only permitted to produce 40 liters apiece. The number has now increased to 900,000. There has been a corresponding increase in drunkenness among the French lower classes, and whereas in 1884 there were only 123 cases of insanity to every 100,000 of the population, now there are 166 to every 100,000."—*Reformed Church Messenger*, November 14, 1895.

Drunkenness deadens the moral nature. It sears the conscience. It perverts the sense of righteousness in the heart and takes away all desire for a spotless and holy life. It inflames every bad passion and often makes its victim a monster of iniquity. The drunkard looses his hold on religion. He crushes out of his heart the most noble and generous impulses. He wallows in the mire of excess and debauchery and drowns every spark of honor and virtue which ever shone in his conduct, or promised to give brilliancy to his career among his fellowmen or to make him acceptable to his Judge. An eminent jurist, with an experience of thirty years on the bench said, in a recent lecture, that the use of strong drink was the cause of three-fourths of the crimes committed in the county in which he held office.

As regards religion, St. Paul says the fruits of the Spirit are love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, temperance. These are the outgrowth of the Christian life, the positive marks of the Christian character. They spring from the seed of divine truth and grace in the heart. They result from union through faith with Christ. And among these is temperance.

On the other hand, on the negative side, among the things to be renounced and avoided are envyings, drunkenness, revelings, and such like. The Apostle says to those whom he is addressing

that he had already warned them and now warns them again that they which do such things cannot inherit the kingdom of God. Such things degrade the character, corrupt the moral life and make the individual who practices them hateful to the Divine Being. Men dishonor God by them. They unfit themselves for the society of the saints. They cannot be admitted into the Kingdom. Among the things thus condemned is drunkenness. "Be not drunk with wine wherein is excess," or intemperance, is the Apostolic injunction, "but be filled with the Spirit."

But the evil effects of drinking to excess, appalling as they are, do not end with the individual who thus indulges a depraved appetite. It is true here, as elsewhere, that no man liveth to himself. The results of the drunkard's wrong-doing come to others as well as to himself.

God hath set the solitary in families. And the drunkard's wife and children share in the effects of his evil habits. As a rule, he impoverishes himself to gratify his thirst. The manufacture and sale of intoxicants are enormously profitable. It is no uncommon thing for a man to spend a fortune upon his passion for strong drink. He takes away the support of his family that he may minister to his failing. His wife is deprived of the necessities and comforts of life. His children are clothed in rags and miss the advantages which a provident father might secure for them. He beggars himself and those dependent upon him that his increasing thirst may be satisfied. A drunkard's family is not a happy family. Not only poverty, but cruelty in many forms, is found there. The wife-beater is in many cases a man who is intoxicated. An ungovernable temper, profanity, jealousy and hatred toward those who have a right to love and and protection go with the excessive use of strong drink. The example of enslavement to a debasing appetite and of a vicious instead of a virtuous life is set before an innocent offspring. The thirst for intoxicants is often transmitted to the children, along with a diseased body, a weakened intellect and depraved moral instincts. The loss of self-respect, and a sense of being disgraced in the eyes of the community, must also be borne by the friends of the lover of strong drink.

Some one recently wrote: "Who would not rather have a son or a friend the victim of the robber or the assassin than of the liquor seller? If the robber steals his money or his property he leaves him still a man, honored and respected. If the assassin slays him for his money he is still fondly remembered and loved as before. But the victim of the liquor-seller, robbed of his manhood as well as of his money, is loathsome even to his friends while he lives, and a source of inexpressable grief when he is dead; an agonizing sorrow from which there is no relief but in forgetfulness of his debauched life and hopeless death."—*Reformed Church Messenger*, November 14, 1895.

"The number of hard drinkers in our country to-day is estimated to be 2,500,000. And an average of four other persons are affected by each one's degradation and shame."—*Reformed Church Messenger*, November 14, 1895.

This refers to the families and near relatives of the drinking men.

Drunkenness is a great waste of money. The amounts spent for intoxicating drink every year are enormous, and are worse than thrown away. It is not a difficult matter to obtain accurate figures upon this point from the internal revenue tax. Whiskey is taxed 90 cents a gallon and beer is taxed \$1.00 per barrel. The amounts received from this source are regularly reported. From these reports it has been ascertained that about (one billion) \$1,000,000,000 are being spent in this country alone for strong drink each year. About half that sum is spent for bread and one-third for meat. For woolen goods less than one-third of that sum is spent, for iron and steel also less than one-third, and for education not one-tenth. And it is almost 200 times as much as is raised and expended each year for the cause of Home and Foreign Missions. Joseph Cook said some time ago: "It has been proven that although we receive \$100,000,000 a year from the liquor traffic, that is only \$1.60 a head, whilst \$15 a head are added to our burdens." In Belgium in 1851 the revenue from the tax on strong drink was \$800,000. It is now \$6,600,000. This represents an enormous expenditure by the people of that country

for intoxicants. And it brings to our attention the alarming fact that this expenditure is increasing at a ruinous rate.

The money spent for strong drink is wasted as far as the individual who spends it is concerned. What a man pays out for whiskey or beer he cannot use for food or clothing. And the whiskey or beer will be of no benefit to him, but in many cases will be an injury to him either immediately or in the future, and in some cases in the end an injury of the most fearful character. It may, of course, be said that the manufacturing and selling of intoxicants gives employment to a large sum of money and to many men, and thus serves to support many families. Over against this, those who have looked into the matter inform us that the same amount of money invested in iron and woolen mills would provide work for just twice as many men and support, therefore, just twice as many families. It is also sometimes said that the iron and woolen mills now established are often compelled to stand idle for months because there is already a surplus of their products, and that to employ one-third of the money now employed in distilleries and breweries and saloons in the establishment of new iron and woolen mills would ruin the iron and woolen business. This looks reasonable at first glance. But it is certainly a sufficient answer to it to say that the overproduction of iron implements and woolen goods exists, not because the needs of the Nation have been supplied, but because of the inability of the people to purchase what they need. And this inability exists not among people of temperate and total-abstinence habits, but among those who spend their money for intoxicating liquors, and who are on this account not able to provide comfortable shelter and clothing for themselves and their families. The assertion may be safely made that if nothing were spent for strong drink in this country, the money thus saved would be used for better food and clothing and shelter, in house-building and traveling and in innumerable other ways, in such abundance that in a few years all branches of morally legitimate business would be so greatly stimulated that every dollar taken out of the whiskey business would find profitable employment in

other enterprises, and that every man who now makes a living by making or selling strong drink would make an equally good living in some other line of life, whilst hundred of thousands of men, women and children would be healthier and more comfortable in outward estate and have a better conscience towards God and men.

Rev. James B. Cooper, of New Britain, Conn., recently made the following calculation. The money spent for strong drink in New Britain each year would pay all the taxes, the salaries of all the school teachers, build a new high-school building and a Young Men's Christian Association building, pay the church debts of the town, amounting to \$330,000, and give every poor family a barrel of flour and buy a suit of clothes for every needy person. And this town is probably no exception to other towns of its size in this country; and in other countries, as a rule, the case is still worse.

It has been estimated that in Chicago last year \$40,000,000 was spent for liquors. It has also been pertinently added: What would this do towards settling the "wage question?" It would give 20,000 families homes worth \$2,000 each.

If it were possible to put a stop to all drinking for once, in less than two years we could pay the national debt with the money thus saved; in half a year more we could retire the legal tender paper currency, and, as the Secretary of the Treasury believes, prevent, in a large measure, the exportation of gold from this country to Europe; in a few years more we could pay all the state, city and county debts, and afterwards support the whole machinery of national and state government, with their large annual appropriations, and do a great deal towards paying county, school and road taxes.

"At a late meeting the Rev. D. M. Beach, of Cambridgeport, Mass., told the story of Cambridge's triumph over the saloon, by which the city gained \$90,000, through the absence of the saloon against the loss of \$60,000 license money. He said that the savings of the people had risen from \$140,000 in the last year of the saloon, eight years ago, to \$556,000 for this year."—*Reformed Church Messenger*, November 28, 1895.

The testimony of the most thoughtful men in all civilized countries, men with the best opportunities to form a correct judgment, is that drinking is the cause of a large part of the lawlessness and crime, and thus of the expense incurred in the suppression and punishment of crime, to say nothing of the degradation and wretchedness resulting from crime, in the countries where they reside. Archbishop Croke, of Ireland, says: "If it were not for drunkenness there would be no crime in Ireland. As it is there is no crime which does not arise out of that evil."—*Reformed Church Messenger*, December, 5, 1895.

The London Times, as quoted by the *Reformed Church Messenger*, says: "It would be impossible to find anything which stands for so much loss to soul, body and estate as the public house. Even if we accept the best that can be made for it in principle, the fact is it is still a huge nuisance and misery. There is not a vice, or disease, or disorder, or calamity of any kind that has not its frequent rise in the public house. The public house degrades, ruins and brutalizes a large fraction of the British people."—*Reformed Church Messenger*, December 12, 1895.

Inspector Byrnes, the famous detective and Police Superintendent of New York, says: "After all, if we hunt vice and crime back to their lairs we will be pretty sure to find them in the gin-mill. Drunkenness is the prolific mother of most of the evil doing. Drunkenness is the prime cause of all the trouble."—*Reformed Church Messenger*, October 3, 1895.

Says George W. Douglas: "I impeach the accursed liquor traffic as a conspiracy against the sanctity of the family. A moralist has well said: 'There is not a demoralizing league in this city but is bottomed on liquor; there is not a gambling hell but is bottomed on liquor; there is not a house of social sin and death but is bottomed on liquor!' See you the transition? Out of the barroom into the gambling hell; out of the gambling hell into the house of sin and death, of which, says Solomon, many enter, but none return; for swift footed and sure, most find an early grave, and a ruin which the eternities shall not repair."—*Reformed Church Messenger*, October 10, 1895.

But it is simply impossible to bring before our minds anything like a complete picture of the ruinous results of strong drink, even though we should continue with these facts and opinions indefinitely. The loss of physical power, of mental vigor and clearness, the moral degradation, the waste of money, the poverty, disease, wretchedness and crime which result from strong drink, to say nothing of the forfeiture of eternal salvation coming upon the 2,500,000 inebriates in this country and upon those who are rapidly recruiting their ranks, and the loss and suffering which their friends and the communities where they live, which are bound to care for them and punish them, are called upon to undergo, are absolutely indescribable. Drunkenness is so great an evil and its consequences are so appalling that no pen can fully set them forth.

There are, however, those who claim that alcohol and the liquors of which it is the basis have a legitimate place in the economy of our life, that physicians use them with the best result, and that to banish them from our midst entirely would be a serious loss to the health of many who now receive great benefit from their use.

The testimony is, however, far from being all on one side on this branch of the subject. Physicians of experience and ability have practiced medicine for years without using alcohol, and have declared that they could get along very well without it.

Dr. Norman Kerr says: "All intoxicating drinks are poisonous. The lighter beers and the finest fermented wines are as truly, though not as strongly, intoxicating as are the coarsest and cheapest spiritous drinks."—*Reformed Church Messenger*, October 10, 1895.

"Thirteen hundred and fifty-five Canadian physicians were asked if general health would be improved by total abstinence, and 1,068 answered in the affirmative. Out of 1,340 who replied to a question on moderate drinking, 901 said that the use of intoxicants, even in moderation, is injurious to health and to activity of body and mind."—*Reformed Church Messenger*, October 30, 1895.

The National Medical Association of England declared, in 1884, that whiskey ought to be used in medical practice with the same caution as any other powerful poison. The London *Lancet*, a prominent medical journal, in six months' time reported 2,000 cases treated by eminent English physicians, not one of whom prescribed alcohol in any form. And some of the best hospitals in London have quit the use of alcohol entirely, and they have had better success since then than ever before.

There are many persons who take an occasional glass of wine or whiskey who have not the least idea that they are in danger of becoming drunkards. They say they will stop in time; when they find themselves getting too fond of strong drink they will set themselves against it. But in this way millions have already deceived themselves. One effect of drinking is to weaken the will power. When one finds himself getting too fond of intoxicants it may be too late to resist the appetite successfully. It is a thousand times easier to overcome the inducements to drink before the habit of it is formed or the appetite for it is created than afterwards. The viper is easily killed when it is small and comparatively harmless. It is the act of a very foolish person to let it grow strong and dangerous before attempting to destroy it.

But is it wrong to take a single drink? A man who steals a thousand dollars is a thief. A man who steals one dollar is a thief too. If one tells twenty-five lies he is a liar. If one tells one lie he is a liar too. He who drinks ten glasses of whiskey a day is a drunkard. It would be hard to understand upon what principle we could claim that he who drinks but one glass a day is not just to that extent a drunkard too. There are those who maintain that it is getting drunk that is sinful, and not drinking. If drinking results directly in sinfulness, then drinking is sinful. If ten glasses of whiskey make a man drunk, then one glass must bear one-tenth of the guilt, because it has caused one-tenth of the sin. The divine law deals with causes as well as with effects. The same law which forbids stealing forbids coveting also. Christ says the axe is laid to the root of the tree. Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit is

hewn down and cast into the fire. Drinking brings forth drunkenness and all its attendant curse and sin. If the axe were laid at the root of the tree, if no one ever drank even one glass of strong drink, most certainly no fruit of drunkenness would ever disgrace and befoul the life of the individual or of the race. A reformation of this kind begins with a single person, and it grows by bringing others, one by one, to adopt its principles.

How shall this great evil be abated? Shall we attempt to regulate and diminish it, or to abolish and destroy it? This is a question that has occasioned the most earnest and at times the most intemperate discussion.

The individual, of course, can control himself. He can, if he will, decline and refuse to drink, and thus save himself from the loss in estate and physical power, and from the mental and moral degradation which comes to a man through his own intemperance. But he cannot in this way save himself, and those whose temporal welfare and future happiness are his concern, from the wretchedness and loss which, as a rule, are visited upon the near relatives of the drunkard and upon the citizens of the same community to which he belongs.

Nearly every man in this country has a high regard for personal liberty. He is not willing to give up his own freedom or to interfere with the freedom of others. He feels that he has a right to regulate his own actions, to eat and drink what he himself prefers and not what another prescribes, and to use his capital in such manufacture or trade as will secure him the largest returns. And there is a strong disposition on the part of the people and the lawmakers to give every man in the land such freedom.

But there are limitations to freedom even in a free country. It was the French Revolutionary Convention that enunciated the truth that, "The liberty of each citizen ends where the liberty of another citizen commences." There is such a thing as freedom. But where one desires to use his freedom to the injury of another, the principle of restraint legitimately comes in. Theft and adultery and murder are crimes in the eyes of the law in all civilized

countries, and have been from time immemorial, because the commission of them, even though the perpetrator might claim a right of personal liberty in the case, would most seriously interfere with the rights of others, whose rights must also be respected. For this reason the insane who are dangerous are locked up and the thief and the murderer are punished. The law itself allows no guilty man to escape, whatever may be said of the administration of the law. And this is done not only that justice may be vindicated, but that society may be protected. The man-eating tiger in the jungles of India has no rights which any one respects. And why should the rum-seller, who robs his victim of property and life and shuts the gates of Paradise against his soul, and brings unnecessary shame to his relatives and expense upon the community, be regarded as having any rights in this direction which the public, which suffers from the business of the one and from the habits of the other, is bound to respect.

If it is true, as a distinguished observer of facts recently said, that "all the crimes on earth do not destroy so many of the human race, nor alienate so much property from beneficial uses," as the drinking habit does, and, as the *New York Tribune* recently said, that "the liquor traffic is to-day the heaviest clog upon the progress and the deepest disgrace of the nineteenth century," it would certainly accord with a wise public policy and with the best interests of the community, not only to restrict and try to regulate, as we do now, the appetite of the drunkard and the business of the drunkard-maker, but to prohibit, by the most sweeping laws and the strictest enforcement of them, all manufacturing and selling of intoxicating drink.

"The cry of personal liberty is the cry, in the first instance, of the saloonkeeper and of the drunkard, then of the demagogue and politician, whose horizon is bounded by success at the next election. It is an appeal for an order of things which has shocked the moral sense of the world by its indecency, its cruelty and its crime."—*Reformed Church Messenger*, November 28, 1895.

There is evidently a growing sentiment in favor of prohibition. A generation ago one could make whiskey anywhere in the

United States without tax or regulations; and almost any one could sell it on condition of paying a small license fee annually. Now we have "high license," and "local option," and "Brooks laws," and the frequent proposition and occasional enactment of the severest restrictive measures.

The New York *Observer* recently said: "The scant respect which not only the public sentiment, but our courts as well, have for the alleged rights of liquor dealers, is significant of the general condemnation under which the liquor traffic lies. There is general agreement that any restriction that can be put upon the trade is legitimate, and that its pursuit should be made as difficult as possible. Any obstacle that can be devised to increase the difficulty of procuring drink is tacitly accepted as wise and just, and even habitual drinkers vote for the practical outlawry of those supplying them with liquor. The protection afforded men in other businesses by the constitutional prohibition of the deprivation of property without due process of law is, in the case of the liquor dealer, withdrawn."—*Reformed Church Messenger*, October 10, 1895.

The following statements appeared in the *Messenger* a short time ago: "Sentiment in Georgia seems to be growing in favor of the anti-barroom bill, which proposes to abolish barrooms, to prohibit the manufacture, sale, and keeping for sale, of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, and to provide for its manufacture and sale for other purposes." "In the Argentine Republic when a man is caught drunk he is made to sweep the streets for eight days." "The police in Denmark have a curious way of dealing with those found drunk on the streets. They summon a cab and place the patient inside. Then they drive to the station, where he gets sober, and then home. The agents never leave him till they have seen him safe in the bosom of his family. Then the cabman makes his charge, and the police surgeon makes his, and the agents make their own claim for special duty, and the bill is presented to the host of the establishment where the culprit took his last overpowering glass."

These things show the state of men's minds towards the whole

business of making, selling and drinking intoxicating beverages. Men are beginning to see that drinking intoxicants is evil and evil only; that the total abstainer is in every way in a better condition than he who drinks; that the rum-seller is growing rich through the temporal and spiritual undoing of his patrons; that heavy burdens are being bound and laid upon the community by the whiskey dealer and his victim, which the sober and industrious citizens are compelled to bear. Hence the public sentiment is becoming educated to an understanding of this, one of the worst of all nuisances, and the people are putting all kinds of obstructions in its path. The final step will be prohibition. It may come soon or it may be indefinitely delayed. The sooner men come to look the monstrous evil in the face and the better they come to understand its true character, the sooner and the more emphatically will they say: It shall exist and be free to ruin a large part of every generation of the human family no longer. As the thief and murderer have been outlaws for ages, as the unlicensed distiller, the moonshiner, is an outlaw now, so in time to come, under the awakened moral sense which follows the earnest preaching of a pure gospel, no whiskey will be made or sold except in defiance of law.

V.

THE FIRST CHAPTER OF GENESIS READ IN THE
LIGHT OF MODERN SCIENCE.

BY H. P. LAIRD.

James Playfair, born in 1748, and successively Professor of Mathematics and of Natural Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, gave out *Ex Cathedra* that there was no evidence that the world had a beginning, and none that it would have an end. This was then accepted by many as scientific truth, although thousands of years before the Psalmist had said: "These (the earth and the heavens) will indeed perish * * * yea, all of them will wax old like a garment." (Part of verse 27, of the 102d Psalm.) It is scientific now to hold with Moses, that the present order of the Universe had a beginning and with the Psalmist, that it will have an end.

The theme of this chapter surpasses all other dramatic representations. Its sustained dignity and sublimity through every stage of the birth of worlds never falls below the stupendous magnitude of the subject. There is no abrupt and broken transition from the height of the divine creative activities described; but rather the calm inauguration of the crowning glory of years of creative energy by the Sabattic rest not yet ended.

Whoever, on a starry night, pauses for ten minutes to look up into the heavens and beholds there the composure, and serenity, which reigns in all that vast domain, will be impressed with the certainty that a time came when the Creator having finished the scheme He had planned ceased, so far as human observation extends, from all further creative activity. All the world has this scientific corroboration of a fact asserted in this narrative.

Aristotle argued that matter was eternal. Plato, his master, more cautious left the question undetermined. The author of

first Genesis with directness and a tone of assured certainty, bore to the children of men a message of profound significance: "In the beginning God, *bara*, created the heavens and likewise the earth."

Here is a new thought for the world; it transcends all experience. From whence did it come in the distant past when this narrative was written unless it was revealed from above? The idea is one of profound significance which Sir Isaac Newton, after a most elaborate scientific investigation of the system of the universe at the close of the *Principia* on page 527, confirms in these words *Elegantissima hæc Solis, planetarum et cometarum compages, non nisi consilio et dominio Entis, intelligentis et potentis oriri potuit, * * * Hic omnia regit, non ut anima Mundi, sed ut universorum Dominus.*

First Genesis is a scenic representation of the order of the creations described, embodying the earliest revelation concerning God, and the origin of things set down in formal statement and transmitted to us by the hand of Moses, and has all the charm and freshness of a perennial inspiration. It has just what the Latin poet once prayed for but did not obtain. *Dii cœptis (Nam vos mutastis et illas) Adspirate meis.*

It can not be doubted by any Christian but that the Apostle John wrote by divine inspiration, when he set forth in formal statement, in the first chapter of the Gospel by him, the eternity of the Son of God and His work in the creation of the world. What the Apostle John wrote can not be verified, even by the utmost human research, and our belief in it rests on faith. The truth of the statement contained in the record in first Genesis appeals to many facts which may be made the subject of human research and observation. It is this feature which gives the narrative of creation such a profound interest in the thinking of all men, and hence it has been scrutinized more than any other portion of the sacred record. By the consent of the ages, and by the approval of the most learned and devout men of every age since the days of Moses, it has been placed at the head of the most stupendous and far-reaching system of religious belief; as if an autograph of God.

In announcing the proposition contained in the first verse, the author had the choice of three Hebrew words: *Yatsar* to form, *Asa* to make, and *Bara* to create. If he had used the first or second of those words he would have expressed the prevalent idea which existed in that age in regard to the visible things of the world. That he used the transcendent term *bars*, involving the idea of origination, which is now regarded as the only scientific mode of accounting for the origin of matter, is not without its weight on the question of a divine revelation.

At the close of the nineteenth century, a gentleman seated in his study at the hour of midnight, by pressing his finger on a button, can instantly flash the light in all the rooms of his large mansion. This might suggest to him the fact which Moses has mentioned in the third verse, "Let there be light and there was light." But in that distant age, when this chapter was written, how was it possible for Moses, without any experience in electricity, to have described so sublimely and scientifically the lighting up of the universe. This is the only part of creation described as having occurred instantaneously, and in looking back in the light of the experience of this age it must be apparent that the instantaneous effect is in accordance with *Science*; but Moses asserted this fact *a priori* before Science had shed any light on the subject of electricity. Whence had he this knowledge, unless it was revealed to him, or to those who preceded him? The first and second eras correspond with the Azoic age of the geologists, in which there is no evidence of either vegetable or animal life. How do those who deny the inspiration of this narrative account for this coincidence? The exception taken to the representations in the seventh verse, of the separation of the waters below from the waters above upon the expanse can safely be left to Hebrew scholarship. Any one who is familiar with the genius of Hebrew thought and language will have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the author understood the cloud system floating in the expanse just as we do now.

The Mozaic record informs us that the waters which covered the earth were collected into *one place*. This is an important

statement and is verified by geological research. The deep sea explorations fitted out by the British Government within the last twenty-five years ascertained by actual navigation that all the oceans have a continuous connected water way.

Prof. James D. Dana (Geology), page 11, says: "But while the continents are separate areas the oceans occupy *one continuous* basin or channel."

Following the retirement of the waters to the great channels, which they still substantially occupy, the dry land appeared and in the same era, the *third* of this narrative, at the Divine command the earth brought forth such a vegetation as has not been seen since the carboniferous period. The earth was warm and genial from its own internal heat. The carbonic gas in the atmosphere, the food of plants was abundant and the electrical light, which first lit up the universe, was everywhere present to vivify. If coal is of vegetable origin, we have overwhelming evidence of the exuberant productions of vegetable life *before* the coal formation existed. It is estimated by geologists that a stratum of coal six feet thick would require fifty-four feet of vegetable fiber for its production. The plants thus converted into coal must have flourished many thousands of years before they were carbonized, and at a period when no air-breathing animal could exist on the surface of the earth. The excess of carbonic acid then prevailing, but afterwards converted into coal, leaves no ground for believing that any air-breathing animal existed at a period *before* the coal was formed. In estimating the amount of woody fibre to make a stratum of six feet of coal the geologists make no allowance for the amount of carbonic acid gas which the coal material may have absorbed after it had fallen to the ground, but this would not reduce the estimate materially.

Professor Dana (Geology), page 161, says: "Indications of plants occur in earlier *Archean* beds than those of animals." I have not observed that any of the writers on geology have assigned any satisfactory reason why the coal plants when fallen did not rot as they do in all subsequent times. The reason seems obvious. Carbonic acid gas is heavier than atmospheric air, which

contains oxygen and excludes the oxygen from the fallen ferns and plants; and thus protected them from the process of slow combustion, the result of oxidation. The evidence from geological research that plant life preceded animal life, at least so far as air-breathing animals are concerned, seems to be overwhelming. The two records, *Moses and Geology*, are at one on this point. In first Genesis the events of millions of years are condensed on to a single page; hence it would be unreasonable to expect more than the mere mention of the leading features of each creative period.

That vegetation flourished at that remote period as it has never since done is apparent from the large coal veins, not only in temperate latitudes, but which have been also discovered in $81^{\circ} 45'$ of north latitude, at which place the thickness of the stratum was reported to be twenty-five feet. Prof. Haeckle, of Jena, was right in saying "that the general condition of life in primeval times must have been entirely different from those of the present time." (*History of Creation*, Vol. I., pp. 341, 342.) When God said, "Let the earth bring forth grass, herbs yielding seed and fruit trees yielding fruit after their kind," we may be quite sure that the primeval conditions were all arranged for such a result, and that we have in this narrative the order in which this happened is not contradicted by geology. At an earlier period, when we were ignorant of the source of solar heat, it was urged as an objection against the authority of first Genesis that the sun should have been made before or cotemporary with vegetable life.

It is now the opinion of those most conversant with physical science that the heat of the sun results from its contraction. Among the number of scientists who maintain this view, Sir William Thompson, of England, and Prof. Herman Helmholtz, of Germany, stand preëminent. In the prosecution of this investigation of the source of the sun's heat, it has been determined by these and other physical investigators that the heat of the sun, at the present rate of contraction and distribution of heat, would be exhausted in less than twenty-one millions of years from the time it first shed its light and heat on the

earth, unless there was latent heat in its matter when it began to condense, and that even on this latter hypothesis its supply of heat to the earth could not exceed one hundred millions of years.

On the other hand, the leading geologists are quite certain that the work of denudation and rock formation represents a period of not less than five hundred millions of years. This long period includes the *Azoic* period, when there was neither plant nor animal life, as well as all subsequent ages. This conflict of authority makes room for a degree of presumption that Moses spoke from the book of Revelation when he assigned the fourth day for the making of the sun and moon, and if, in the further investigation of the subject of difference between the physical investigators and geologists, it should be established that both are approximately right, the position of Moses as a *scientist*, if not an inspired writer, will take precedence of all searchers after truth who have come after him. It will then be the task of those who deny the authority of this chapter to account for the prescience of the author. The economy of the scheme of creation leads us to believe that the Supreme Architect furnished no more power than is necessary to run the universe according to a prearranged plan; hence He made no provision for a supply of sun power *ab extra*, during the time when the created thing in itself had such power. The earth in its earliest stage was a *quasi* sun generating heat and electrical light by its contraction; but when the surface was sufficiently cooled to admit of plant life the word went forth and it was clothed with an exuberance of vegetable life. We thus see the philosophy of there being no sun heat in the earliest stage of the earth's life. If the investigators of physical science are right in their calculations and the geologists in theirs, if the sun had been made before vegetable life began, its source of heat would have been expended millions of years ago. JAMES CROLL, one of her Majesty's Scotch geologists, in "CLIMATE AND TIMES," page 347, says: "Gravitation is now generally admitted to be the only conceivable source of the sun's heat."

R. S. Ball, Astronomer Royal for Ireland, Encyclopedia, Vol.

XVII., p. 311, says: "Now what supplies this heat? (heat of the sun). * * * As the sun loses heat it contracts. * * * The sun is thus slowly contracting; but as it contracts it gives out heat, * * * and thus the further cooling and further contraction of the sun is protracted. * * * It can be shown that the sun is at present contracting, so that its diameter diminishes four miles every century."

If we accept the statement in first Genesis, that the sun was not made until the fourth creative day, the apparently conflicting position between the geologists and the investigators of physical science is reconciled.

There is another line of proof of the late appearance of the sun as a member of our solar system so obvious that it is remarkable that it has not been adverted to.

All the geologists agree that the conditions which prevailed in the period which furnished vegetable life for the formation of the coal was a warm, moist, equable temperature extending over the whole area of the dry land. This is proven by the fact that the principal coal plants flourish best under such climatic conditions; that great beds of coal are found in the Arctic region between 70° and 78° of north latitude, and that the flora which composes these Arctic seams of coal is of the same species as the plants which compose the coal strata in the now temperate region. The inference is that the internal heat of the earth at this early period furnished from pole to pole a sufficient amount of heat to render the climate warm and equable, and just as the coal flora required.

The facts are indubitable, and the only inference which can be drawn from them is that at this early period the Arctic regions enjoyed a warm climate, which the internal heat of the earth could alone supply.

Sound philology forbids holding that the Hebrew word *Yom*, day, in this narrative has a more extended signification in some parts of the narrative than in other parts, *unless* the context permits an inference of such a distinction. A degree of the circle of the terrestrial equator is about seventy miles in length, while

a degree of a parallel circle near the north pole may not be one-half mile in length; and yet we could find no fault with a description in which the word degree was used in reference to both circles, if there was anything in the context to indicate that in one place was meant a degree of the equatorial circle, and in the other place that the degree mentioned had reference to a fractional part of a parallel circle near the north pole. The Hebrew word *Yom*, day, in the 14th, 16th and 18th verses of the first chapter of Genesis is clearly indicated to be a *Solar* day. It is clear that the word *Yom*, day, in the 2d and 3d verses of the second chapter (which were improperly separated from the narrative of the first chapter) is not a solar day, for it is the seventh day of a *series* of six preceding days, some of which began before the solar day was in existence.

Yom, then day, in the 5th, 8th, 12th, 19th, 23d and 31st verses was clearly, as the narrative indicates, a creative day, and not a solar day—mere fractions of God's great eternity which the geologists are trying to spell out by the amount of work done on the surface of the earth, and compute their duration by many millions of years.

St. Augustine, one of the early Church Fathers, in contemplating this subject, said: "What mean these sunless days." The length of these creative days was not revealed, but the fact was revealed in the context that they were not solar days. The geological researches are too imperfect to fix with any degree of certainty the length of the six days, either separately or jointly; but geologists do estimate the whole period at from six hundred to one thousand millions of years. The Biblical student, when he considers the magnitude of the work which is apparent to every observer, and the three hundred millions of stars (suns) which, in the process of condensation, like our sun, mitigate the cold of space and render life possible on this planet, is not at all startled by the long period which the geologists compute as the measure of *Creative Time*.

It has been suggested that the refrain at the close of each section of the divine creative days,

Wayehi erebh, Wayehi bhoquer
Yom ehadh,

and so on, each day being numbered in its order, might have been added by a later hand; but on a careful reading of the original text it will be apparent that no such inference can be drawn. First Genesis and the first three verses of the second chapter constitutes one whole.

The second creative day follows the order of the first, on which light came after the primeval darkness. Hence in this enumeration of the six creative days *erebh*, evening, always precedes *bhoquer*, morning. When we speak of a solar day the morning is first in our thinking, and the evening follows.

The seventh day is not characterized by these incidents; the great drama and contrivance of God's providence ushered in the morning of the seventh day not yet ended, which received a special benediction, in that the Creator rested from all the work which he created in making. In all the manifold forms of organic life the soul has no rivals in its ambition to spring over the abyss of death and wing its way to God.

This appetite for eternal life, and that other dread, not of a dissolution of the body, but of eternal death, which hangs like a pall over unregenerate life and mars every joy, distinguish man from all his animal congeners, and are strongly suggestive of the reason which induced the All-wise Creator to communicate to him a special revelation, such as is found in this chapter. From the first chapter of Genesis to the last word in the Revelation of St. John the divine, we observe a connected and continuous scheme pointing to the ultimate realization of the appetency for prolonged existence, which distinguishes man from all other forms of organic life.

VI.

THE OBSERVANCE OF THE LORD'S DAY.

BY REV. J. W. LOVE, D. D.

By Lord's Day, as is well known, we mean the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday. Those who base the obligation to its observance on the fourth commandment call it Sabbath, though this is a different day of the week, different in origin and obligation, and passed away with the old Jewish system. The Sabbath was given to commemorate the finished work of Creation, and as a day of rest, divinely commanded to be observed as a holy day. It was even made a penal and a capital offense to engage in unnecessary labor on this sacred day. Numbers 15 : 35, 36. The Lord's day, it is true, takes the place of the Jewish Sabbath, as a day of rest and of worship, but for the Christian, strictly speaking, there is "no law of the Sabbath." That law was abrogated by the higher law and freedom of the gospel and of Christianity. The Lord's Day—our day of rest and of worship—has no "thus saith the Lord" requiring its observance, nor is there any divide penalty attaching to its desecration, except the natural result following the violation of higher moral and Christian obligation required by the new dispensation.

One of the reasons
The obligation to observe the first day of the week as a day of rest and of worship is based upon a Christian appreciation of the work of our redemption from sin and its misery, completed in the resurrection of Christ from the dead. We call the first day of the week the Lord's Day because it commemorates the finished work of redemption, as the seventh did the finished work of Creation. But as it was a greater work to redeem man than to originally create the universe, so we are under greater obligation to keep holy the Lord's Day as a fitting expression of gratitude, and as a means of exercising and cultivating our religious natures

in accordance with the freedom which the Gospel affords. The Apostles and early Church, in the exercise of this Christian liberty, began at once the religious observance of the first day of the week immediately after the resurrection of their Lord, and that, too, so far as the record goes, without any positive command or outward constraint. The Lord Himself selected the first day upon which He put special honor, not only by rising from the dead, but by at least five appearances to the disciples on the same day, by again appearing to the eleven a week later, and by the miraculous giving of the Holy Ghost on the first day of the week. From this on, we find the early Church assembling from week to week on first day, as at Troas (Acts 20:7).*

Paul exhorts the Church at Galatia and Corinth to "lay by" their charitable offerings on the first day of the week (1 Cor. 16: 2), and the apostle John had his wonderful apocalyptic vision on the Lord's Day (Rev. 1: 10). We find too from primitive writers that the weekly worship of Christians of the early centuries of Christianity was uniformly on Lord's Day. There is no reference to the observance of any other day as a Christian festival. The younger Pliny about A. D. 112 writes to the Emperor Trajan that a religious people called Christians were accustomed to assemble to sing praise to and worship Christ as God on a stated day. And while he does not mention the particular day, it is at once evident that it could not have been the Jewish Sabbath, since all were familiar with Jewish custom, and it would have been superfluous to speak of it.

I repeat, it was in the exercise of Christian liberty, and as the expression of higher Christian love and life, that the Lord's Day, rather than the Jewish Sabbath, was made the weekly festival of rest from secular labor, and of the worship of Him in whom all the hopes of humanity must center from this time on. For the Church to feel that she is not under the constraint of even the moral law, as given in the Decalogue, but under the higher law

*It is likely that converts from Judaism continued also to observe the seventh day as a matter of Jewish legalism, from which at first they could hardly be expected to get away. But in time Jewish legalism was given up and Christian freedom in this, as in other respects, took its place in Christian practice.

of love to and life in Christ, is the strongest possible obligation that could be imposed to the religious observance of the Lord's Day. Christians will thus realize that it is a glorious privilege and an unspeakable joy to keep holy this sacred day.

But how, it may be asked, can this motive and obligation apply to the people of the world and of those who deny the deity of Christ? We reply here, the motive and obligation to observe Lord's Day must necessarily be on a lower plane, but ought also to be more than sufficient to compel cessation from unnecessary labor, and a restraint of sinful indulgence of the flesh. The observance of this day has its secular as well as its religious benefit and obligation, and so it becomes a question of importance to the State, as well as the Church. It is clearly the province of the State to provide a weekly rest-day for its citizenship and for the protection of good morals. While legal enactment cannot make men religious, it can protect and encourage morals and afford the opportunity, to such as are so inclined, to engage in divine worship.

It is a well established fact that constant toil, seven days of the week from month to month, not only wears out the physical life more rapidly, but is also injurious to the mental and moral welfare of the toiler. The laborer needs a weekly rest that he may have opportunity for wholesome relaxation, for directing his mind to a change of subjects, whether social, moral or religious, as his aptitudes may incline. Of course, the State has no right to direct how a man shall spend his Sundays; that must be left to his own conscience, but it has a right to release the citizen from grinding toil one day in seven, to proclaim religious worship a legitimate act that must not be interfered with, and to protect each one in its enjoyment. This it is supposed to do. The Constitution of the United States, of all the separate States, and laws of about all the States, made in pursuance of their Constitutions, forbid any but work of necessity and of charity to be performed on Lord's day. They all guarantee religious liberty and a weekly rest from unnecessary service to employers. These legal requirements are undoubtedly based upon the teaching of the

word of God and are found to be in the interest of good citizenship and the welfare of the State.

The citizen may decide for himself whether he will have any religion, and, within certain limits, what are works of charity and necessity that may be done on Lord's Day. If, however, he chooses a religion the practice of which is plainly in conflict with the moral interests of the State, as Mormon polygamy, or a religion having any demoralizing features, the State may step in and restrain its practice.

So, also, much that relates to the observance of the Lord's Day is left to the individual conscience, but if any one carries on his secular business or a traffic simply for the money there is in it, or does anything that would pervert the purpose of the State in making the first day of the week a legal rest day, he may be called to account for such violation of divine and secular law. That is to say, in the eyes of the civil law, all business pursued for profit, as the conduct of theatres, places of secular amusement, liquor saloons, etc., are regarded as perversion of good morals, and may be prohibited. It is true that recreation and amusement may come within the sphere of personal liberty, and there may be a question whether the State has control. For example, a man may drive his family over the city or through the country. He may go out on his bicycle singly or in company with others. He may play cards, invite his friends and entertain them at his home in any way he sees fit, provided in doing any or all of these things he does not interfere with the liberty and enjoyment of his neighbors. There is, however, a certain limitation of personal acts that comes under the head of unwritten law, and which acts, by common consent, may become a nuisance or an injury to the general welfare. These may and ought to be restrained by lawful measures.

This brings us to the inquiry: What is a desecration of Lord's Day?

In the divided state of public opinion this question may not be so easy to answer. It is well known that continental Europe, which claims to be as much Christian as America, allows a great

deal of unnecessary labor, of recreation and of personal liberty that would shock even our Western Christian consciousness of rightful Sunday observance. In Berlin, Germany, for instance, professed Christians, from the Emperor down, patronize the Royal Opera, the theater and other places of secular amusement on Sunday more than on any other day of the week. The café, the beer garden, the dancing hall, are thronged, especially on Sunday afternoon and evening. It is said that on any pleasant Sunday a great multitude may be found at the great city park of Berlin and at its adjoining zoölogical garden. Thousands upon thousands go to the country upon excursions. While a small proportion of the people go to church in the morning, the day is generally given up to social recreation and pleasuring. In France, except by comparatively few, the Lord's Day is entirely one of purely secular observance, especially of fleshly gratification of all kinds. Other countries of Christian Europe generally make it a holiday rather than a holy day. Do we want the Continental Sunday in America? It seems to be rapidly coming to that in many of our large cities, especially in the West. In any representative Western city there is perhaps as much desecration of our day of rest and worship as in any of the cities in Europe of equal size. There is vast deal of unnecessary business done by provision, cigar and fruit dealers, by the ice men, small confectioneries, ice cream saloons, etc. About all our places of amusement are run at full capacity; drinking saloons are wide open; the parks hold out extra inducements and attract large crowds; railroads get up cheap excursions and bring many thousands of our country friends from a hundred and more miles distant, as well as from nearer points; all our daily newspapers get out large editions and vie with each other in the number of their pages and the variety of their contents. In many private circles there is great laxity in religious observance of the day.

Of course, there are many, perhaps a majority of our professing Christians, who conscientiously regard the day with reverence, and seek to improve its sacred hours in cultivating their religious

nature ; but they seem to be greatly in the minority—certainly not over one-fifth of our population ! If the churches raise a protest against Sunday desecration, or even the plain violation of our Sunday laws, they are charged with advocating Puritan severity—"blue laws;" interfering with personal liberty ; wanting to be keepers of other peoples' consciences, etc.

Now while there may be those who are Sabbatarians, and would exact more than even the Gospel demands, the danger is to the other extreme. Cardinal Gibbons has well said : "The desecration of the Christian Sunday is a social danger against which it behooves us to set our face and take timely precautions before it assumes proportions too formidable to be easily eradicated."

"A close observer," he goes on to say, "cannot fail to note the dangerous inroads that have been made upon the Lord's Day in our country within the last quarter of a century." "If these encroachments are not checked in time, the day may come when the religious quiet, now happily reigning in our well ordered cities" (these well-ordered cities are scarce in the West), "will be changed into noise and turbulence, when the sound of the church bell will be drowned by the echo of the hammer and the dray; when the Bible and the prayer-book will be supplanted by the newspaper and the magazine (it has largely come to that already); when the votaries of the theatre and the drinking saloon will outnumber the religious worshippers; and salutary thoughts of God, of eternity and of the soul will be choked by the cares of business and by the pleasures and dissipations of the world." All this is measurably true to-day in Western cities, and is rapidly becoming increasingly more so.

Shall our ministers hold their peace in the face of this great sin of Sunday desecration? Surely they ought not. Whether men hear or forbear, they dare not refuse to warn the public of the moral and religious dangers to which we are exposed. If they do, their brother's blood will stain their clerical robes, and ultimately they may themselves stand condemned at the judgment-bar as having been unfaithful to the trust reposed in them.

At the risk of being themselves denounced, they should not

hesitate to denounce, as their obligation of office requires them to do, all unnecessary labor and Sunday traffic, Sunday amusements, the keeping open of the liquor saloons, the publishing of Sunday papers, the running of railroad excursions, and every other form of Sunday desecration. Of course, the secular newspapers will ridicule, the unbelievers scoff, and the pleasure-seeking sensualist regard them as Puritanic fanatics, but they can much better afford to endure all this, coming from the source it does, than to come under the condemnation of Him to whom they must one day give account for their stewardship. But, after all, may be the better class of people, and those who want to be right, will be induced to see the right and be influenced to walk in the right. At all events they will then have clean consciences, and the responsibility of heeding or not heeding the law of divine love and life will be with those to whom they preach. Again we say: Let them cry aloud, and spare not those who are guilty of Lord's Day desecration; it may be they shall be the means of saving some who otherwise would be lost to morality and religion.

VII.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT FROM THE YEAR 730 UNTIL THE YEAR 1710 OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA.

BY REV. CHARLES E. CORWIN.

I. THIRD PERIOD. 730 to 1517.

No other age of the Church is as barren in the study of soteriology as the age of scholasticism. Christianity had been heathenized by the barbarians who overran the Roman Empire, and a legal, Judaistic tendency had been developed within the Church by its unregenerate leaders. Such a distinctively spiritual and Christian doctrine as the doctrine of redemption through Christ could not flourish, and hence it is that, while angelology and demonology received in this period consideration entirely out of proportion to their importance, that most important and unique doctrine of the faith was removed very largely from practical treatment.

The only writer in the Greek Church upon this subject worthy of mention is Nicolas of Methone. That the Redeemer of mankind must be a theanthropic person he considered capable of demonstration. Following the theologians of a former age, he held that Christ's death was necessary, not as a ransom paid to God, but to deliver men from the power of the devil.

In the Roman Church the early schoolmen followed Augustine, simply restating his ideas without originality. As in looking from a hill at a distant wood, some one tall tree is discerned towering conspicuous from among its lesser companions, so, as we stand upon the heights of the 19th century and gaze at the age of scholasticism, we see the noble form of Anselm rising above his fellows in the field of soteriology. Anselm's ideas of Christ's work are thoroughly Scriptural, and if his reason could have had a practical effect upon the Church, that purification of

character, which is a necessary result of a true faith, might have made the Reformation, which took place four centuries after his death, unnecessary. Anselm had the one thing needful for a proper theory of redemption, a true idea of sin; for without a full and just conception of the evil of sin it is impossible for one to understand the infinite necessity and the infinite value of Christ's sacrifice. The substance of the argument in his treatise, "*Cur Deus Homo*," is as follows:

1. God is an infinite sovereign to whom man as a creature owes a debt of absolute obedience.

2. Man has sinned; he, therefore, owes not only absolute obedience for the future, but absolute satisfaction for the past. The honor of God in its very essence demands either punishment or satisfaction.

3. Man cannot pay his past debt; and by his sin he has brought himself into such a state that he is unable to yield obedience for the future. Man is therefore subject to condemnation.

4. God cannot, from the necessity of his own nature, allow his work to fail; therefore God must provide satisfaction for man. As the debt is greater than any thing except God, God alone can pay the debt; but as man has sinned, there is a moral necessity that man pay it. Therefore the only being who can pay it must be such a person as is very God and very man, a true Theanthropos.

5. Christ, as man, owes perfect obedience, but not unto death. His death is, therefore, supererogatory, and, because of His divinity, more than answers all the requirements of God from man.

6. As Christ's death was for righteousness' sake, it was for the honor of God. In justice, therefore, as God has received this unrequired honor from Christ, He must reward Him.

7. Christ, as God, already possesses all things. He can, therefore, receive no reward for Himself, but, since He is a man, a proper reward is bestowed if His sinful brethren are pardoned.

Such is the outline of Christ's work presented in the early days of scholasticism by one of its most able exponents. Anselm perhaps errs in making Christ's active obedience a ground of

justification to the exclusion of his passive righteousness. He fails to make sufficient of the union of the believer with his Redeemer, and his work is marred by certain minor discussions, characteristic of his age, but which to our minds appear foolish. Nevertheless, if greatness consists in rising above one's surroundings and in the power to produce effects upon the future, Anselm was truly a great man. Anselm was not appreciated by his contemporaries. The brilliant Abelard advanced theories not only totally opposed to Anselm's teachings, but also to the Scripture. God, he taught, can and does pardon sin without any satisfaction. This idea, the precursor of the theory of a moral atonement, arose from his feeble conception of sin. Christ's work consists in simply showing God's love, so that the sinner may be attracted to it in return. Against this low view the spiritual and mystical Bernard, of Clairvaux, lost no time in raising a protest, although he added nothing to the doctrinal development of the subject.

Hugo, of St. Victor, held mystical views of Christ's work in accord with the general character of his mind. Against Anselm he taught that the atonement was not an absolute necessity, although he admitted that it was the most appropriate way for the salvation of sinners. He seems to have had the idea of Christ's active and passive righteousness, an idea not developed till a later period. Thus he says: "Christ, therefore, by being born, paid the debt of man to the Father, and by his death expiated the fault of man." *De Sacram. C. 4* Peter Lombard, the great Master of Sentences, vacillated in his conception of the atonement. He confounded justification with sanctification, as Augustine had done before him, and no doubt his failure to distinguish between these two different things was one of the causes which led the Council of Trent to adopt its peculiar soteriological system. Thus he says: "The death of Christ justifies us, first, because it excites love in our hearts by which we are made actually righteous; and, secondly, it destroys sin, by which the devil held us in captivity, so that now it cannot condemn us." Robert Pulleyn held to a relative necessity, and in general followed Abelard.

The latter part of the scholastic period was occupied by the controversies of two schools, the school of Thomas Aquinas and the school of Duns Scotus. Among other subjects of discussion the doctrine of atonement came before the theologians of these schools. We notice that the different views which they take of Christ's sacrifice correspond to the different conceptions which they have of the nature of sin. Aquinas held Augustine's strong doctrine of sin, and his views of the atonement are, therefore, profound, following in general the teaching of Anselm. He would not affirm that the death of Christ was an absolute necessity for salvation, because he thought such a statement derogatory to the divine omnipotence, but he held that it was most appropriate. He taught:

1. That Christ's sufferings were the greatest possible.
2. That they acquired an infinite value from the nature of the sufferer.
3. Therefore they are more than a satisfaction for the sins of the whole world.
4. That the believer takes part in the benefits of Christ's work on account of his mystical union with Him. On account of which he may be said to have suffered, died and risen with Christ. He says: "Christ, through His passion, not only earned salvation for Himself but also for all His members." Through the school of Aquinas the doctrine of Anselm was carried down, slightly modified, to the Reformation period.

On the other hand, the Scotians, because of their feeble, Pelagian views of sin, held loose views of the atonement. According to their idea any creature, appointed by God for the purpose, could have made an atonement for the sins of the world. Christ's sufferings have no proper connection with man's sin, but God, from mere grace, accepts them as an equivalent. Scotus himself says: "Christ's merit is only as of much force as the Trinity is able and willing to accept." This doctrine is called the acceptilation theory, and was, as we shall see, projected into the next period.

Before the Reformation however, there were several sects,

which were persecuted by the Mother Church, but which held the Scriptural doctrine of the atonement. Within the Roman communion itself were earnest men who were the morning stars of the brighter time which was to come. The more outspoken of these, as Wyckliffe and Huss, suffered persecution to a greater or less extent. The more mystical usually avoided it. Conspicuous among the orthodox mystics was John Wessel. He held that the incarnation was not the result of sin, but that the humble form and sufferings of Christ in that incarnation were directly the result of sin. His views regarding the atonement were evangelical.

1. Christ is the Redeemer by manifestation of His divine life.
2. Christ became a mediator for man between God's justice and His mercy.
3. Christ effects this meditation by means of the sacrifice of Himself. This sacrifice is the one all sufficient sacrifice, and human merit is of no avail.
4. For this sacrifice, suffering and death are necessary. It is of value not according to the pain endured, but according to the love exercised. The saint partakes in this sacrifice just so far as he is sanctified.

We now leave the period of Scholasticism and turn our attention to the period of the Reformation, a period exactly opposed in thought to its predecessor, but for which that predecessor was necessary as a preparation.

II. FOURTH PERIOD. 1517 TO 1710.

As the mind of man is able to consider only one subject at a time, so it seems that the Christian Church has been able to develop but one department of Theology at a time. Thus, it was only after centuries of struggle that Theology proper, Christology and Anthropology were settled in their permanent shape as the foundation for the edifice of that larger truth which was to be built by future generations. With the period of the Reformation, therefore, the Soteriology of the Scripture, which had held a minor position in the thought of the Church, came into promi-

hence and was developed in a way which its importance would have led us to believe it should have received before. The position which this subject occupies in the order of development is, however, the natural one. Step by step the truth must be elaborated. Theology proper must be at the bottom, for without definite ideas of God all other truth is inoperative. Christology, which shows Christ's position in regard to God on the one side and to man on the other, comes next, for unless we understand the position which the Redeemer occupies in the sphere of revelation we will be unable properly to systematize the truth. When the idea of God is established and the position of Christ is appreciated and defined, the Church is ready, and then only is she ready to consider man, the sinner, in relation to both his Judge and his Advocate.

Anthropology, therefore, comes next in order and this was, as we have seen, the study of the Church in the age immediately preceding the Reformation.

At last, to some extent at least, the mind of the Church had apprehended God, had recognized Christ in his unique personality and had discovered man's condition, sunk in sin and misery. When these truths had been settled was the Church prepared to take up the question, how, through this Redeemer, man might be just with God, and then came the Reformation. It must not be supposed that the development of these ideas was entirely successive.

In every period of the Church each part of the system of truth was studied and individuals innumerable have held definite opinions on each, either right or wrong, producing definite results in their lives. It is true, however, that each period has had its characteristic subject, and the order of these subjects has been the logical one. The Reformation was not so much a breaking with the past as it was a return to the past, to the Scriptural doctrine which had been so largely covered by the traditions of men. Justification by faith, the material principle of Protestantism, was not a new discovery by the Reformers, but rather the rediscovery of that truth which Paul had discovered for himself fully fourteen centuries before, "The just shall live by faith."

The study of the history of any particular doctrine in the Reformation period must be of a different character from the study of former doctrinal developments. While before, the Church had been one in outward form at least, now she was divided into several different branches. Therefore in former times the study of doctrine was the study of the views of individuals, or, at the most, the study of the views of some Council, which were after all only the expression of the general opinion of the representative minds of the Church of that day. In the Reformation, however, the individual opinion is of historical value only as it was able to prove itself the expression of the Christian consciousness of a large division of the Church, and so find a place in some one of the numerous confessions or symbols which are characteristic of the age. Side by side developed opinions of all possible shades. The principal types of doctrine concerning the atonement admit of the following classification :

1. The Judicial Theory.

Christ's work is not merely a general condition of forgiveness, but a specific satisfaction for the sins of the elect. Christ fulfilled the claims of the law on their behalf in such a way that God, as a simple matter of justice, must pardon them. His mercy is not seen in His pardon, but in the provision of His grace by which satisfaction is provided. This theory, having its roots in the teaching of Anselm, is usually connected with a belief in a limited atonement. By a limited atonement is meant, not that the merit of Christ's work is not sufficient to save all men, but that He died only for the elect, and that His work had no reference to the condition of the non-elect.

2. The Governmental Theory.

God as a moral Ruler must maintain His dignity and the dignity of His holy law under all conditions. If He pardons sinners He must do it in such a way that His hatred of sin is shown to the universe and that other free agents are not led to think lightly of the character of sin. He does pardon the sinner without any real satisfaction for the sin as far as God himself is concerned, but for the purposes of government He must, while He pardons

the sinner, display His hatred of sin to the universe, and place a condition of acceptance upon the sinner to whom the Divine clemency is to be extended. The sufferings of His only Son constitute the most stupendous display of His hatred of sin to the universe, and faith in Him is the condition imposed upon the returning sinner. This theory, derived from the acceptilation theory of Scotus, is usually connected with the doctrine of an unlimited atonement.

3. The Moral Theory.

Abelard was the father of this idea in its modern form. God is ready to receive the sinner without any display against sin or any condition for the sinner, but the sinner will not return to God. God must present some powerful motive to draw out his affection. Nothing could appeal more strongly to a moral creature than the sight of the Creator suffering and dying in order to show him His love. Christ's work, therefore, consists not in paying the penalty of sin, but in drawing men away from sin to God by the influence of His love. This view was also held by many Unitarians who would not admit that Christ was the Creator, but who held that he suffered, as a righteous man, a martyr's death, an example to the world.

4. The Mystical Theory.

In order to salvation man must be united to God. The Son of God becomes incarnate, partakes of human nature, undergoes human experiences, and so lifts man by union with Himself out of his sinful nature into communion with and final absorption in God. In this essay the Soteriology of the various divisions of the Church and of the chief sects will be considered under one or the other of these four heads. As, however, the Church of Rome refused a reformation, and projected the scholastic system and morals into the Reformation age, her doctrine cannot properly be treated under the same heads as that of the Protestant bodies. The Roman doctrine of justification will therefore be treated first by itself, in order that, having disposed of all that remains of the age of systems in the age of reform, we may turn without distraction to that Soteriology which is truly reformed.

I. SÖTERIOLOGY IN THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH.

When the Roman Church had refused to accept a genuine reformation and had driven the reformers out of her communion, she was placed in a peculiar and awkward position. Claiming to be founded upon the Scripture, she must not allow it to become evident that any of her doctrines were repugnant thereto. The task which was set before her was therefore nothing less difficult than the proving that all the mass of traditions which had developed in the course of twelve centuries and had received the papal sanction was in perfect agreement with the Scripture. For the harmonizing of these many divergent views the Council of Trent held its protracted sessions. The Scriptures plainly teach that Christ's merits are the one all-sufficient ground of salvation and that man is accounted righteous apart from works through faith in Christ. The Romish tradition had continually laid increasing stress upon the necessity of good works as a ground of justification; therefore the Fathers of the Council must prove both Scripture and tradition to be true and in agreement. The confusion in Augustine in regard to justification and sanctification formed the basis upon which their work proceeded. Justification rests upon two corner stones, the one the merits of Christ, and the other an inward state of holiness in the individual. The one is complete at once and firm beyond the possibility of shaking; the other is of slow development and of such doubtful quality that no one can be assured of salvation in this life. When, therefore, according to the Council, Christ's merits are mentioned in the Scripture reference is made to the one foundation, while when the traditions speak of works the other foundation is intended. Justification, the judicial and instantaneous act of God, is confounded with sanctification, the progressive work of man aided by the Holy Spirit. Faith is an inward progressive state of godliness infused by God in the heart. Therefore as the man becomes just he is justified. Christ by his sufferings for us obtains for us the grace which, implanted in our heart, produces growth in holiness, and as we become holy we are, to use the very words of the Council, justified more and more. It is because this grace

is not our own, but a gift of Christ, that the Scripture can speak of our salvation as altogether the work of God. According to the decrees of Trent sin is not so much guilt as pollution. When the pollution is removed the former sinner may appear before God justified without regard to his former sins. The grand mistake of this conception is that the effect, growth in grace, is put for the cause, forgiveness of sins. A few quotations from the decrees of the Council of Trent will prove the statements made above. "Justification is not only the remission of sins, but also sanctification and renovation of the inner man through a voluntary acceptance of grace and gifts, whence a man from unjust becomes just, from an enemy a friend, so that he is an heir according to the hope of eternal life." Again, "Through faith alone we are justified, because faith is the beginning and foundation of human salvation and the root of all justification." Opposed to this rather evangelical expression is the following: "If any one shall say that through faith alone the wicked is justified in the sense that nothing else is required that may coöperate toward the grace of justification following, let him be anathema."

II. LUTHERAN SOTERIOLOGY. JUDICIAL THEORY.

The Reformation in Germany differed from the Reformation in other countries in that it was more personal. We may think of the Swiss Reformation without Zwingli or Calvin, but if we attempt to remove the form of Luther from the Reformation of his "Fatherland" we destroy its life. In this respect its doctrinal development, at least in its early stages, partakes more of the character of the earlier periods. What Luther believed concerning the atonement the Lutheran Church believed. Luther wrote no treatise on the atonement, and yet it was by his heart appreciation of it that he became the power that he was in the Church. He was no schoolman as Anselm, systematically studying the subject objectively. He devoted himself to the subjective acceptance of the salvation freely offered on account of Christ's sufferings and death. Therefore, we do not find minute distinctions in his writings concerning active and passive right-

eousness; no discussion of the question of absolute or relative necessity nor of the method by which Christ's righteousness is applied. The fact was the great thing to his mind, and his life was devoted to the spreading of a knowledge of the fact among the people whom a cruel priesthood had long kept in ignorance for selfish reasons. Luther laid great stress on Christ's victory for us over our enemies. He believed in the strongest form of the doctrine of personal satisfaction. Commenting on Gal. 3: 13, he says: "The sole way of evading the curse is to believe and to say with sure confidence, Thou, O Christ, art my sin and curse, or rather I am thy sin, thy curse, thy death, thy wrath of God, thy hell; Thou art, on the contrary, my righteousness." He also represents the law as saying, "I find Him (Christ) a sinner, and such a sinner as has taken upon Himself the sins of all men; and I see no sin besides but in Him; therefore, let Him die on the cross. The Augsburg Confession, composed by Melancthon, but sanctioned by Luther and his colleagues, makes the following statement concerning justification in the fourth article: "Also they teach that men cannot be justified before God by their own powers, merits or works; but are justified freely for Christ's sake through faith, when they believe they are received into favor, and their sins forgiven for Christ's sake, who by His death does satisfy for our sins. This faith does God impute for righteousness before Him."

It was at a later date that the Formula of Concord became the doctrinal standard of the Lutheran Church. This formula teaches concerning Christ's atonement:

1. Christ is our righteousness both according to His divine nature and according to His human nature. This is elaborately stated in opposition to certain errors mentioned. He offers a perfect obedience in our place to God.

2. Faith is the means by which this righteousness is applied. This faith is not a bare belief, but a gift of God, by which we recognize Christ as our Redeemer in the words of the Gospel and confide in Him. It is a surprising fact, however, that in this formula the death of Christ is not mentioned specifically as a ground of justification, but only His perfect obedience.

We see, then, that the Lutheran standards teach a judicial theory of the atonement, made by Christ's whole life. Luther developed the idea of Christ's passive obedience, while later, in the Formula of Concord, His active righteousness has the first place. The doctrine of a limited atonement is the logical result of the judicial theory, yet the Lutheran Church seems to have left this conception unformulated or almost to have decided against it in article 11 of the Formula of Concord. Luther's conception of sin was so profound that he was compelled to believe in the absolute necessity of the atonement; and the Church which bears his name in this also followed in his steps.

III. REFORMED SOTERIOLOGY. JUDICIAL THEORY.

While Luther was contending for the truth in Germany, Ulrich Zwingli was also lifting up a standard against prevailing corruption in Switzerland. Zwingli was a very different man from Luther. He looked at truth objectively without inward struggle. While Luther only came out of the old Church after much agonizing prayer and diligent searching of the Scripture, Zwingli was ready to leave her without a regretful thought. Luther's views of sin led him to his conception of satisfaction through Christ alone. He therefore found his starting point in anthropology; Zwingli, on the other hand, according to his objective method, began with theology, and arrived at his doctrine of atonement from this direction. This difference between the two Reformers is seen in the character of the Churches of which they were founders; for while the Lutheran Church is subjective and mystical, the Reformed Church is objective and exegetical.

But although the leading spirits of these two Churches, and the Churches themselves, differ in their starting point, and method in their search for truth, they both arrive at the same conclusion in all essential things, especially in Soteriology. Zwingli, in the sixty-seven articles written by him in 1523, says: "Christ is the one way of salvation of all who have been, are, or shall be," A. 3. "Christ offered himself once on the cross a sacrifice and victim, making satisfaction forever for the sins of

all who believe," A. 18. "Christ bore our griefs and all our labors," A. 54. In the Ten Theses of Berne which were revised by Zwingli and presented to the conference at Berne in January, 1528, the following statements concerning Christ's work appear: "Christ alone is wisdom, righteousness, redemption and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world," A. 3. "Christ only has died for us and so He only is the mediator and advocate with God the Father," A. 7. The first confession which represented the Swiss reformers was composed at Basil in 1536, and is known as the First Helvetic Confession. This says: "He alone is mediator and intercessor, victim and also priest, Lord and king, so therefore we recognize Him alone and with our whole heart believe that He alone is our reconciliation, redemption, sanctification, expiation, wisdom, protection, justification, and reject every medium of life and salvation except Christ alone," A. 11. From these brief quotations it is evident that Zwingli and other early reformers in Switzerland held the judicial theory of atonement. The distinction between the active and passive righteousness of Christ is not yet apparent, nor had the discussion concerning the limits of Christ's work arisen. Zwingli's statement that Christ made satisfaction for the sins of all who believe is consistent with either the doctrine of an unlimited atonement or with that of a limited atonement.

It was reserved for the clear, analytic mind of Calvin to gather in itself all the rays of light from the earlier Reformers and concentrate them in one bright beam which has illuminated theological truth ever since. Calvin belonged to the second generation of Reformers, and therefore he was at a great advantage in his labors; for he was not compelled to take the lead in the first rupture with Rome, and he found many blocks already hewn in the quarries of Biblical theology, which he could easily put in their places in the edifice of systematic theology. No Protestant creed since his time is altogether unaffected by his system. Calvin believed most firmly in a judicial atonement in which the sinner is justified by the righteousness of Christ. He says: "God, at the same time that He loved us, was in a certain ineffable manner

angry with us, till He was reconciled by Christ." He taught that Christ's work for us was accomplished by means of His active and passive righteousness, thus he says: "In short, from the time of His assuming the character of a servant, He began to pay the price of our deliverance in order to redeem us. Yet, more precisely to define the means of our salvation, the Scriptures ascribe this in a peculiar manner to the death of Christ. He himself announces that He gave His life a ransom for many, and Paul teaches that He died for our sins." (Inst. Bk. II., Ch. 15 : 5.) Considering his views upon predestination it is hardly necessary to remark that Calvin believed in a limited atonement. The Second Helvetic Confession, composed in 1566, two years after his death, bears the marks of his influence. It teaches :

1. Christ assumed a true human nature and in it suffered for us.
2. He is the only and eternal Saviour of the world.
3. Man is saved only by faith in Him. (Caput 11.)

This confession, of course, adopts the judicial theory, but is silent concerning the extent of the atonement. The passive righteousness of Christ is emphasized but His active obedience is not mentioned.

The French Reformed Church looked to Geneva for her theology. Under the influence of Calvin were trained her young men, and when they returned to their native land they brought back something of his spirit, a spirit which led many of them to a martyr's death.

The Gallican Confession, which became a standard of the French Church, was prepared by Calvin himself, and therefore simply presents his views as ratified by the Synod at Paris, 1559, In its 13th article it says :

"We believe that all that is necessary for our salvation was offered and communicated to us in Jesus Christ. He is given to us for our salvation, and is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption ; so that if we refuse Him we renounce the mercy of the Father, in which alone we can find refuge."

The Belgic Confession, composed two years later, might, per-

haps, be classed among the Dutch symbols. It was, however, written in French by a Frenchman, Guy De Bres, for French refugees, and only became a Dutch confession because these refugees were in Holland. It may, therefore, be considered a product of the French Reformed Church. It teaches strongly a judicial atonement for a limited number through the passive righteousness of Christ. We have now reached a point in the history of the doctrine when the pioneer work of the Reformers was accomplished. That work was done, as we have seen, in Germany and France, but especially in Switzerland. Holland received her doctrine from the Swiss and German Reformers, and only at a later time did she elaborate upon it herself. As the Jesuit Strada has expressed it, "Nor did the Rhine from Germany, or the Meuse from France, send more water into the Low Countries than by the one the contagion of Luther, and by the other that of Calvin, was imported into the same Belgic provinces." The Belgic Confession was adopted by the Synod of Dort, and the canons of that Synod agree in their doctrine of atonement with the conception of the Swiss Reformers. These canons teach:

1. God must receive satisfaction for sin and man is not able to render it.

2. The Son of God therefore makes a most perfect sacrifice and satisfaction for sin, of infinite worth and value, abundantly sufficient to expiate the sins of the whole world.

3. His death derives its value both because He was a perfectly righteous man and endured the wrath of God against sin, and especially because He was the Son of God and therefore a person of infinite dignity.

4. All who believe in him are justified from all their sins. This is the doctrine of a judicial atonement by the passive righteousness of Christ. The Synod of Dort taught the doctrine of a limited atonement, holding that Christ's work is sufficient to save all men, but was intended only for the elect. Thus it says: "The death of the Son of God is sufficient to expiate the sins of the whole world;" and a little further on it says: "It was the will

of God that Christ by the blood of the cross, whereby He confirmed the new covenant, should effectually redeem, out of every people, tribe, nation and language, all those, and those only, who were from eternity chosen for salvation and given to him by His Father." (2 Head of Doctrine, A's 3 and 8.)

The Reformation in England and Scotland, however much it differed from the Reformation on the Continent in matters of polity, still agreed with it in all essential doctrines. The judicial theory of atonement was held by all those accounted orthodox. The Scotch Confession of 1560 taught:

1. Jesus offered a voluntary sacrifice for us to the Father.
2. This sacrifice consists in His sufferings from the cruelty of men and from the wrath of God.
3. There is no other sacrifice for sin.

The Scotch Confession is not definite upon the question of a limited atonement, nor does it take into account the work of Christ throughout His whole life. The Thirty-nine Articles of the English Church are in substantial accord with all the Reformed symbols of Europe. Christ's work is sufficient for our salvation and there is no other way for the returning sinner but by faith in Christ. They teach a limited atonement, but not so strongly as the Westminster Confession, two generations later. This says: "The Lord Jesus, by His perfect obedience and sacrifice of Himself, which He, through the Eternal Spirit, once offered up unto God, hath fully satisfied the justice of his Father, and purchased not only reconciliation, but an everlasting inheritance in the kingdom of heaven, for all those whom the Father hath given to Him." (Caput 8:5.) In another place it decides against an unlimited atonement with as much force as the Synod of Dort. The words are these: "As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so He hath by the eternal and most free purpose of His will, foreordained all the means thereto. Wherefore, they who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed in Christ by his spirit working in due season; are justified, adopted and sanctified, and kept by His power through faith unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified and saved, but the elect only." (Caput 3:6.)

IV. UNORTHODOX SOTERIOLOGY. MORAL, GOVERNMENTAL
AND MYSTICAL THEORIES.

Of the larger body of separatists from the orthodox fold, the Socinians, disciples of Faustus Socinus, come first. The Socinians were the Unitarians of the Reformation period, and, of course, it would be impossible for them to accept the judicial theory held by the Reformed and Lutheran Churches. If Christ was simply a great human prophet, He could never offer a sacrifice equivalent in value to the sins of the world. Socinus held that God was able to pardon sin without satisfaction, justice not requiring that so long as sin is removed. Against a vicarious atonement he proposed six propositions.

1. If sin is punished in Christ it is in no sense forgiven, and there is no display of mercy on the part of God.

2. The substitution of penalty is impossible. God forbids man to punish children for the sins of their fathers; therefore He will not do Himself what He forbids in others.

3. Christ did not offer a sacrifice equivalent to the sins of the whole world, even if the substitution of penalty is allowed. This idea, of course, followed the denial of the divinity of Christ.

4. Christ owed a perfect obedience and perfect submission to the divine will for Himself. Therefore, He could not give His righteousness to another.

5. If Christ has satisfied all the claims of divine justice, so that nothing more is due from man, it is unjust in God to demand faith as the condition of forgiveness. If man is forgiven because of Christ's work, without personal righteousness, it follows that man may continue in sin and yet be saved.

Socinus taught that Christ was a great prophet, who is the Saviour of men in the sense that they are to follow His example. His death is to all the example of the most perfect obedience to the will of God. He says: "Christ is the Saviour of His faithful ones, because by His example He continually leads and conducts them along in that way of salvation which they have already entered." He also held that the death of Christ was a confirmation of the promises of God. Compare the following: "There-

fore Christ died that the new and eternal covenant of God, of which He Himself was mediator, might be established and strengthened * * * and so His blood continually cries to the Father that He may be mindful of those promises, which Christ Himself had announced in His name, and for the proving of which He had not refused to shed His blood."

Christ's death was also the necessary door by which He entered into His glory. Thus: "Hence He died that through death He might come to His resurrection." The Socinian idea of atonement is the moral theory, and this theory, while it lessens infinitely the greatness of Christ's work, yet from its nature makes the scope of that work unlimited in its peculiar character.

It was natural that between the judicial theory of atonement, held by the Church, and the loose, moral theory of Socinus and his disciples, there should be a middle ground occupied by those who believed in Christ's divinity, but who were unwilling to accept all the conclusions of the Lutheran and Reformed theologians. Such a position was occupied by the Arminian party, of which Arminius, Grotius, Curcellaeus and Limborch were leaders. Their original creed was presented to the Estates of Holland and West Friesland as a remonstrance in 1610. In this document there is little divergence from the orthodox symbols in regard to the atonement. It does, however, teach unlimited atonement by the death of Christ, which atonement is made effectual only for those who believe. The words are: "Jesus Christ, the Saviour of the world, died for all men and for every man, so that He obtained for them all, by His death on the cross, the redemption and forgiveness of sins, yet no one actually enjoys this forgiveness of sins except the believer." (Art. 2.)

The Arminians advanced against the Reformed doctrine of satisfaction for sins many of the arguments of Socinus, but they nevertheless held that Christ's death was a sacrifice appointed by God as a substitute for the sins of men. It is in no sense an equivalent for sin but is the condition, which God in his infinite wisdom has made, by believing which the sinner is forgiven, just as under the Old Covenant the sacrifice of an animal was the

condition of pardon. Against the Reformed doctrine Curcellaeus said: "Not therefore, as they commonly think, did Christ render satisfaction by enduring all the punishments which we deserved on account of our sins, for in the first place that does not pertain to the idea of sacrifice, for sacrifices are not payments of debts; secondly, Christ did not suffer eternal death, which was due to sin, for he only hung on the cross a few hours and was raised again the third day. Lastly, although He had endured eternal death, that death would not be the equivalent for the sins of the whole world, for His death was only one, which could not be equal to all the deaths which were owed, one by each man for his own sin."

The governmental theory of Christ's work was developed by Hugo Grotius to an extent unknown before. It therefore deserves especial mention. Grotius tried to solve the problem by discovering what is the nature of the law against which the sin is committed. Most of the theologians of the time held that the moral law was an absolute and essential quality of Deity. If it belong to the very essence of God, of course sin could not be forgiven until God's nature had received satisfaction; but if, on the other hand, the moral law is simply a command laid upon men, having no connection with the eternal being of God, its penalties can be remitted by God when He sees that no evil results from such remission, just as an earthly sovereign can remit the penalty which he has imposed when he sees that the ends of justice will be satisfied thereby. While a promise once made is binding upon the maker, a threat is not. God can therefore threaten sinners with eternal death and afterward freely pardon them. Two motives led God to determine on the salvation of the rebellious race, a desire that reverence and love toward Himself might not fail among men, and a desire to show the splendid spectacle of His love toward sinners, to the universe. Therefore He had the most weighty reason for pardoning and restoring sinners, and He would have done so by a free act of His will except that regard to His government forbade it. If He and the sinner had been the only intelligent beings in the universe He could and would have done

it at once; but He is the Ruler of many moral creatures, and it would be disastrous to His government to pardon sinners without showing at the same time his hatred of sin, and without making a condition for the sinner. God has, therefore, in His infinite wisdom, appointed the sufferings and death of His only begotten Son as the exhibition of His hatred of sin, and belief in Him the condition imposed upon the sinner who would accept the proffered mercy. Grotius laid great stress upon the moral effect of Christ's sacrifice as a motive to win the affection of men, and he considered Christ's life of active obedience to have been lived as an example for men.

Thus we see that from the barren uplands of the scholastic period have flowed down three streams of soteriological thought into the fertile meadows of the Reformation period. From Anselm came the judicial theory of atonement, which was in general adopted by the great reforming Churches; from Abelard flowed the theory of a moral atonement, which modified so as to destroy Christ's divinity, was developed by the Socinian body; while the ideas of Dun Scotus were preserved by the Arminians, at whose head stood Grotius.

It remains for us to consider the mystical theory of several of the smaller sects and the peculiar views of certain individuals.

The Mennonites believed in a doctrine of justification by a mystical union with Christ. The believer through faith becomes united to Christ, and as Christ's life becomes his he is not only forgiven his past sins, but comes into a state of holiness. They resemble to some extent their bitter enemies, the Roman Catholics, in confounding justification with sanctification. The Mennonite Confession says: "Through a living faith we acquire a true righteousness, that is pardon and remission of all sins, as well past as present, so that also He pours in or upon us abundantly, through Jesus and the power of the Holy Ghost, a true righteousness. The result is that from evil we become good and from unjust, just." (Art. 21.)

The Quakers would not have denied the judicial theory of atonement, but they also laid great stress upon a personal union

with Christ. It is the formation of Christ within us which is the one thing all important, and, as He is formed in the believer, the believer is sanctified and, as thus just, is pronounced just before God, not on account of his outward good works, but on account of his personal union with the Divine. Among the mystics may also be classed the Moravians, who, while professing the orthodox Lutheran doctrine, also laid preëminent stress upon the vital union with the Divine Man. Spener and the Pietists, at whose head he stood, while holding firmly to the orthodox doctrine of justification for the sake of Christ's work, paid so much attention to the problems of personal piety that they were sometimes in danger of appearing to believe in the necessity of good works as a ground of salvation. It was held by some that it was dangerous to press the idea of salvation by faith alone too far, for fear of consequences disastrous to morality. Within the Reformed Church arose the school of Saumur, which enrolled among its defenders Amyraldus, Testard, Placæus and others whose names have become familiar to the student of theology. They did not deny the judicial theory of atonement, but taught that it is unlimited in its extent and that it is possible for all men to be saved. God has by a general decree given Christ as a mediator for the whole race; but, since He foresaw that no sinner would repent and believe in his own strength, He has made a special decree by which He has elected some of the lost race to salvation for the sake of glorifying His Son. This doctrine was condemned by the Reformed Church. Within the Lutheran Church divisions were caused by the too refined speculations of Osiander, who attempted to distinguish between pardon and justification, teaching that justification is inherent and pardon relative. He supposed that only the divine nature of Christ became our righteousness. He was opposed by Stancarus, who asserted that only the human nature suffered for us. Piscator, who was driven out of the Lutheran Church, and who entered the Reformed, held that Christ owed His active righteousness for Himself, and, therefore, that we are only benefited by His passive righteousness. These minor discussions had very little influence upon the Church at large.

The statement, "All progress is through conflict," is well illustrated by the history of Soteriology. Every advance which has been made in the doctrine of redemption has had its opposing error. Creeds, symbols and confessions have been proposed for the purpose of defining the true doctrine and as a protection against heresy, but the creeds become obsolete, the symbols narrow, while the confessions, stated to guard against error, are found by succeeding generations to have shut out valuable truth. Just because Christ is the God-man, who by His life and work has wrought out a complete righteousness for all who are united by faith to Him, is it impossible for the Church to express in any form of words the entire truth. If it were possible to include within the limits of one confession the whole truth, it would be proven thereby that neither the person nor the work of Christ were infinite in their character.

Not in vain, however, have been the attempts of the Church to formulate her belief. By this process, the truth, which Christian consciousness has already evolved, is fixed beyond the danger of loss, and a ground secured from which further advance may be made. To that man who is being led into all truth by the spirit according to Christ's promise, does it ever become increasingly clear that apart from the law the righteousness of God is revealed, the righteousness of God by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe.

VIII.

THE PLACE OF THE IDEAL IN COLLEGE LIFE.*

BY PROF. C. ERNEST WAGNER.

We all require a goal towards which we may direct our energies, a power beyond as well as in ourselves. The capabilities of excellence are inherent in each one of us, but they will never be developed unless nursed and incited by some ideal amid proper surroundings. The latent power of will and the energies of mind are as helpless as the lungs without air, or as the heart without blood, if not themselves vitalized by a power that is not inherent in them. Every Archimedes must have a fulcrum beyond the world which is to be raised.

It is in this sense that I wish to speak of an ideal. It is no mere fantastic figment of the brain, the child of an imaginative man's fancy, as some would have you believe; no Utopian dream of the closet; no creation of human councils; no device of the State; no contrivance of the schools. It is the most real of all the realities that God has established in the world. Having mastered that conception, let us consider definitely the place and scope of the ideal in college life. How are we to apply it here? What is the ideal college life?

Every student, be he boy or man, must determine that for himself. As temperaments, tastes and ambitions differ, so necessarily will ideals; but I plead with you, each one, to set up your ideal now, if you have not already done so. Do not drift through college without one, and then at the end of your course look back and see what it might or should have been. That is unutterably sad. Let me sketch for you, in brief what, from my standpoint, would be the ideal college life.

To be ideal and contribute, as it naturally would, to the making of an ideal man, it should be ideal, first of all, physically;

* Substance of an address delivered at the opening of the Fall term of Franklin and Marshall College, September 10, 1896.

that is to say, the bodily conditions should be, as nearly as possible, perfect. *Mens sana in corpore sane* is a trite formula, and yet I feel constrained to make it the text of this part of my discourse. In all human life the physical basis is of prime importance. College life, to be ideal, must have this same foundation. The student should aim to be physically perfect, sound as to his body, I may even say beautiful; for the human form in its perfection is the highest type of beauty. And here he may find his ideal embodied in the standards of the ancient Greeks, the most cultivated of people, who thought physical weakness or imperfection cause for shame and loathing, and who gave most painstaking care to the development of manly strength and beauty. True, in recent times we seem to be getting back to the standards of the Greeks, and perhaps there is little need for me to inculcate this lesson. The "physical culture" idea has laid hold not only of our college students; it has led captive men and women in every walk of life. Like all good things, it may be, and is, abused. It becomes a "fad," and in many instances is carried to ludicrous, not to say injurious, extremes. But, in the main, I think it a healthy reaction and rejoice in its widespread vogue.

Bodily health with its concomitant beauty is for its own sake a sufficient incitement to care and attention. But for the student, as for all brain workers, there is another and a higher motive. No man can do his best work unless his brain is in a normal condition, and the brain, being a part of the physical organism, cannot possess, much less exercise, its full powers unless the whole body be vigorous, pulsating with perfect health. There may be, of course, an abnormal or morbid activity, independent of physical lassitude; but it must necessarily be of short duration and feeble in its outcome.

How the body is to be developed and how kept in a healthy state, common sense, a purely animal instinct, will, it seems to me, teach any man. All he needs is the will to put his natural intelligence into practice. I cannot help feeling that any man sins, and that egregiously, who, through disinclination, false industry,

or pure indolence, disregards the simplest laws of health, neglects personal cleanliness, eats injudiciously, and fails to exercise with regularity and vigor, not to speak of more wanton sins, such as sensual indulgence and brutal dissipation in all its forms. He sins against himself, first of all, by reason of weakened powers and impaired usefulness; against his daily associates, by reason of irritable temper and general incompatibility; against posterity—the innocent children through whose veins his sluggish, impure blood must one day flow; and, last of all, against his God, in whose image we are told man was first created. Young men, and college students in particular, need to think more on these things than they do; they need to be reminded, to remind themselves day by day, of the duties they owe to their bodies; and, above all, to hold themselves to those duties, to discharge them as conscientiously as any other college task.

You as students come here not exclusively for study, for the routine work of the classroom. You come to enjoy a charmed existence, which is the right of every youth while passing through life's brightest season. The old poets, you remember, when they wished to express the acme of human happiness, the very seventh heaven of earthly bliss, sang of "halycon days," the time of the winter solstice, when the halycon, or king-fisher, built her nest—that brief period of calm between two spells of storm, when a strange, unearthly peace brooded over land and sea. "Halycon days" they were. Beautiful figure, beautiful thought, is it not? These are your "halycon days." Though you may not know it now, you will know it later on, when the storms begin again. Like all who have gone before, you will look back to these quiet, happy, nest-building days, and call them, as we all have done, "halycon days." Make them "halycon days" now. Be supremely happy while you may. No man can do his best work while unhappy. Hence it is as much your duty to be happy in this world as in the next. Every living creature is able to exert greater power when the mind is strengthened in its activities by the glow of a cheerful spirit in a healthy, flawless body.

Physically, then, the ideal student, according to my standard,

is a high-spirited, alert young fellow, who indulges with vim in all healthful out-door recreations, who throws himself heartily into college sports, and who, by holding to an honest, sportsmanlike spirit, strives to place college athletics on a plane that shall be an honor, not only to his *Alma Mater*, but to the cause of inter-collegiate sports as well. The records of our larger colleges show that the athletic men can and, as a rule, do stand well in their classes. So far as I can see, there need be no diminution of brain activity because of physical perfection. In all reason, there should be corresponding gain, both in quality and quantity of work done. In short, my ideal student would be a clean, wholesome young animal, with the fresh, untainted blood of youth bounding through his veins, who sheds dyspepsia and all other student ills as the duck's oily back sheds the rain of heaven. Or, if you like the figure better, I would have him a fine specimen of youthful purity and vigor, physically fit to become the life-long mate of the fairest, highest-bred woman in the land.

And now we approach a higher plane in the ideal college life: higher, as mind is higher than matter, brain superior to brawn. Here we need to think more closely; here we need yet more ideal views. In our land, with regret, aye even shame, be it said, there is much that is erroneous, utterly reprehensible, in the prevailing views of education. Even the so-called "higher education" is dragged down into the self-same mire. Need I tell you what I mean? We are living in the deadly atmosphere of Utilitarianism, intellectually breathing the poisonous miasma at every inhalation; the symptoms are all about us; they confront us in the men and women we meet every day—chronic cases, incurable patients, for the most part. If we but keep our faculties alert, exercise our intellectual senses, so to speak, we shall detect the poison in every whiff; we shall recognize the symptoms in every passer-by, and what is more to the point, we may count ourselves of all men most fortunate if we keep our own minds free from the contagion and our beautiful ideals intact and unshaken.

It is the modern utilitarian view of education that is blighting

our intellectual life and is keeping us groping along the lower levels. And at this point I do not wish to be misunderstood or to have my words misconstrued. I am not slurring or depreciating normal schools, business colleges and institutions of that class. In this busy, practical age they have their legitimate place. An institution which, like the Eastman Business College, for example, frankly advertises in its circulars: "Young men educated for profit," and which fits them directly and exclusively for business service, for usefulness in the commercial walks of life, such an institution, I say, is doing its chosen work, and doing it with all possible accuracy and despatch. It has its place and deserves its due meed of praise. Having said that of it, however, I have said enough. On the other hand, had I the eloquence of a Cicero or a Demosthenes, I should not cease reiterating, until I should have instilled into American minds and implanted in American hearts the essential, irreconcilable difference between such special training (for that is all it is) and education, in its deepest, broadest, highest sense—true education. What that is, what it involves, college men, if any class, should learn and appreciate; and having once learned, having once appropriated the glorious truth, should go forth into active life resolved each one to be a little, consecrated wafer of leaven in the great, sad, heavy lump of modern utilitarianism.

What education is, the higher education, you can feel and understand for yourselves, if you but will, far better than words can describe. Matthew Arnold's familiar phrase comes nearer it than anything I can now recall. It is "to try to know the best that is known and thought in the world, irrespectively of practice, politics, and everything of the kind; and to value knowledge and thought as they approach this best, without the intrusion of any other consideration whatever." It is that indefinable something ("culture" we call it in its manifestation) which lifts a man to a higher plane than his fellows occupy; transfigures him, as it were; opens up to him a new world, a world of ideas, it is true, and yet a very real world to him, a world which he would not exchange for all the gold buried in this poor old earth of ours, for

all the earthly pleasures, titles, honors, associations, which uneducated men hold dear. It is a something that enters his very being, a something that he lives, a something that transforms his character, modifies all his standards, and fills him with chagrin and an unspeakable abhorrence when he sees its fair flowers exposed in the market-place to be bid and chaffered for as material, every-day commodities. When Agassiz, the high-souled disciple of science, was approached by a committee of educators who sought, by promise of fabulous reward, to tempt him to their service, his immortal reply was: "Gentlemen, I have no time to make money." Could the grand, underlying principle of his ideal life—for it was ideal, though devoted to pure science—have been expressed in fitter words?

True education is non-professional in its aim. It is the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, for the very love of it, for what it is to the student. What it may fit him for or bring him in is a secondary matter. And here I think it fitting to quote some noble sentiments most happily expressed by President J. G. Schurman, of Cornell University, in a paper read before the Second Annual Convention of the Collegiate Association of the Middle States and Maryland, held at Princeton College in November, 1890. He says, and his words have no uncertain sound: "I venture to assert that the only vindication of the outlay of energy, time, and money devoted to college education is that knowledge is a good in itself. The attempt to justify it as useful for some ulterior end, as, for example, success in life, is not less preposterous than the defence of righteousness on the ground that it has the promise of the life to come. * * * We only degrade it when, to stem that materialization of modern life which measures all worth in terms of money, we attempt to recommend it on other grounds than its own inherent excellence and adaptation to the noblest longings of the soul. * * * The educated man, as compared with the uneducated, sees more, feels more, wants more, is interested in a vastly greater variety of objects, and, in short, leads a larger, fuller, and richer life. He is touched by emotions, haunted by thoughts, and moved by ideals which are incommunicable to minds that have

not been nourished at the breasts of human science and culture. The masses of men live on stimuli that come from the here and the now. But education multiplies objects of interest throughout the limitless expanse of space and the ever-enduring course of time. It has been said that the object of education is to train men to think. It were truer to say it gives them something to think about. It is not in the activity of thinking (which seems to be evoked by all sorts of occasions), but by the abundance and excellence of material upon which thought operates, that the man of liberal education is the superior of his fellow-thinkers."

These bold, inspiring words open up to your view the "Elysian Fields" of culture; and in proportion as you enter those fields with eagerness and joy, there to browse on the fabled heartsease, glistening with the dews of Hymettus, will your college life be ideal intellectually. The true conception of education and the well-defined taste for what is highest and best are the "open sesame" to the treasures of the intellectual life. Endowed with these, every book you read, every observation you make, every association you form, will be but a part of your education. You will be, each one of you, the personification of the poet's ideal scholar, who "finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks, sermons in stones, and good in everything," and will not, shut in by a narrow horizon, seek, like a certain wise, bookish precisian, of whom Emerson tells us, to emend the master's text to read: "Sermons in books, and stones in the running brooks."

In this work of cultivation, remember, we dare not stop short with books. If we do we shall have come but a little way. We shall have learned but a small part of the lesson it is meant we should learn. It was Goethe who said:

"Einen Blick ins Buch hinein und zwei ins Leben,
Das muss die rechte Form dem Geiste geben."

Letters are all very well up to a certain point; but Life is a far greater schoolmaster. Letters, in short, are built upon life. Without it they could not exist. They are but the reflection of it—the reproduction, inadequate and impartial at best, of just so

much of life as the mind of man is capable of reproducing. Life is the great original source whence all that is written is drawn. Books are only secondary sources which combine and arrange for us the results arrived at by original investigators. We use them because our own individual experience cannot be universal.

If there be any great poet or thinker in modern ages who exemplifies this principle it is Shakspeare, "the myriad-minded." Let me quote from the first of Professor Ten Brink's five published lectures on Shakspeare, entitled "The Poet and the Man." He says: "His powers of observation and combination were, no doubt, turned by Shakspeare at an early age upon his own proper domain, the study of man. The little world which surrounded him, and the world within his own breast, offered him perfectly ample material for this study, and as his needs grew greater, so also did the circle of his experiences widen. He lived in a little town where rural work was combined with town occupations. His father was a farmer and merchant. Already in early youth he was brought into close contact with various forms of human activity. He accustomed himself to observe them all, to inquire into the aims, the methods, the implements of each. And this habit he retained in later life. Thus it is that he knows the technical name of every object in every field of activity, that he can represent with such exactness every detail of work, complicated though it may be, in any trade. Hence the traditions or the hypotheses according to which Shakspeare is now a butcher, now a wool merchant, or, again, a typesetter, a physician, or a soldier."

It is Shakspeare who teaches us that "all the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players, who have their exits and their entrances." With him we watch them "play their many parts." The action lasts a life-time, the scene is ever shifting, and, if we have his eye, the interest never flags. The men and women about you, your college mates, your own manifold nature within you—these are the things that literature and, above all, Shakspeare, incites you to study. Begin now; cultivate the habit of observation; learn the lesson well, and, if spared, the chances are you will some day be wise old men.

Then there is the world of Nature, to which I can only allude in passing. The poets have sung her charms so unremittingly, her lore they have interpreted so eloquently, that it would ill become me even to attempt to win for her new devotees by any feeble praises I might sing.

Let me only remind you that you must enter her service young would you ever know her well. Her secrets, I am convinced, she reveals to those only whom she counts her children. But to those children she is a very good mother. She teaches them many things which the uninitiated never dream of knowing. She is shy of tardy wooers, cold to half-hearted lovers; but if you learn to know her young, and are faithful in your allegiance, you may be sure she never will betray you. For has not Wordsworth—perhaps the greatest Nature poet of all time, and the truest interpreter she has ever had—has he not told us so in these undying words?

* * * * "Nature never did betray
The heart that loved her; 'tis her privilege,
Through all the years of this our life, to lead
From joy to joy; for she can so inform
The mind that is within us, so impress
With quietness and beauty, and so feed
With lofty thoughts, that neither evil tongues,
Rash judgments, nor the sneers of selfish men,
Nor greetings where no kindness is, nor all
The dreary intercourse of daily life,
Shall e'er prevail against us, or disturb
Our cheerful faith, that all which we behold
Is full of blessings. Therefore, let the moon
Shine on thee in thy solitary walk;
And let the misty mountain winds be free
To blow against thee; and, in after years,
When these wild ecstasies shall be matured
Into a sober pleasure, when thy mind
Shall be a mansion for all lovely forms,
Thy memory be as a dwelling place
For all sweet sounds and harmonies; oh! then,
If solitude, or fear, or pain, or grief,
Should be thy portion, with what healing thoughts
Of tender joy wilt thou remember me,
And these my exhortations!"

In this beautiful county of Lancaster, with its majestic Susquehanna, its meandering Conestoga, its wooded hills and park-like vales, there certainly can be no excuse for neglecting Mother Nature. She allures you in most engaging fashion; she makes the lesson so easy for you that none but the most indifferent, the hopelessly apathetic, or the downright lazy, can hold out against her blandishments. I hope to hear of not only one but several walking clubs during the mellow autumn days that are so soon to come.

Again, the social side of your nature needs cultivation, no less than the intellectual and the physical. To that end you need associates; and it is right here in college, as you doubtless know, that you will be apt to form (if you are newcomers), that you have already formed, or are forming now (if some little way on in the course), friendships that will endure through life. "There is no friend like an old friend," the song has it, and, as between man and man, you will find that true, I think. The friends you may make later on can never be to you quite the same as the friends you made in college. You will be sure to feel this when you come back in after years to your class and fraternity reunions. It becomes, therefore, a matter of no little moment that you should at the outset find associates and friends, and then that they should be such as shall satisfy you; such as shall be congenial; such as shall meet the requirements of your nature. Friendships, to be satisfying and lasting, must, of course, be fully mutual. With care and discrimination make to yourselves such friends, and your college life shall be to you a time of social quickening, a period that shall call forth all that is generous, unselfish and companionable—*gemüthlich*, as the Germans say—in your nature.

But we have not done. There is another and the highest stage to reach; the summit is yet unattained. And here we touch the real man, the *ego*—real because imperishable. Man's true elevation does not come through his body, nor through his intellect, nor through his sensibilities, as such; but through his moral nature. This brings him into contact with the Divine Ideal. If

this attribute of his being be dwarfed, while the others grow, what boots it all? We shall have a gnarled, misshapen, imperfect creature, a monstrosity, not a man. If that which is Divine in him be dormant, wherein does he differ (in essence) from the other animals? No. The ideal man is developed as to his spirit no less fully than as to his mind and his body.

Here we are in a different realm. Science cannot lead the way. The learning of the schools is mute. Even reason, though God-given, when left to its own resources, is at fault. We may imagine we have found the *summum bonum* in the intellectual life. We may surround ourselves with all the adornments of culture and refinement, with all the niceties which minister to man's higher nature and appeal to his finer sensibilities; we may succeed in eliminating well-nigh all that is animal and earthy in our constitution; and in this rare and artificial atmosphere we may persuade the poor, starved, emaciated soul into believing that we have solved the problem for it, that it is being fed upon "the bread of life," that the spiritual realities are its own for time and for eternity. In the rapt utterances of the poet, in the keen sensitiveness to and appreciation of beauty found in the lover of Nature and of Art, we may recognize a nearer approach to this true spiritual insight. And yet, a man may see

"The gold that with the sunlight lies
In bursting heaps at dawn,
The silver spilling from the skies
At night, to walk upon,
The diamonds gleaming with the dew."

His soul may be stirred to its profoundest depths in the presence of a noble painting or a stately edifice; it may tingle with delight in the appreciation of a rounded period, an eloquent sentiment, or an uplifting poem; it may thrill with ecstasy at the rhythmic flow of a heavenly sonata; and yet be deaf to the "still small voice" of God.

This is no creed of man's compounding, I would have you understand. It is an eternal truth, revealed by God, who is a Spirit, to the responsive spirit in man—that part of him which

is like God, and which alone can receive and appropriate Divine truth. The spirit, quickened and kept alive by exercise, hears messages and receives impressions, as real to it as, yea more real than, the testimony of the senses.

"The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting, and cometh from afar.

* * * * *

Hence in a season of calm weather,
Though inland far we be,
Our souls have sight of that immortal sea
Which brought us hither,
Can in a moment travel thither,
And see the children sport upon the shore,
And hear the mighty waters rolling evermore."

There must be, you observe, an occasional "season of calm weather." Do you know what that means in this busy, bustling, pleasure-seeking world? There must be times when you withdraw yourself from the fast-rushing tide of human life and human affairs; when you exclude everything and everybody, even your dearest, closest friend; wrapped in a solitude so complete that the released soul seems to hover on the borderland of spirits, about to launch forth again upon that "immortal sea" which brought it hither. In such moments as these, awful yet ecstatic in the extreme, you gain more true knowledge—wisdom, I should say—than all the books and schools in creation can teach you in a life-time. For it is then you learn what there is within you, whence you have come, whither you are going, and what you are meant to be. It is in such moments as these that you laugh at the modern materialistic psychologists who dissect, and weigh, and biologize, and theorize, and deduce, until their poor brains reel, in the vain effort to solve the mystery of man's being and demonstrate that there is no such thing as soul in him, because it cannot be cut out of his brain cavity or extricated from his great nerve-center and placed in alcohol for the delectation of the gaping crowd.

But you ask me, "How are you going to prove that there is such a soul, such a power, element, attribute, or whatever you choose to call it, in man's being?" Do not for a moment sup-

pose I am going to make the attempt. I cannot do it any more than the scientists can. I know only too well that each individual man must make the discovery for himself, or live out this little span of life in ignorance. All I can do, or all you can do, is to give the soul a chance to verify itself; to unbar now and then the shutters of worldliness; to release the long-imprisoned spirit, that it may soar aloft and abroad, wheresoever it will. Be assured the olive branches of revelation will be brought in fast enough.

But what has this to do with "The Place of the Ideal in College Life?" A great deal; because it is the highest of all ideals. The ideal that unchains the human soul, and gives it spiritual air and spiritual food, is the character-building ideal; and character, you know, is the man. It is higher than intellect, immeasurably above physical culture. It is the life of the man, the ideals of his prophetic moments transformed into daily thoughts, words and deeds. It is the influence that evokes

"That best portion of a good man's life,
His little, nameless, unremembered acts
Of kindness and of love."

It is the inherent principle which distinguishes him from the mass of his fellows who are swayed by every passing whim, be it for good or evil, susceptible to every influence, creatures of impulse, the "unstable as water" type of men. But what a grand thing is character! The noblest creation on God's earth, it seems to me, is a man of character. Humanly speaking, he is the greatest power for good in the economy of Nature; his influence is unlimited; the possibilities of his being are beyond compute. How is he formed and fashioned? As I have intimated before, by the ideals which he allows his untrammelled soul to choose, and to which, being chosen, his will holds him fast from day to day. Of such stuff the ideal man is made. He is a harmoniously cultivated man; cultivated as to his intellect, his sensibilities and his will; but above all, it seems to me, as to his *will*.

If a man is to have a character (and who would be without one, after he has come to recognize the nobility of it in another?)

he must begin to build it young. It is not a commodity to be acquired in a day, or a week, or a month, or a year. If a college boy would have it when a man, he must have the groundwork for it well laid before he leaves his *Alma Mater*. It is not a detachable something, like a garment, which can be put off and laid away until convenience or necessity require it to be brought out again. Tell me not that there is no chance for its development, no possibility of its exercise, here in college; that one must "do as the boys do," or be isolated and unpopular. There never was a greater fallacy, a more cowardly subterfuge. It is right and proper, and necessary to a distinctive college life and college spirit that you should do as the boys do in all matters where conscience suffers no violence. But to disregard that silent monitor; to set principle aside merely from fear of being thought odd or incurring displeasure, is one of the most unjust, most cowardly, and, at the same time, most unwise things a boy can do. That it is unjust to one's self and cowardly in the extreme, you will readily concede. That it is also unwise, experience and observation will amply prove. Principle, backed by character, is a manly quality, and manliness wins respect wherever found—preëminently in a community of college boys. Even though it run its invincible front against custom, tradition, and prejudice, it will yet win the respect due its quality.

We have found then, if our premises and conclusions be correct, that the ideal college life is within the reach of every individual student, if he only keep it persistently before him, day by day, in its three-fold yet single form; and have the will to live up to the ideal, so far as human capabilities will permit. To recapitulate; what, in few words, is the ideal college life?

It is not that life which keeps a young man poring slavishly over books, to the utter disregard of recreation, health and social pleasure. For then he reverts to the bookworm type, and the bookworm is a man shrunk back into the chrysalis. It is not that life which binds a young man to classroom tasks and conforms him to classroom standards, only that he may lead his fellows in term marks and finish with an honor. For that

makes of him a machine ; and a machine, you know, is some points below a bookworm. Nor yet, again, is it that life whose incentive is the bread-winning power ; a shrewd investment, which will in time bring him in his living and help him feed his wife and babes. That makes of him a speculator, a broker in educational values ; and such broking, above all other forms of the trade, is illegitimate. Nor, finally, is it that life which leads a young man to cherish the notion that Commencement Day ends all, and that he shall then go forth a full-fledged scholar, a doughty knight armed *cap-a-pie* for life's tournament. Knights of this sort are usually unseated in the first encounter, and are dragged back to cover by kind friends, with their smart plumes trailing in the dust. Of all fond dreams, this is surest to meet with speedy disenchantment.

College life is a success exactly in inverse ratio to the student's cherished belief that it is the mastery of all human knowledge. A brief experience in the world, a few tilts with some of our self-educated men who have never rubbed their backs against a college wall, effectually opens one's eyes to this truth. Happy that student, young or old, primary or advanced, who makes the discovery while yet in college. The remainder of his course may be of some account to him.

No ; college life is only the outer court of the temple of Knowledge, where, among the quiet cloisters, novitiates linger until discipline has proved them. Now and then they catch a glimpse behind the veil ; but it is only a casual glimpse, a fleeting suggestion. If worthy, if those glimpses awaken in them a longing for the mysteries beyond, then may they, after patient waiting, be consecrated to the service, become ordained priests ; and by a life within the shining courts, a life devoted to the joyous duties, the irksome tasks, that rise from day to day, approach ever nearer to the great ideal — live, as nearly as man may, the ideal life.

IX.

THE REFORMED QUARTERLY REVIEW.

With the present issue of this REVIEW two of the editors retire from the editorship. Dr. Titzel retires because he finds it necessary to be relieved from all extra tax upon his physical strength. The senior editor, the writer of this, finds the present a proper occasion for him to retire also, after a service of some *thirty years* as editor. He feels also the need of being relieved from any extra tax upon his physical energies, and he feels also, that the long time he has served as editor, a large portion of it alone, is sufficient reason for his retirement. In addition it may be said that the changes taking place in the management of the publication house render it a fit time to advance the interests of the REVIEW by giving it a new impulse. The writer considers it a proper time to start a *new series* of the REVIEW.

This remark suggests to us some further thoughts in reference to the past history of the REVIEW and its prospects for the future.

In its earlier history, or what may be called its *first series*, as the *Mercersburg Review*, it was intimately connected with the institutions at Mercersburg, and served as an organ of the movement in theology that in those times was claiming the attention of the Reformed Church. Its pages contain the best history of the theological attitude of the Church in that period, in its struggle to determine and settle its own consciousness of its peculiar life and its relations to other Churches. Those who lived through that period will readily recall the peculiar interest that then attached to the pages of the REVIEW, both on account of the importance of the questions it discussed, and the commanding ability of its articles. It was a period of discussion and controversy, which accounts, in part, for the intense interest taken in its pages by its writers and readers.

When this controversy came to a close a change necessarily took place in the general tone of the REVIEW. With the change

of its title to THE REFORMED QUARTERLY REVIEW it was felt that one part of its mission, as this appeared during the controversial period, had come to an end. Although it lost nothing of its interest in the peculiar views that characterize the life and genius of the Reformed Church, yet when the peace measure was adopted it was thought proper to avoid in its pages whatever might seem to stir up controversy. In the nature of the case there was more or less sensitiveness in regard to the manner in which theological questions were discussed, and this, unquestionably, exerted a restraint, more or less, upon the contributors to its pages.

We think there is less of that feeling of restraint now. Sufficient time has elapsed to allay in large measure the feeling generated by the controversies. The same subjects may be discussed in a positive way, yet without partisan controversy. The peace spirit is so deeply settled in the Church that there is little danger of stirring up the old strife. This is becoming more and more apparent in the meetings of our General Synod, especially, it was remarked, in the spirit and tone of the last meeting at Dayton.

From these and other similar considerations we conclude that the present is a favorable opportunity to give the REVIEW a new impulse in starting a *New Series*. This conclusion implies that we have no thought that the Board will allow the REVIEW to be discontinued. Such discontinuance we would regard as entirely unwise, almost, indeed, a calamity. We have said that much of the most important and interesting history of the Church is contained in the pages of the REVIEW. The conditions of theological inquiry in the present day in the Church at large call for discussion equally now as then. Nay, these questions are arising with new and increased interest. They appear throughout the whole religious world. The wonderful advance in science in its various departments brings forward new questions of controversy between belief and unbelief. To discontinue the only organ of the kind the Church now has would imply a lack of interest in the most momentous questions of the age.

Although not the most important, yet we notice as one worthy of remark the fact that the REVIEW gives permanence in its pages to addresses and papers that form a part of the current history of the Church and its institutions. If we wish to refer to these we naturally turn to the REVIEW, where they are mostly preserved.

But now we turn to the principal question on which the continuance of the REVIEW seems to turn, viz., the financial question. It is not a secret that the REVIEW has scarcely, if at all, been fully paying expenses.

We may remark here that it is no new thing for a quarterly review to be hampered for want of pecuniary support. We know of one instance, and there have, no doubt, been other instances, in which the quarterly of a much stronger Church than our own was compelled to discontinue for want of such support. In the nature of the case, in ordinary times, there are comparatively few who subscribe for such a publication, few as compared, for instance, with the number that subscribe for a weekly periodical. But the importance of such a periodical as a quarterly review, and the good it accomplishes, are not to be measured by the number of subscribers it obtains. It is of interest mainly to the clergy and a limited number of laymen. Yet its influence may indirectly reach out to many more than its subscribers.

Our own REVIEW has no reason to be discouraged by its pecuniary support. There is reason to believe that if a little more personal effort had been made, and the prompt collection of outstanding dues had been attended to, it would have been self-supporting. It is said by some who have made somewhat of an investigation of its affairs that even with its present subscription list it would pay expenses if its publication were economically managed. This difficulty then resolves itself simply into the work of obtaining a few more subscribers. Surely these can be obtained if any reasonable effort is made. If each pastor would subscribe, or, which might be better, if each consistory would subscribe for him, the work would be more than done. How little it would be if each congregation, through its consistory, would

take the REVIEW and hand it over to its pastor. Besides, there are a few laymen in almost every charge who would be able and willing to take a copy of the REVIEW, not only for his own personal interest in its pages, but in order to support an important periodical in the Church.

As an inducement to increase its subscription list, we may refer to another consideration, which may weigh with many, viz., the prospect that the interest of its articles may be increased under new management in a *new series*. We have referred to some of the embarrassments that have affected the REVIEW for a time. Writers have been slow to write lest they might, in some way, interfere with the Peace Basis. We believe that condition of things has largely passed away. We do not think any amount of freedom in discussing theological questions would now interfere with the peaceful state of the Church. Old party lines have been largely obliterated. The harmony existing in all the practical interests and affairs of the Church would not be affected by any reasonable freedom in the discussion of theological questions.

Instead of this, we believe that interest in the theological questions of the age serves to add to the interest in practical matters. The two are closely allied. The more interest that is taken in the questions that pertain to the life and genius of the Church, the more interest will be felt in the practical work of the Church. We might give instances of this. The discussion of the catechism, its history and genius, and the catechetical system, as contrasted with the emotional and revival system, accomplished much good in a practical way, in leading our pastors to value and practice catechizing in their congregations. We might give other examples. The theoretical is always closely allied to the practical. The theological interest, notwithstanding much that is said to the contrary, is closely allied to the practical work of the Church. The interest in missions will be found to be gauged by the views held in regard to man's fallen estate and the nature of the work required to redeem him. Once let a view very prevalent in our age prevail, that all religions are equally good for the peoples, or nations, that hold such religions; that Christianity is

only one, it may be the best, among world-religions—let such views prevail, and the very sinews of the foreign work are at once cut and destroyed. How many are there even to-day who think that Buddhism is good enough for the nations, China and Japan, that hold it, and therefore there is no call for Christian missions among them. We might give other examples. Every theological dogma has a practical interest corresponding to it. Of course our theological seminaries are expected to ground their students in theology, but there is need of study and research on the part of those who have gone out into the pastoral work for still further study, and such a periodical as the REVIEW may be an important inspiration and help. Who can estimate the influence in this way, of the early copies of the REVIEW! Even now they are referred to and studied by later generations of ministers.

True there were giants then engaged in its pages; but there is no reason why its influence should not be felt in this day. We have writers who are able to supply its pages with interesting articles. The question is how to call them out.

Our own opinion is, without intending at all to dictate to any one, that the REVIEW would prosper better by having *one single editor*, and then by securing for him a syndicate of writers, say ten or twelve, who would engage to assist him by furnishing articles. This would not be designed at all to exclude other writers, but merely as an ensurance of so much support regularly. The Editor-in-Chief might then lay out his plan and policy, and suggest at times, topics or subjects he might wish to have treated.

There are subjects calling for consideration and discussion in this age. We believe that our theology and philosophy may be effectively applied in their treatment. Why then should we not add our mite to the general discussions of the age? How often we hear the remark, "our system of thought would tend to bring into clearer light such and such questions in theology and sociology." Well, let us bring our system forward. We have a system. No one has gone earnestly through our institutions, literary and theological, without feeling that we have a unique system of thought. Let us not be over-modest. Let us use the

philosophy of Rauch, Nevin, Schaff, Harbaugh and Higbee, not to mention living teachers, and apply it in discussing the live questions of the day. As a Reformed Church, the only one except the Reformed Church of America, in this country, our title is older than the Presbyterian and some other Protestant Churches. Why then, though comparatively small in numbers, should we not assist among the Protestant Churches of this country?

One of the organs, the main one, indeed, for doing so, is our *QUARTERLY REVIEW*. Let us gird up our loins and resolve to maintain this historic periodical, trying to make its later days reflect the glory of the earlier.

Upon the death of Dr. Harbaugh, about thirty years ago, by appointment we took charge of the *REVIEW*. For a short time we had Dr. Higbee associated with us. For fourteen years Dr. Titzel has been associate editor, and for the last few years Dr. Rupp has also been an associate editor by appointment of the Alumni Association.

Our resignation has not been suggested by any difficulty in maintaining the *REVIEW*. Our belief in the ability to sustain it must appear from the preceding remarks. But we feel that we have rendered our full quota of service in the thirty years we have been editor of the *REVIEW*. We feel loth to leave the relation in which we have stood for so many years to the readers of the *REVIEW* and to its coeditors. But we have faith in young blood, as well as in the judgment of old age, and we have felt that some new energy brought to bear in the editing of the *REVIEW* might prove to its benefit and advantage.

As we write these lines our introductory of thirty years ago comes up before us. Dr. Harbaugh had been its editor, and promised much for the years to come. Suddenly his life was cut off, and his editorial mantel fell upon us. We tried to do what we could, in our inexperience, for the maintenance of the *REVIEW*. It was a difficult position for us to fill, but with the help we received it continued to prosper, and as it now passes into other hands we trust it may continue to prosper in the time to come,

even more than in the past. It shall be our own pleasure to render all the aid to it we can. Let its friends rally around it and there will be no difficulty in maintaining it. There is a committee now, appointed by the Alumni, to look after its condition, with Dr. Santee as chairman, and from what we have heard from him there will be no great difficulty in providing for its future wants. With such worthy and renowned ancestors in the REVIEW, it would be unworthy their memory to allow it to be discontinued now. We hope, therefore, that the Board will resolve to continue its publication, and make such appointments as may subserve this end.

T. G. APPLE.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THE CHRIST OF TO-DAY: By George A. Gordon, Minister of the Old South Church, Boston. Houghton, Mifflin & Company, Boston and New York, Publishers. 1896. Pages 322. Price, \$1.50.

This book was written for theological thinkers among ministers and laymen. It is dedicated "To the students in our theological seminaries, to those entering the Christian ministry, and to the new generation of Christian laymen, whose unspeakable privilege it will be to recover, both for the reason and the heart, the old and almighty faith in the infinite Christ." The book, in fact, is a plea for a theology that shall be adequate to the idea of the infinite and eternal Christ on the one hand, and to the religious and moral ideas of the present age on the other. No age, not even the apostolic, has ever apprehended the fullness of the revelation of Christ. Out of the treasures of wisdom and knowledge which are hid in His person, Christ, who is ever living and present with the Church to the end of time, has something new to communicate to every age, and every new age therefore must have a new theology. "The philosophy of Christianity," says Dr. Gordon, p. 182, "born amid the wreck of the Roman Empire, renewed in the grand contest with the corrupt Church of the Middle Ages, and that seemed adequate to the narrow world of the Puritan, is to-day totally inadequate in view of the magnitude of the Christian task. The sense of history and the conviction that Christianity has a cosmopolitan mission are bound to work out a new theology, in which the new shall be that which was true from the beginning."

The principle of this new theology, according to our author, must be the person and consciousness of Christ. There was a deep truth in the saying of Protagoras that "Man is the measure of all things." But, of course, this can not be true of the individual man; it can be true only of the perfect and universal man, who is "the Eternal Humanity in the life of the Infinite," p. 136. We are glad to find thus distinctively recognized the Christological principle as the central principle of theology. This principle may at times have been applied in a way that was crude and fantastic, as if the idea of the person of Christ could serve as a logical concept from which a system of theology might be derived by a simple dialectical process. But in the sense that the truth revealed in the person and consciousness of Christ must be the light by which all true thinking concerning God and divine things must be illuminated, in this sense the Christological principle is the true principle of theology, and no

theology can be Christian that violates this principle. It is in this sense, as we understand him, that Dr. Gordon maintains the validity of the Christological principle.

In regard to the motive of the book under consideration, and in regard to the class of readers for which it is intended, we can do no better than let the author speak for himself. In regard to the first point he says, p. 34: "We find ourselves in the heart of a Christian inheritance of overwhelming wealth. It is the task of this, as of every generation, to ascertain its value and to use its full dynamic resources. To understand the old in the light of the new is the most difficult, and at the same time the most urgent of undertakings. In particular, the highest conception at which humanity has arrived is the conception of Christ; the conception of God follows that and is conditioned by it. We can never transcend it any more than we can go beyond the order of the world. We can only enter into a generous rivalry in the endeavor to fathom its infinite significance for mankind. This the author has tried to do, in such form as the limits of the discussion imposed." In regard to the class of readers for whom the book was written, the author tells us that it is meant "for all those who feel the greatness of the common Christian inheritance, and who at the same time are at a loss to understand its meaning for the generation to which they belong. There are thousands in our midst who long to hear the wonderful works of God in their own tongue. Into the dialect of present thought the meaning of the Divine Wonder must be put. The understanding, burdened with the sense of the infiniteness of the Christian message, must coöperate with the living spirit. For the most part; then, the persons addressed in this discussion are those who have not broken with historic Christianity, who stand in the consciousness of its grandeur and finality, but who desire a better understanding of that which holds them with a grasp so beneficent."

The perusal of this book will be stimulating and helpful especially to the preacher, whose business it is to speak of the wonderful works of God to men now in *their own tongues*—to interpret the truth of Christianity in the dialect of present thought. We, therefore, commend it to our readers. W. R.

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NICENE THEOLOGY: With some Reference to the Ritschlian View of Theology and History of Doctrine. Lectures delivered on the L. P. Stone Foundation at Princeton Theological Seminary, in January, 1896. By Hugh M. Scott, D. D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Chicago Theological Seminary. Chicago, Chicago Theological Seminary Press, 81 Ashland Boulevard. 1896. Price, \$1.50.

These lectures, which are six in number, "present the origin and development of the Logos Christology, with frequent reference to negative criticism—chief of all that of the school of

Ritschl." For preparing such a course of lectures, Dr. Scott's studies and extensive learning eminently fitted him. The volume before us is consequently a very able and scholarly presentation of the subject to which it relates. It is, moreover, also very timely, as the tendency of much of the theology of the present is of such a character as to persuade students that the articles of the Christian faith rest upon a very unsubstantial foundation. Dr. Scott, however, shows successfully, we think, that the Nicene theology which is contained in the articles of the Christian faith is a normal development of apostolic and New Testament teaching. The special subjects of the different lectures are, respectively, Critical and Biblical Prolegomena to the Development of the Nicene Theology of the Divine Christ, Laying the Foundations of the Nicene Theology, Development of the Doctrine of the Divine Christ upon the Ground of the Christian Tradition, Imperfect Apprehension of the Divine Christ in His Work of Salvation, the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit and the Trinity as Necessarily Involved in that of God and the Divine Christ, and the Doctrine of the Divine Christ in its Relation to the Rule of Faith and to Dogma. Besides the lectures, the volume also contains a large number of footnotes, which add very much to its value. It is a merit of the work that nearly all quotations from the sources and from German works are translated into English, and consequently can be more readily understood. Though we are not able on all points to agree with the author of these lectures, yet in the main we believe him to be thoroughly correct in his views, and we therefore heartily commend his book to all who are interested in the subject of which it treats, and especially to those preparing for the ministry.

IN HIS FOOTSTEPS: A Record of Travel to and in the Land of Christ, with an Attempt to Mark the Lord's Journeyings in Chronological Order from His Birth to His Ascension. By William E. McLennan. New York, Eaton & Mains. Cincinnati, Curte & Jennings. 1896. Price, 50 cents net.

The character of this little book is well set forth in the subtitle. It is a record of travels in the Holy Land. Its purpose is so to present the life of Christ as to make it interesting to young persons, and to impress its leading facts upon their minds in a clear and definite manner. For the purpose intended it is a most admirable work. All classes of persons will, indeed, find it replete with instruction. Besides the letter-press it contains several good maps and many striking illustrations, which add to its value. It is in every way well suited for use in the Sunday-school, and it would be well if Sunday-schools generally would make use of it in the instruction of their pupils.

STUDIES IN THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. By B. B. Loomis, Ph. D., D. D. New York, Eaton & Mains. Cincinnati, Curts & Jennings. 1896. Price, in paper, 25 cents net; in cloth, 40 cents net.

The systematic study of the Bible is very important if we would rightly understand its precious truths. To indiscriminate reading of it are unquestionably due many of the errors into which men have fallen concerning its teachings. The increasing tendency to make it a systematic study is therefore greatly to be commended. To be a guide and aid to the student in such study of "The Acts of the Apostles" is the design of the present volume. It consists of a course of twelve studies, in which the entire book of Acts is considered. The first study is devoted to an analysis of the book, the second to the introduction, the third and fourth to the Pentecostal Church, the fifth to the Transitional Church, and the remaining seven to the establishing of the Gentile Church. The work is admirably suited to the purpose for which it is intended, and those who will use it as a guide and aid will find it very helpful. Like the preceding volume, it is well fitted for use in the Sunday-school. It has been especially prepared as a companion volume to Dr. J. L. Hurlbut's *Studies in the Four Gospels*.

SUNSET MEMORIES. By Rev. Nicholas Vansant, of the Newark Annual Conference, Author of "The Life and Character of Rev. H. Mattison, D. D.," "Rachel Weeping for her Children," "Entire Holiness," etc. With an Introduction by General James F. Rusling. New York, Eaton & Mains. Cincinnati, Curts & Jennings. 1896. Price, \$1.00.

This book is both biographical and historical. In it the author gives an interesting account of his family and personal life and ministry, together with chronological glimpses of his pastoral charges and work, and memories of the New Jersey and Newark Conferences of the Methodist Episcopal Church. In his introduction, General James F. Rusling says: "It is a brief history of a New Jersey family of sterling life and character that began life down in the Jersey 'Pines' a century or so ago, and now consists of over two hundred descendants, not one of whom has become a pauper or a criminal, or a drunkard even, but all of whom have added to the honor, the prosperity and the wealth of the State, and bid fair to do so yet for long years to come." The work, we would yet add, is written in an attractive style, and will be found pleasant and entertaining reading not only by the friends of the author, but by others also.

